In 1999, the coalition between the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Komeito began as a marriage of convenience. However, the two parties subsequently weathered both good times and difficult periods – such as when they were ousted from power in 2008. The LDP and Komeito were thought to have developed a bond that transcended political differences, even though their relationship remained rooted in mutual political interests. Nobody foresaw the collapse of a marriage that had lasted for 26 years – but that’s exactly what happened when Komeito pulled out of the coalition on October 10.
The domestic political consequences of the breakup are obvious. As a result of the end of the LDP-Komeito partnership, which in effect was a well-oiled electoral machine, it is widely estimated both parties are likely to lose a significant number of their seats if their long-established cooperation at the local level ceases to exist. At maximum, the LDP could lose more than 50 seats.
On the other hand, the end of the LDP-Komeito coalition will likely lead to a significant shift in Japan’s national security policy. By their own admission and that of others, Komeito has positioned itself as a “brake” on the LDP’s more hawkish tendencies. When Abe Shinzo pursued his legacy project of reinterpreting Japan’s right to exercise collective self-defense and codifying it into law, Komeito ensured that the change included major restrictions on where and when the Self-Defense Forces could be dispatched. More recently, when the issue of Japan’s participation in the joint development of next-generation fighters arose, Komeito’s hesitation to be involved in the production of lethal weapons stalled the process.
By contrast, the LDP’s new partner is likely to hit the gas pedal, not the brakes, on a hawkish national security approach.
What had saved Takaichi Sanae’s once fading prospect of becoming the first female prime minister was the help of Nippon Ishin no Kai, an Osaka-based political party that has replaced Komeito as LDP’s new coalition partner. Notably, Nippon Ishin shares far more principles with the LDP in the foreign policy sphere.
In the preamble of the document that stipulated their cooperation on policy matters, the LDP and Nippon Ishin expressed their bleak view that the current international environment is “the most severe and complex international security environment since the end of World War II.” They also matter-of-factly stated that Japan would act as an “autonomous nation” and stressed their resolve to “support strategic stability in the Far East and contribute to global security” with a reminder that the Japan-U.S. alliance was a “cornerstone” for such endeavor. They even agreed that Japan should take a leading role in that effort with a “worldview of international politics and security grounded in realism.”
The focus on the substance of both foreign and national security policy foretells the more assertive direction the new coalition prefers to pursue. Notable details include the revision of Japan’s three key strategic documents – hailed as a significant step forward at the time of their adoption in December 2022 – the acquisition and forward deployment of long-range missiles with counterstrike capabilities, and the passage of an anti-spy law. Had Komeito still been part of the coalition, it is likely they would have shown signs of resistance, if not outright refusal, to these policies.
Among Japanese political parties, Nippon Ishin has been one of the strongest advocates of assertive national security policies. The party once campaigned on a promise to introduce “nuclear sharing,” which would allow the stationing of U.S.-made nuclear weapons in a country long known for its aversion to them. More recently, Nippon Ishin proposed an overhaul of Japan’s national security framework, including revising the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty into a truly mutual defense pact, deleting Clause 2 of Article 9 of the pacifist Constitution – which renounces the maintenance of “war potential” – and removing restrictions on the exercise of the right to collective self-defense – an option Komeito has deliberately opposed.
On China, which the defense buildup backed by the new coalition seeks to deter, Nippon Ishin would like the LDP to show more backbone, while Komeito, which has historic ties with China, would want more benevolence. In July’s upper house election, Nippon Ishin successfully ran Seki Hei, a fierce public critic of China and a naturalized citizen of Chinese descent. When he announced his candidacy prior to the election, he stated that “China’s hegemonic ambitions pose a threat to Japan” – a view he said is shared by his party leader, Yoshimura Hirofumi. Seki has been sanctioned by the Chinese government for his purported “inaccurate commentary” on China.
The LDP and Nippon Ishin together do not hold a majority in the Diet. However, there are parties outside the coalition that are just as “realistic” as the LDP and Nippon Ishin, and are willing to support the new coalition in passing legislation in exchange for strengthening national security. For instance, the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) and Sanseito have no objections to Japan enhancing its defense capabilities and are open to cooperating with Takaichi on a case-by-case basis.
Moreover, both the DPFP and Sanseito are pro-Taiwan. DPFP leader Tamaki Yuichiro held a one-on-one meeting with Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te during his visit to Taiwan. Sanseito leader Kamiya Sohei has also stated that Japan and Taiwan form a “community of shared destiny.”
With Komeito absent from the ruling coalition and the Japanese Diet now dominated by a “realist” orientation, the brakes once applied to Japan’s national security and China policies have become virtually unrecognizable. While Komeito has been accused of hindering Japan’s efforts to bolster its preparedness against the Chinese threat, it is equally true that the Buddhist party has played a crucial role as a mediator between Japan and China. Now, as the LDP’s traditional China hands fade from the political scene and uncertainty continues to prevail in the region, Japan is in need of a new actor to take on Komeito’s role as a conciliatory force in China-Japan relations.
It will be tempting for Takaichi, a pro-Taiwan defense hawk, to fully assert herself in pursuit of maximalist national security goals and to chart a bold new course in Japan-Taiwan relations. However, meaningful deterrence also requires effective reassurance. As U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt famously said, a nation’s survival in turbulent times depends not only on carrying a “big stick,” but also on the ability to “speak softly.”