The escalating tensions between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea have compelled Manila to redefine its security cooperation framework. For decades, the Philippines relied almost entirely on the U.S. alliance for its security. Today, however, Manila is trying to take a more active role, building a loose web of defense partnerships aimed at sharing responsibilities, deepening cooperation with friendly states, and reducing dependence on a single ally.
From Dependence to Diversification
For decades, the Philippines’ defense posture rested almost entirely on its alliance with the United States. The 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, followed by the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), formed the backbone of that relationship. These arrangements gave Washington access to Philippine bases and shaped the country’s military planning. In 2007, Manila took a modest step toward diversification by signing a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) with Australia – another close U.S. ally – to regulate the legal standing of foreign troops during joint activities.
Under President Rodrigo Duterte (2016–2022), however, the Philippines briefly attempted a strategic realignment. Seeking rapprochement with Beijing, Duterte downplayed the 2016 international arbitral tribunal ruling that invalidated China’s expansive maritime claims in the South China Sea, and in 2020 even announced plans to terminate the Philippines-U.S. VFA.
In the end, Duterte’s gestures toward Beijing brought little in return. China kept up its pressure at sea – from coast guard intimidation to fishing restrictions – showing that goodwill alone did not translate into genuine stability. Recognizing the futility of accommodation, Duterte backtracked on the abrogation of the VFA in July 2021 after a meeting with then-U.S. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin, symbolically restoring the alliance.
Since taking office in June 2022, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has continued the policy of re-engagement – but with a twist. He expanded EDCA in April 2023, authorizing four new sites for U.S. access, and signed the Bilateral Defense Guidelines a month later to modernize cooperation. The bigger change, however, lies in Marcos’ pursuit of “networked deterrence”: maintaining the U.S. alliance while building a wider web of defense relationships across the Indo-Pacific.
His goal is not just to rely on U.S. power, but to turn the Philippines into a regional connector – a country capable of hosting and coordinating multinational security efforts. This means negotiating VFA- or SOVFA-style agreements with new partners and organizing Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs) to boost joint presence and interoperability in the South China Sea.
Minilateral Momentum
The first major step in this direction came with the Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) negotiations that were launched with Japan in November 2023. Both nations face coercive Chinese actions in their respective maritime domains and share an interest in deterrence through enhanced interoperability.
The Japan-Philippines talks were part of a wider shift in regional diplomacy. Countries are turning to small, flexible groups to get things done, rather than waiting for ASEAN’s slow, consensus-driven machinery to act. ASEAN’s consensus rule has limited its ability to respond decisively to Chinese assertiveness, prompting Manila to pursue alternatives.
The Japan-Philippines-U.S. (JAPHUS) trilateral was formally consolidated at an April 2024 Washington summit, marking a milestone in formalized cooperation. Parallel efforts led to the emergence of the “Squad” – a quadrilateral grouping of the Philippines, the United States, Japan, and Australia – launched in June 2024 at the Shangri-La Dialogue. These overlapping partnerships reinforce the Philippines’ central role in Indo-Pacific deterrence networks.
After less than a year of negotiation, the Japan-Philippines RAA was signed on July 8, 2024, streamlining procedures for the mutual deployment of forces and joint training. The inaugural activity, Doshin–Bayanihan 5–25, followed shortly after, involving combined humanitarian assistance and disaster relief exercises at the Benito N. Ebuen Air Base in Mactan.
Widening the Web
Marcos’s diversification strategy hasn’t stopped with traditional partners. Between January and April 2025, Manila concluded an SOVFA with New Zealand, underscoring their shared interest in freedom of navigation and overflight. The partnership has already deepened through the Track 1 Maritime Dialogue (June 2025) and Vice-Ministerial Consultations (August 2025).
Canada is next in line. Following the 2024 Defense Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding, both sides finalized SOVFA negotiations in March 2025, with signing expected soon. These agreements expand the Philippines’ options while integrating non-regional partners into its deterrence network.
Europe’s engagement represents another frontier. The Philippines and France launched VFA negotiations in June 2025 in Paris, positioning France to become the first EU member state to ink such an agreement with Manila. This step could pave the way for other European nations to follow, driven by growing recognition that Indo-Pacific stability is crucial to global trade and the rules-based order. Reflecting this momentum, the United Kingdom announced its interest in a SOVFA with the Philippines later in 2025.
Operationalizing Deterrence
Legal frameworks are now translating into tangible military cooperation. Since November 2023, the Philippines has organized a series of Maritime Cooperative Activities (MCAs): joint patrols and exercises conducted within its exclusive economic zone and surrounding waters. To date, 25 MCAs have been carried out, 19 of which involved the United States, reflecting the enduring depth of the bilateral alliance (see the chart below).
However, participation has diversified rapidly as Manila’s network of defense partnerships has expanded. The first activities in 2023 were conducted with the United States and Australia, but by 2024, Canada, Japan, and New Zealand had joined the initiative. In 2025, France and India also became involved, signaling growing interest among extra-regional partners in contributing to maritime stability. Most recently, Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. this month extended an invitation to Ireland to participate, underscoring Manila’s intent to broaden cooperation with European states.
Through these exercises, the Philippines is both strengthening interoperability and demonstrating collective resolve and embedding its partners within the operational realities of deterrence in the South China Sea – a tangible manifestation of its emerging minilateral deterrence strategy.
The Logic and Limits of Networked Deterrence
Manila’s evolving defense diplomacy reflects both necessity and adaptability. Faced with China’s persistent gray-zone tactics and ASEAN’s institutional paralysis, the Philippines is stitching together a patchwork of partnerships that collectively enhance deterrence and give it greater strategic flexibility.
Still, the approach comes with challenges. Managing a growing list of defense partners could stretch resources and coordination capacity. Public unease about foreign troops on Philippine soil could also resurface. And while building new ties, Manila must avoid alienating its Southeast Asian neighbors who remain wary of external military entanglements.
Taken together, these developments mark an important transformation. The Philippines is no longer content to be a junior partner in someone else’s alliance system. By pairing its U.S. alliance with a new set of Indo-Pacific partnerships – and now with strengthening links to Europe – Manila is weaving a flexible, multilayered web of deterrence that fits the complexity of today’s security environment. This pragmatic form of diplomacy, which relies on overlapping, issue-based partnerships instead of rigid blocs, shows that the country is learning to navigate power politics on its own terms.
In a region where old alignments are shifting and the South China Sea remains contested, Manila’s experiment in “networked deterrence” could become a model for small and middle powers seeking both security and autonomy.