Understanding domestic politics in China must start with understanding local Chinese politics. Under its Leninist political system, China is one of the most decentralized states in the world in terms of fiscal spending. More than 85 percent of Chinese government spending comes from local governments. In particular, township governments shoulder the most important governance responsibilities, such as education, healthcare, and public welfare. Using the township-level government as an example, it’s instructive to explore exactly how these all-important local systems actually work – and who operates them.
While all government workers are equal, some are more equal than others. At the top of the township government hierarchy are local leaders, who are township cadres with administrative rankings. A township typically has three section-level (科级) leaders: the township Chinese Communist Party (CCP) secretary, the township mayor, and the chief of the Township People’s Congress, who is often the former township party secretary transitioning to retirement. In addition, there are approximately 10 vice section level (副科级) leaders, including vice party secretaries, vice mayors, the discipline inspection secretary (纪检书记), and the heads of several key offices. Officials heading less critical offices or serving as vice chiefs of any office do not hold administrative rankings and, therefore, are not considered leaders.
The next level below government leaders are civil servants with no rank who hold bianzhi (编制), which refers to established posts within government offices. Bianzhi status grants significant benefits, including superior welfare compared to regular citizens and lifelong employment (unless the employee commits a crime). Within the bianzhi workforce, “cadres” and “officials” hold civil servant bianzhi, while other bianzhi workers have public institution bianzhi – the same designation given to teachers and doctors in public hospitals. Only those with civil servant bianzhi can reasonably expect opportunities for promotion. In contrast, those with public institution bianzhi have no career advancement prospects.
The path to promotion begins only when an official is elevated to the vice section level, becoming a township leader. Making it to vice section level is not difficult. Officials attest that almost all cadres can expect this promotion as long as they don’t make any serious mistakes. However, further promotion from here becomes extremely difficult. Therefore, most township leaders do not view promotion as a strong incentive and often describe themselves as “not caring much about promotion.”
Promotion opportunities at the township level are rare, as leaders face intense competition and strict age cutoffs. As Chien-wen Kou and Wen-Hsuan Tsai noted, the age cutoff for promotion to vice section and section levels is 40, while the cutoff for vice division (副处) level is 45. In reality, interviews indicate that in many places, the cutoff age for the vice section level can be as early as 35.
Promotion opportunities are further constrained by the competition among vice section leaders, 10 of whom may vie for just two section-level positions. Moreover, township party secretaries and mayors are often not promoted from the pool of vice section leaders within the township. Instead, county-level governments may appoint section-level leaders through temporary transfers (挂职), effectively fast-tracking their promotion.
Additionally, according to a Hunan cadre, a recent directive from the Organization Department stipulates that newly promoted vice section leaders cannot be considered for further promotion for three years. If the vice section leader is rotated to another town during the three-year period, then the three-year countdown must start again. This new directive greatly reduced the possibility of making the section level by making the age cutoff more pressing.
As a result, township governments are often referred to as a “black hole for young cadres,” trapping many in perpetual vice section level assignments. They frequently surpass the promotion cutoff age and remain indefinitely in vice section positions.
Promotion prospects do not improve for section-level leaders, as they face even fiercer competition. A county typically has only around 10 vice division (副处) level positions. Township and street (街道) party secretaries and mayors compete for these roles alongside section chiefs from the county government. As several cadres have concluded, promotion opportunities are largely reserved for those with the right connections.
Since promotion opportunities are rare, township leaders have developed different career calculations. Some are primarily motivated by the goal of “escaping the township.” Many township leaders keep their families in the county center to access better housing and educational opportunities for their children, while residing in township government dormitories during the workweek. Consequently, they aspire to secure an administrative reassignment (平调) to the county government as a section chief, which would allow them to work closer to their families. Obtaining such a reassignment depends largely on strong personal connections with county leadership and the Organization Bureau.
Others, however, prefer to remain in the township because they value the benefits of “holding real power” (大权在握). Many leaders enjoy the authority that comes with being “number one” (一把手) – and the ability to leverage this nearly unchecked power to enrich themselves. For such figures, an administrative reassignment to the county government is seen as a career downgrade.
The lack of promotion incentives is a widespread phenomenon. According to research by Jianxing Yu and Xiang Gao, more than 70 percent of surveyed officials in Zhejiang stated that they know their terminal position early in their careers. Therefore, since early in their career, many local officials decide not to participate in the promotion tournament.
Bianzhi workers are not the only personnel working in township governments. Many township governments often employ more contract workers than official bianzhi workers. They perform similar tasks and often work closely with officials. In fact, township contract workers are often more competent than their counterparts. Unlike officials, who are required to rotate posts and localities under the Civil Servant Law, contract workers often remain in the same position for their entire career. This continuity allows them to develop a deeper understanding of local conditions and acquire specialized skills.
One township official sent from the county government shared, “Before I met with contract workers, I looked down on them. I thought their role was to assist me. After working with them, I realized that I am the one here to assist them. I can’t do their job. Their jobs are incredibly challenging, and they possess skills that I don’t have. My role is to support them in what they do.”
In theory, a township government can terminate a contract worker’s position at any time. However, the specialized skills that contract workers possess make them irreplaceable, granting them de facto job security. For example, it took one Guangxi township more than three months to fully replace a contract worker who decided to leave for a position as a local police assistant. This three-month period included the hiring process as well as providing job training until the new worker could perform independently. During this time, the remaining staff had to shoulder the additional workload. As a result, township governments are highly reluctant to fire contract workers unless they commit a crime or a serious mistake.
The primary distinction between contract workers and regular officials is that contract workers do not receive the welfare benefits that officials are entitled to. They only receive basic wage, which is lower than bianzhi workers’, and do not enjoy any bonuses or subsidies. Recently, fiscal challenges faced by local Chinese governments have made township contract workers the biggest victims. For instance, in one Guangxi township, while officials can still expect their monthly paychecks, contract workers are experiencing delays of over four months in receiving their salaries.
The delay in paychecks has sparked significant discontent among contract workers. In one instance, a local leader directed a group of contract workers to complete a new task outside of their responsibilities, and a contract worker openly complained, questioning why she should work when she had not been paid. In other cases, contract workers have delegated responsibilities to bianzhi officials, asserting, “Since you receive better benefits and an actual paycheck, you should handle the work.”
In return, contract workers enjoy more freedom compared to officials. They are not subject to investigations by the commissions for discipline inspection at various levels, since many of them are neither civil servants nor CCP members. Additionally, they are exempt from sitting through the grueling meetings or participating in political activities that are typically reserved for officials and Communist Party members.
Furthermore, contract workers are not governed by the Civil Servant Law or CCP Party Regulations. For example, township officials can take one day off with permission from their office director; for more than two days off, they must obtain official approval from the township leader. In contrast, contract workers can take more than two days off simply by speaking to the office director, without needing to provide specific reasons.
Overall, China’s township governments are best described with one word: stagnation. One cadre captured the reality of township government succinctly: “Everyone is stuck.” Such stagnation will inevitably lead to organizational decay.
The resiliency of the CCP comes from its grassroots, and a stable Chinese state depends on local governments delivering services. Decaying local governments will lead to long-term social consequences.