The United States is alone in the world in maintaining an unofficial but truly deep relationship with Taiwan. Yet across the Indo-Pacific region and as far afield as Europe, concerns about China’s designs on Taiwan are widespread. While concerned countries do maintain some level of engagement with Taiwan, many seem to have embraced an indirect approach to deterring Beijing. The Philippines is emerging as the center of gravity for these efforts.
In August, Australia and the Philippines publicized plans to finalize a new defense agreement in 2026. The agreement is expected to institutionalize regular bilateral defense ministers’ meetings, enable a larger slate of combined military exercises, and facilitate Australian investments in Philippine defense infrastructure development. This new agreement will build on a track record of deepening security ties, including an earlier Status of Visiting Forces Agreement.
Richard Marles, the Australian defense minister, announced that “Australia is pursuing eight different infrastructure projects across five different locations…for the benefit of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.” This is reminiscent of the U.S.-Philippines Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, through which the United States has secured access to a number of Philippine bases that the Pentagon is now upgrading. Some of these bases were chosen to better position U.S. forces to project power into the South China Sea and towards the Taiwan Strait. The development sites on which the Philippines and Australia agree will reveal much about how both countries envision this evolving security partnership.
The Australia-Philippines partnership is about more than words on paper. The joint announcement came during the third annual Exercise Alon, bilateral maneuvers involving, according to the Australian chief of joint operations, “realistic, high-end warfighting training.” Australia deployed F/A-18 Super Hornets and EA-18G Growlers to the Philippines for the first time in what the Australian Department of Defense described as “the largest overseas joint force projection activity that Australia has conducted within our region in recent history.”
In September, the Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement went into effect. The pact paves the way for more military exercises, industrial cooperation, technology exchange, and infrastructure development. “Ultimately, this agreement ensures that our most potent instruments of national power – our armed forces – can operate together,” said Philippine Secretary of Defense Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr., “not to disrupt the rules-based international order, but to uphold and preserve it against unilateral attempts to reshape it for narrow interests.”
Tokyo decided some years ago that it was in Japan’s interests to shore up Philippine defense capabilities. When a Chinese naval destroyer and coast guard cutter collided in the South China Sea in August, they were attempting to chase down a Japanese-built Philippine patrol vessel. But the new agreement goes beyond equipment provision. Now there is a legal foundation for Japanese forces to train and exercise on Philippine territory and vice versa.
The number of countries with which the Philippines has such arrangements is growing. Canada agreed to a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement in March of this year, with New Zealand following in April. Manila and Paris launched negotiations in June. That month, General Romeo Brawner, Jr., chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, suggested that South Korea could be next. Teodoro later confirmed this as the government’s intention. Last year, Manila and Seoul elevated their relationship to a strategic partnership.
The Philippines has evolving defense ties with European countries beyond France as well. In January 2024, it agreed to a Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Cooperation with the United Kingdom. Last month, during a visit to the Philippines by the British frigate HMS Richmond, London indicated its intent to negotiate a Status of Visiting Forces Agreement with Manila.
Last year, Manila and Rome announced plans to conclude their own defense MOU. Just this past March, Ukraine and the Philippines began negotiations on co-production of military drones. In May, Germany and the Philippines signed a defense cooperation agreement. In June, Lithuania and the Philippines agreed on a defense memorandum of understanding. At a press conference in Manila, the Lithuanian defense minister spoke openly about Chinese actions targeting Taiwan and the Philippines in the South China Sea.
Japan is Asia’s richest, most powerful democracy. The Korean Peninsula is home to Kim Jong Un, who has paired a growing nuclear arsenal with delusions of grandeur. The Taiwan Strait is arguably the region’s most dangerous flashpoint. But somewhat surprisingly, the Philippines is becoming a regional nexus for allied defense integration.
In part, this is because of long-running maritime disputes and the country’s status as a democratic U.S. ally, which eases cooperation. Without the Philippines, it will be very difficult for interested parties to prevent China from steamrolling across the South China Sea.
But China’s maritime territorial ambitions are only part of the story. In bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral settings, the countries discussed here have spoken publicly about the need to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. They understand that the risk of Chinese aggression is growing and that such an eventuality would come with global security and economic repercussions. Yet they remain hesitant to directly involve themselves in cross-strait affairs.
Instead, the Philippines – Taiwan’s next-door neighbor to the south – has become the locus of their efforts. A collection of U.S. Indo-Pacific allies and NATO partners have committed to helping transform the Armed Forces of the Philippines into a more formidable military while securing the legal basis for deploying their own forces to the Philippines – whose geography will make it integral to waging a defense of Taiwan.
For decades, China has been trying to remake the region’s security environment. It may finally be succeeding, though not in the way it hoped.