In early July 2021, Afghanistan’s national forces entered Bagram air base only to find it abandoned. Their American counterparts had left in the middle of the night without a word, walking away from what had been their largest installation in Afghanistan during the war on terror, complete with runways, barracks, and even American chains like Burger King and Pizza Hut. Built by the Soviets during the Cold War, Bagram had grown into a sprawling symbol of U.S. power in the country and in the region.
A month later, the Taliban seized it, along with the rest of Afghanistan.
In the past few weeks, U.S. President Donald Trump has called for retaking the base, citing its strategic location and insisting that “we should have never given it up.” His remarks have prompted many in Washington to voice support for the idea.
A return to Bagram appears attractive, at least on paper. From there, the United States could monitor China, track Russian activity in Central Asia, watch Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, and launch operations against extremists, particularly the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). This combination makes Bagram look like an indispensable asset. It is hardly surprising, then, that Trump warned the Taliban that “bad things” could happen if they refused to give back Bagram, and equally unsurprising that many have argued in favor of the idea.
However, while the opportunities appear tempting, the risks for the U.S. are far greater. Despite the common perception that reclaiming Bagram would bolster U.S. interests and security, in reality a U.S. takeover would do the opposite. Retaking the base by force is nearly impossible, and securing it through a deal with the Taliban would not make the United States safer or protect its interests in the region but would instead fuel terrorism and escalate tensions with regional powers. A negotiated return could serve to legitimize the rule of an oppressive regime and the purported benefits rely on hollow promises of access to Afghanistan’s rare earth wealth.
Of the many arguments for returning to Bagram, three proposals for how to retake the base stand out. First, the option of retaking the base by force. This option is arguably not a serious possibility. The Taliban posses more than $7 billion worth of U.S. weapons and vehicles left behind in 2021, giving them more firepower than they ever had during 20 years of insurgency against Afghanistan national forces and their allies. Taliban members have already threatened suicide bombings against anyone who sets foot in Afghanistan, the same tactic they used regularly during the years of foreign military presence.
In addition, mounting a mission to retake Bagram would have to navigate a complex region where the U.S. military’s access is thin or nonexistent, with Iran to Afghanistan’s west, the Central Asian states of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan to the north, and Pakistan to the east and south. Even in the most optimistic scenario where the U.S. manages to capture the base, maintaining it would require thousands of troops and heavy logistical support. No administration could afford to sustain such a commitment.
A second option is to regain the base through negotiations with the Taliban. Although this option may appear more practical than the first, in practice, it is very unlikely that the Taliban would accept. Since Trump’s remarks in the U.K., many Taliban officials have issued firm rejections to the proposal. The group’s Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi declared, “Not even a meter of Afghanistan will be given to Americans,” and Fasihuddin Fitrat, the chief of the general staff, added, “A deal over even an inch of Afghanistan’s soil is not possible. We don’t need it.”
It should also not be forgotten that the group, as I wrote last month, “rose to power on a narrative of jihad, resistance, and austere Islamic rule,” and a deal with the very invader they once fought against would undermine the foundation of their legitimacy, at least from within. Therefore, a negotiated return is highly improbable.
A third option, proposed as a way to address the impossibility of a direct deal with the Taliban, involves third-party arrangements. The idea is to outsource Bagram’s management to regional partners, particularly Muslim countries like Qatar, while the U.S. could benefit from the deal to some extent. This proposal, however, is an oversimplification of the situation. It assumes that changing the flag changes the reality.
Even if the Taliban allowed troops from Muslim countries to occupy the base, the U.S. would still require a presence there in order to operate effectively out of it. In other words, for the U.S. to benefit from what the base has to offer, American personnel and munitions would still need to be present. Without at least a limited presence, outsourcing Bagram would amount to costs for the U.S. without any real gain.
Moreover, an arrangement of this kind is very likely to be read by Taliban members and the leadership in Kandahar as surrender rather than clever diplomacy, and therefore denied out of hand. For the Taliban, sovereignty is their central political currency, and no faction within the movement, whether labeled hardline or pragmatic, can afford to be seen as selling it for money, recognition, or political advantage.
Setting aside the question of whether a Bagram takeover is even feasible, the base would not deliver the benefits its advocates imagine. Counterterrorism is often cited as the primary justification. As much as the threat from ISKP and other militant groups is undeniable, a renewed U.S. footprint would not eliminate that threat, but would likely further fuel them. First, the base itself would become a prime target for dissatisfied Taliban factions, ISKP, and the remnants of al-Qaida. Second, a deal, either directly with the Taliban or through a third party, granting U.S. access to Bagram would serve as free advertising for ISKP and others. These groups, already opposed to the Taliban, could use the presence of “infidel soldiers and their allies” in Afghanistan, and the Taliban’s compliance, to recruit not only from dissatisfied Taliban ranks but also from fighters across South and Central Asia, expanding their foothold in the region.
Beyond fueling terrorism, there are also geopolitical risks. Unlike in 2001, when Washington faced little pushback from regional actors and major powers, today Beijing and Moscow are far more assertive. China’s Foreign Ministry has already condemned the idea of a U.S. return, warning against escalating tensions and stressing Afghanistan’s sovereignty. Russia, even before these discussions, had accused the United States of seeking to destabilize the region. And more recently, China and Russia, alongside Iran and Pakistan, have jointly opposed the creation of foreign military bases in or around Afghanistan. With a U.S. presence back at Bagram, it would not be surprising if regional actors moved quickly to counter American influence whenever possible. This could not only increase instability inside Afghanistan, which in turn fuels terrorism, but also escalate already volatile great-power relations.
Rare earths are often cited as another motive for a return to Bagram. On paper, Afghanistan’s mineral wealth is real and vast. In reality, however, the country still lacks the basic infrastructure and security needed to exploit that wealth. A U.S. presence, especially a limited one, would not fix these problems – not any more than 20 years of occupation did – and might even worsen them by triggering attacks and resistance from within Afghanistan as well as opposition from regional actors.
In this regard, there are lessons to learn from Beijing’s experience: despite years of effort, it has made little progress in extraction, and in recent years Chinese nationals working in Afghanistan and Pakistan have been attacked and killed by ISKP and other unidentified armed groups.
Equally important are the principles at risk. Over the past four years, the Taliban have shown that they have not fundamentally changed from their first period of rule. Instead of destroying televisions, this time around they’re experimenting with disconnecting the internet. Any U.S. presence in exchange for political or financial concessions with a group that bans girls from education beyond the sixth grade, erases women from public life, and excludes ethnic groups from meaningful participation in government would raise serious questions about what the United States really stands for. Entering into an arrangement with such a regime would not only grant it international legitimacy but also erode the United States’ own credibility.
Whether Trump’s comments about Bagram were merely bombastic rhetoric or a serious proposal, the idea of returning to the base is likely to backfire. It is important for the United States not to repeat the mistake of oversimplifying the situation in Afghanistan, as it did before and during two decades of war, and to recognize that the political, security, and geopolitical environment around Bagram today is very different from what it was 20 years ago.
At best, a U.S. presence would be a costly symbol with little to no practical gain. At worst, it would entangle Washington in yet another war it cannot win. To counter terrorism, and to maintain engagement with Afghanistan, the U.S. would be better served by monitoring conditions on the ground from afar; keeping open channels with groups and movements that seek an inclusive government, from women-led advocacy networks to various resistance and opposition fronts inside and outside Afghanistan; and supporting the people through indirect venues like UNAMA, rather than seeking to reestablish a military foothold at Bagram.