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Why Indonesia Should Not Buy an Aircraft Carrier, At Least For Now

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Asia Defense | Security | Southeast Asia

Why Indonesia Should Not Buy an Aircraft Carrier, At Least For Now

The proposed acquisition of the decommissioned Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi is out of step with the country’s main defense priorities.

Why Indonesia Should Not Buy an Aircraft Carrier, At Least For Now

The Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi anchored in Naples, Italy, Oct. 25, 2024.

Credit: Wikimedia Commons/Benzekre

The Indonesian Navy is now getting closer to acquiring its first aircraft carrier with the purchase of the aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi, which was decommissioned by Italy in 2024. While there has been no official confirmation regarding the timing or value of the acquisition, both the Indonesian government and navy have made clear their willingness to push ahead with the plan With the purchase of the Garibaldi drawing closer, it is worth noting that the decision is inappropriate for Indonesia at the present time, due to its operational effectiveness and sustainability, as well as its impact on the national defense industry.

The plan to purchase this aircraft carrier is being driven by the need to enhance Indonesia’s ability to carry out Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) operations. This is evident from the recent statements of the Chief of Naval Staff, Adm. Muhamad Ali, and the spokesperson for the Ministry of Defense, Brig. Gen. Frega Wenas Inkiriwang. Both highlighted Indonesia’s past difficulties in HADR operations, particularly following the 2004 tsunami in Aceh.

At first glance, Indonesia’s reason for wanting to buy the Garibaldi seems rational. However, the plan also raises doubts about whether purchasing an aircraft carrier is the most appropriate answer to Indonesia’s current needs and conditions. This doubt stems from at least two things.

First, it is true that Indonesia, situated at the convergence of three tectonic plates and the Ring of Fire, is highly susceptible to natural disasters. According to the WorldRiskIndex, Indonesia ranks third highest in the world with regard to risk for natural disasters. The capacity to provide logistical assistance and execute large-scale evacuations is indeed essential. Nonetheless, traditional aircraft carriers such as the Garibaldi are not the most appropriate solution for Indonesia. Despite being technically viable per the documented requirements, the substantial dimensions of the Garibaldi raise questions regarding its operational efficacy in Indonesia’s rather shallow waters and narrow shipping channels.

Second, before realizing the purchase of an aircraft carrier, Indonesia must first consider its operational sustainability. As with any weapons purchase, the life cycle of the Garibaldi must be considered and taken into account. The age of the Garibaldi, which was launched by shipbuilder Fincantieri in 1983 and commissioned in 1985, is a crucial consideration. Although some have argued that the Indonesian Navy successfully operated the Van Speijk frigate, which was first launched in 1967, until today, and still operates the U-209/1300 submarine, which was built in 1981, this does not automatically serve as a justification. The older the age of a weapons system, the higher the potential maintenance costs.

Furthermore, it is necessary to see if domestic shipyards are ready to perform Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) for an aircraft carrier. If MRO cannot be done domestically, the Indonesian Navy will have to seek MRO facilities abroad, which will naturally increase logistical and financial costs. Even if Indonesia then encourages domestic shipyards to prepare MRO facilities for aircraft carriers, this will also require investments that need to be considered.

Besides the issue of maintenance costs and the question of MRO facilities, the operational sustainability of the Indonesian Navy’s aircraft carrier is also related to human resources. An aircraft carrier, being a large vessel, naturally requires a large crew: 550, in the case of the Garibaldi. This number is far greater than the KRI Brawijaya, which is currently Indonesia’s largest surface warship with “only” 160 crew members. This demands that Indonesia make a large investment in human resources for a single aircraft carrier.

The investment Indonesia will have to make in both human resources and the technical facilities supporting the aircraft carrier is certainly not small. The question then is whether the government can ensure that the necessary investments can be realized, given the country’s limited defense budget, and whether this will be sustainable into the future.

One of the means of ensuring this sustainability is integrating the aircraft carrier into Indonesia’s defense and military doctrine. Whether they like it or not, the Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian National Armed Forces must begin to consider moving away from the current doctrine, which, as some experts have argued, is not well-suited to the operation of an aircraft carrier. If the military does not plan to change its doctrine in the future, then the acquisition of an aircraft carrier could potentially be just an impulsive purchase. This is certainly not what the Indonesian people want or need.

Moreover, the purchase of the aircraft carrier Garibaldi also raises concerns and questions in terms of Indonesia’s long-standing vision of defense self-sufficiency. Will this purchase help strengthen the capacity of the domestic defense industry? If it turns out that the purchase contract does not include a meaningful transfer of technology, then the urgency of purchasing an aircraft carrier certainly becomes weaker.

In stark contrast to the notes and questions arising from the aircraft carrier purchase discourse, there is one platform that is actually more promising. The platform is a Landing Platform Dock (LPD) that can be built at domestic shipyards, namely those run by the state-owned shipbuilder PT PAL. The Indonesian Navy itself is currently known to operate at least seven Makassar-class LPDs, with the first unit having been in operation since 2007. Of these seven LPDs, three are used as hospital ships. In addition to having been operated by the Indonesian Navy for a long time, the Makassar-class LPD is also capable of operating effectively in Indonesia’s geographical conditions, as evidenced by its deployment in various regions, including for HADR operations.

Procuring more LPDs from PT PAL would also support strategic considerations for the development of the national defense industry. According to research conducted by Laboratorium Indonesia 2045, one of the challenges faced by the domestic defense industry is the inconsistency and instability of government orders. This makes it difficult for the national defense industry to continue R&D on other products, as well as increase production and MRO capacity. Furthermore, should the government and the Indonesian Navy opt for LPDs produced domestically, it could also enhance their prestige. For all of these reasons, the Indonesian government needs to carefully consider the proposal to purchase the Giuseppe Garibaldi, and instead turn to its domestic defense industry to fulfill its needs in terms of HADR missions.