The saga of Timor-Leste’s application for membership in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is set to come to a successful conclusion at the bloc’s summit later this month. The acceptance of the country into the bloc, despite the doubts and reservations of some ASEAN member states, represents both a diplomatic victory for the small nation and an opportunity to rethink ASEAN’s procedures and operational logic.
For Timor-Leste, this moment marks a significant step in its adaptation and openness to a large-scale market, but also an opportunity for its fragile economy to develop, provided it can overcome the challenges posed by such openness.
For ASEAN, the need to balance economic criteria with political interests – still constrained by the bloc’s awkward rule of consensus – makes it difficult to deepen its objectives while dealing with the substantial weight of sovereignty, which continues to hinder collective progress.
A Long and Winding Road: From Independence to Regional Integration
In the early days of East Timor’s independence, in 1974 and 1975 before the Indonesian invasion and occupation, the first generation of nationalists envisioned a new state with regional ties, particularly to ASEAN, which had been formed in 1967. In projecting what could become a foreign policy based on diversifying partnerships, the country’s connection to Southeast Asia – and especially to Indonesia – appeared both natural and inevitable.
This was not Indonesia’s understanding, as it saw in the prospect of East Timor’s independence a source of political instability and a misalignment with the United States, which at the time held a tutelary power over ASEAN. Geography and history tied the half-island to Australia and the Pacific islands, as well as to Portugal and the Portuguese-speaking countries that had by then freed themselves from colonial rule.
Within this framework of regional belongings, which materialized, after two decades of guerrilla warfare, in the creation of the Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense (National Council of Timorese Resistance) in 1998, the signing of the New York Agreements in 1999 opened up a realistic horizon for independence for the territory occupied by Indonesia since late 1975.
Among the priorities envisioned by Timorese political leaders was regional integration into ASEAN. It is important to note that, by the late 1990s, not only was Indonesia engulfed in an economic and political crisis, but ASEAN itself was undergoing a profound transformation as a result of the end of the Cold War. The bloc was expanding its objectives (including the decision to implement a free trade area) and widening its membership to include the remaining “continental” Southeast Asian countries: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar. The crisis in Indonesia and the fall of Suharto in 1998 created an opportunity for the referendum which enabled the Timorese people to exercise their right to self-determination.
During the United Nations transitional administration that prepared East Timor’s independence between 1999 and 2002, the topic of ASEAN membership continued to be discussed, ultimately leading to a formal application in 2011. In the meantime, in July 2005, Timor-Leste began participating in ASEAN Regional Forum meetings and, in 2007, signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation.
In the state-building process of the newest state in Southeast Asia, regional integration emerged as a structuring and priority identity element for asserting itself within a familiar geopolitical space, while balancing the weight of bilateral relations with Indonesia and Australia. This explains why Timorese political leaders responsible for foreign affairs have emphasized the development of multiple affiliations through ties with Australia, the Pacific Islands, and Portuguese-speaking countries. In the Strategic Development Plan 2011-2030, drafted by the government in 2011, the desire to join ASEAN was explained by geographic location, the aspirations of the leaders and people, and cultural affinities with neighboring countries.
By 2014, Timor-Leste met all the admission criteria outlined in Article 6 of the ASEAN Charter, namely: geographical location in Southeast Asia, recognition by the member states, agreement to abide by the principles of the charter, and the capacity and willingness to fulfill the obligations set out therein.
In 2016, Timor-Leste began its application to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which could facilitate ASEAN’s acceptance, given the regulatory adaptations required to align with international trade rules. Timor-Leste’s WTO accession was completed in 2024, along with the necessary adaptation and harmonization with ASEAN standards, although legislation and procedures still require significant coordination.
In 2022, Timor-Leste was granted admission “in principle,” which allowed it to participate in meetings and summits, and paved the way for a period of socialization that culminated in the decision, made in May 2025, to finally admit Timor-Leste into ASEAN. Fourteen years of debate surrounding Timor-Leste’s lack of preparedness to become the 11th member of the organization – marked by the reluctance of some members and a test of the limits of the “ASEAN Way” – stood in contrast to the unanimous support from successive Timorese governments regarding the merits and benefits of accession.
The delay between ASEAN’s recognition that Timor-Leste had met the formal criteria outlined in the ASEAN Charter and its eventual acceptance “in principle” in 2022 can be explained by ASEAN’s traditionally cautious modus operandi and a kind of political taboo. However, specific states, such as Singapore and Myanmar, were more vocal in expressing reservations for different reasons.
Although not entirely resolved, all the concerns that had persisted on both sides were overcome by extending the young nation the benefit of the doubt.
What Is at Stake with Timor-Leste’s Accession to ASEAN?
Timorese governments have long been aware of the limitations imposed by oil exploitation and the importance of developing the country’s weak and poorly diversified economy. This awareness has underpinned the consistency of their pursuit of the strategic goal of ASEAN membership.
More recently, this commitment was reinforced by the reduction in U.S. aid and China’s growing influence. It is worth noting that Timor-Leste established a comprehensive strategic partnership with China in 2023, a sign of the importance of that bilateral relationship, but one that may have raised concerns in some quarters. This partnership strengthens Timor-Leste’s connection to the Maritime Silk Road and ensures continued Chinese investment in critical infrastructure.
Although equidistance and neutrality remain Timor-Leste’s preferred foreign policy postures – as reflected in its advocacy for the peaceful resolution of conflicts and its defense of international law concerning the South China Sea – this alignment has not gone unnoticed within ASEAN.
While ASEAN membership is a politically and technically complex issue, internal debate around the objective – whether more optimistic or skeptical – did not reach significant depth or polarization. The commitment to ASEAN membership was viewed as a kind of coming-of-age milestone, a challenge to be overcome through adaptation to a large-scale market and regulatory harmonization. At the same time, the political and diplomatic efforts involved and the emphasis on human resource development were seen as a demonstration of maturity for a state that remains the poorest in the region.
All the years of waiting have also served as a stress test for ASEAN, which operates on a consensus-based model that emerged in the context of newly independent states asserting their sovereignty during and after the Cold War. In recent years, discomfort with this rule has become increasingly evident. It is seen as limiting, rigid, and outdated. It also undermines the concept of “centrality” that ASEAN has long claimed as a core principle.
With ASEAN membership, Timor-Leste will become part of major regional institutions, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade pact. The governing elite is well aware of the burdens involved and the unpredictability of factors such as a weak and underperforming bureaucracy, the above mentioned excessive economic dependence on oil extraction, and the lowest per capita GDP in the region. Cautiously, Timor-Leste’s President Jose Ramos-Horta has acknowledged that full capacity-building will be a long-term process.
It is important to note that over 60 percent of Timor-Leste’s imports come from ASEAN countries. More recently, reductions in U.S. aid and Washington’s imposition of 10 percent tariffs on Timorese exports have increased its economic vulnerability and further emphasized the importance of Southeast Asian relations. Timor-Leste’s lack of economic preparedness arises within the broader context in which ASEAN’s operational formulas are being called into question.
As mentioned above, this isn’t ASEAN’s first enlargement. The accession of Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999 highlighted the importance of inclusion, based on the assumption that it would lead to convergence. However, over time, it has become increasingly clear that the coherence of ASEAN’s internal functioning has been affected by the accession of these newer members. The idea of differentiated levels of development was applied to these states, with variable tariff reductions and intra-regional trade still only representing about 20-25 percent of total trade.
It is essential to understand the historical context of ASEAN’s earlier enlargement – the end of the Cold War, China’s rapid economic rise, globalization, and the broader trend of regional integration – which explains ASEAN’s willingness to expand even as it deepened its objectives.
Politically, the crisis in Myanmar and conflicting interests in the South China Sea have underscored the difficulties of finding practical solutions while maintaining a strict consensus model. Within ASEAN, voices call for qualified majority voting on economic and technical matters and differentiated integration (the so-called “ASEAN-X” formula), leaving out more sensitive areas – especially in the security domain.
The principle of non-interference and the claim that Timor-Leste had supported Myanmar’s National Unity Government were among the reasons that Myanmar’s military junta cited in opposing Timor-Leste’s membership.
This institutional and political dimension of Timor-Leste’s accession raises broader questions about entrenched practices and dysfunctions within ASEAN, representing an opportunity for debate about the organization. Alongside this is the concern over economic impact and the potential widening of disparities within the group. As the poorest country in the region, with serious infrastructure deficiencies, Timor-Leste’s need for aid from countries such as China, Australia, South Korea, and Japan – and even from the European Union –may be viewed with some apprehension by its partners.
Adapting customs regulations and creating a more attractive framework for foreign investment will occur within the RCEP and ASEAN Free Trade Area frameworks. This dual effort by ASEAN and its newest member state will require monitoring of the changes, as well as allocation of funds and training of human resources as part of the assistance to be provided. ASEAN and its members have played a significant role as a capacity-building agent for Timor-Leste. Singapore, for example, is already contributing through the E-Stars program, which is aimed at capacity-building for Timorese officials who must participate in ASEAN meetings, ensuring a meaningful regional commitment.
In continuation of the strategic importance of the relationship with Indonesia, with which some land and maritime boundaries are not yet fully defined, joint ventures are expected to be formed with Indonesian capital and Timorese labor in areas such as agriculture, fisheries, and small-scale industry.
Naturally, several concerns remain. There are expectations of improved quality in imports, including consumer goods and construction materials that are essential for daily life and represent a barrier to development. A phased integration into the ASEAN Free Trade Area, similar to what occurred with Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar, is also anticipated.
The Expectations
It is not realistic to expect immediate benefits for Timor-Leste from ASEAN membership. Once again, the examples of Vietnam and Cambodia are illustrative. It took years before the positive effects of accession were felt in terms of economic growth. However, they benefited from increased international visibility and credibility immediately; this attracted investment, created business opportunities, and opened the door to new partnerships.
Timor-Leste’s management of the U.S.-China rivalry must be handled carefully, without explicitly siding with either, following the common practice of many ASEAN countries, albeit to differing degrees. Although the economic dimension of ASEAN membership has received the most attention, it is essential not to overlook the crucial importance of security.
A sense of responsibility and a striving for high standards will be constantly required if the concrete benefits of ASEAN membership are to eventuate. By mid-2025, Timor-Leste had already ratified 84 ASEAN agreements, and 91 legal instruments had been translated into the country’s two official languages: Tetum and Portuguese. Harmonization has demanded a significant effort from the public administration to deal with technically complex issues. Additionally, the ASEAN Secretariat and the Asian Development Bank have provided support through capacity-building programs to train civil servants to handle matters related to the ASEAN Economic Community independently. Market liberalization will require the establishment of efficient fiscal and customs management mechanisms.
Despite Timor-Leste’s adaptation efforts, and given the country’s dependence on oil and gas revenues, there is an expectation that the changes brought about by accession will contribute to a long-desired and much-discussed economic diversification, attracting more foreign investment, promoting value-added agriculture, and developing sustainable tourism.
The capacity of the Timorese leadership will be put to the test. On the social front, internal mobility within ASEAN may offer a solution to the problem of youth unemployment, which in Timor-Leste stands at around 20 percent. This also highlights the need to improve education and human capital.
Cambodia and Laos’ positive examples are presented as incentives, based on the assumption that Timor-Leste can follow the development path through effort and coordination. It can also expand its maneuvering capacity on the multilateral front by gaining a seat at the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summits.
A strengthening of the government and a cross-sectoral structure spanning all ministries are expected to enable better coordination and greater assertiveness in the government’s engagement with ASEAN.
As Dionísio Babo Soares, former minister of foreign affairs, stated, “the success of this stage will ultimately depend on the strategic vision of Timorese leadership and its ability to align national policies with regional commitments, without losing sight of the concrete interests and needs of the population.”
This admission is an opportunity for affirmation, projection, and development. It demands of Timor-Leste rigor, the enhancement of human resources, a strong sense of institutional responsibility, and political commitment. These conditions will require a political class focused on advancing the national interest and an informed and dynamic civil society.
Conclusion
ASEAN is nearing a crossroads as it approaches its 60th anniversary in 2027. Although its member states have not felt the need to revise their procedures and operational habits, arguing that the sovereignist paradigm was and continues to be the most appropriate for the bloc, they are increasingly experiencing consensus as an obstacle.
Timor-Leste’s admission was just one of a wide range of political issues, some of which are urgent, such as the South China Sea dispute or the crisis in Myanmar. Lack of preparedness and the effects of asymmetrical integration have been the perennial reasons for delaying the process, even if they have not been without merit. However, the shortcomings of the “ASEAN Way” undermine the organization’s desired centrality, and the strategic environment of competition between China and the United States disrupts a balance that has always been fragile.
Under these circumstances, there is a conducive environment for existential reflections of the collective, the parts, and the whole. The “ASEAN community vision 2045″ document, approved in May 2025, is a sign of these worries.
For Timor-Leste, this is the greatest challenge it has faced since the restoration of its independence was proclaimed on May 20, 2002. The country will now be acting in a much more competitive market, and fulfilling the commitments undertaken will require an effort that must be accompanied by a deepening of structural policies to address issues related to employment and education for a predominantly young population, a more fragile healthcare system, and food insecurity. The general capacity building of human resources is, as mentioned, a vital element to ensure adequate representation within the organization, but above all, in implementing the transformations and reforms required domestically.
Diplomatically, Timor-Leste can also provide a link to specific multilateral arenas, such as the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and the G7+, a group of post-conflict countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and Asia. There will be greater exposure to risks, but also other resources available.
Isolation and widespread poverty will not disappear with integration; in fact, they will become more visible. Close ties with Indonesia or connections with Australia, while still important, will be tempered by other regional partnerships and relationships. The complexities of Timor-Leste’s ASEAN accession cannot be reduced to a statement by President Ramos-Horta regarding the mobilization of national interest around this achieved goal; nevertheless, it is worth quoting him. As he said in January, “We would have to be really dumb and lazy if we do not benefit because there is potential for taking advantage” of ASEAN membership.
With its long-awaited goal within sight, Timor-Leste is about to turn a page and begin writing a new chapter in its history.