The arrest of a Pakistani national linked to the U.N. proscribed Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in Itaewon, a district in Seoul, by South Korean police in August underscores the spread of the terror group’s global tentacles — both in terms of its ambitions and operations. The LeT has been generally viewed through the prism of its anti-India militancy in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). However, the group’s ideological architecture also embodies a pan-Islamist and anti-Western worldview that has occasionally spilled into transnational plots.
The Pakistani national was arrested under the Counter-Terrorism Act and the Immigration Act. He reportedly joined the LeT in 2020 and received training in arms and infiltration tactics in Pakistan. While he has not been accused of plotting terrorist attacks in South Korea, his alleged affiliation is reflective of the LeT’s expansive network beyond Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Kashmir Valley.
From its inception, the LeT articulated an expansive vision stemming from the Ahl-e-Hadith sect. It sought both regional influence and relevance within the jihadist landscape. The group’s transnational intentions are not merely theoretical, but have manifested in networks across Asia, Europe, and North America, and in attacks and propaganda campaigns designed to target Western and Jewish targets as much as Indians.
A Pakistani Proxy
The LeT was formed as the militant wing of Markaz al-Dawa wal-Irshad (MDI) during the Afghan jihad of the 1980s against the erstwhile Soviet Union. Nurtured systematically by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the group became a crucial instrument in Islamabad’s strategic toolkit to check a far larger India, expand influence in Afghanistan, and maintain plausible deniability.
In India, the LeT has a deadly record with fingerprints on some of the most lethal urban terrorist attacks over the past three decades, including the 2000 Red Fort attack in Delhi, the 2005 Delhi bombings, the 2006 Mumbai train blasts that killed over 200, the 2008 Mumbai siege — a three-day operation that targeted Western and Jewish civilians, and the attack on tourists at Pahalgam this April. In 2019, the LeT rebranded itself under fronts such as The Resistance Front (TRF), which claimed responsibility and then distanced itself from the Pahalgam attack.
The murky role of Pakistan’s deep state in fostering groups like the LeT has been laid bare by Islamabad’s cosmetic prosecutions and crackdowns, designed more to placate international opinion and less to dismantle militant infrastructure. The LeT’s operational patterns, including fidayeen attacks, coordinated ambushes, as well as access to sophisticated weapons, reflect an ideological and institutional backing from Pakistan’s security establishment. Despite investigations into the 2008 Mumbai attacks, including the 2009 FIA Red Book listing over 30 individuals connected to the incident, not a single one has been formally prosecuted.
The LeT has benefited, both covertly and overtly, from state patronage. Government grants to its charitable wings and military officers “on deputation” demonstrate these ties. David Headley, a Pakistani-American operative central to the 2008 Mumbai attacks, testified that Pakistani officials, including Major Rehman Hashim Syed and Major Iqbal, were identified by the FBI as handlers who provided him with funding, and logistical support for reconnaissance missions in Mumbai and Denmark.
The LeT’s proxy warfare extends beyond the boundaries of India. In Afghanistan, the LeT operated as an expeditionary force to further Pakistan’s search for strategic depth and was involved in attacks against Indian infrastructure. As such, Afghanistan continues to remain a third space for the broader India-Pakistan conflict, with the Pakistani military pursuing strategic depth to undermine the Indian influence.
To put this into context, much like Russia’s Wagner Group or the United States’ Blackwater, the LeT operates in a grey zone area between state and non-state actors. Despite lacking corporate credentials, it potentially operates as a de facto private military company (PMC) for Pakistan — armed, trained, and tasked to carry out operations the Pakistani military cannot. Outsourcing wars to proxy groups like the LeT allows the Pakistani state to retain deniability.
The LeT has reportedly exported bomb-makers and trainers, deployed fighters to Afghanistan and Syria, as well as operated charity fronts as cover for legitimacy, funding, and recruitment purposes. This hybrid model of the group — part proxy and part charity — complicates the concept of deterrence. It’s safe to make the argument that the LeT is more than a terrorist outfit; it is a quasi-contracted extension of the Pakistani security apparatus.
Networks in South Asia and Beyond
The LeT’s stated ambition has been to “encircle India” by exploiting porous neighborhood borders with its networks to use Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives as logistical hubs, training grounds, and safe havens. The LeT operative who carried out the 2010 Pune blast was reportedly trained in Sri Lanka. In the Maldives, the LeT’s Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq exploited post-tsunami chaos for recruitment. Nepal and Bangladesh have reportedly served as corridors for infiltration into India.
The LeT’s reach has extended beyond the Indian subcontinent, too. In the 1990s and 2000s, LeT facilitators were reported to be present in Denmark, the Netherlands, the U.K., Canada, Australia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Chechnya. British citizens like Richard Reid (the “shoe bomber”) and Shehzad Tanweer, one of the 7/7 bombers, are reported to have trained in LeT camps.
To gain relevance, the outfit has also dipped its foot into global causes, including the Rohingya issue in Myanmar. LeT fronts, such as Falah-e-Insaniyat, have sought to engage Rohingya communities, while the Al Khidmat Foundation has organized seminars in Turkiye. Following India’s strikes on suspected terrorist headquarters and camps in Pakistan on May 7, U.N.-designated terrorist Muzamil Hasmi of the LeT reportedly claimed in a speech in Gujranwala on May 28 that the group played a crucial role in the student uprising that toppled Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in Bangladesh.
The LeT’s Salafi-inspired ideology, transnationally resonant, makes it compatible with groups such as al-Qaida, and even the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP). The former head of ISKP, Mawlawi Aslam Farooqi, was previously linked to the LeT. While some defections of jihadists to ISKP appear genuine, many are reportedly orchestrated under ISI oversight, allowing Pakistan’s security establishment to maintain influence and situational awareness within competing Islamist factions.
The LeT’s longevity can be attributed to its mother organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), which reportedly operates an “external affairs department” to liaise with jihadist groups and maintain foreign networks. Annual congregations at the group’s Muridke headquarters attract foreign participants, providing both ideological reinforcement and opportunities for operational networking. Funding streams often originate from Gulf-based charities and diaspora networks in the West.
A Global Threat Demands a Global Response
Leaders like Hafiz Saeed and other senior figures who have been designated as terrorists have been arrested from time to time. But such action is short-lived. Court trials of LeT leaders are opaque.
The LeT’s charitable fronts continue to function with relative impunity. International pressure has occasionally forced tactical pauses in the LeT’s operations. However, the structure remains intact.
The LeT’s continued operational utility, and the role it plays in justifying the Pakistani military’s high budget and influence, makes the full dismantling of its network unlikely.
The West’s perception of the LeT as a merely regional problem is deeply flawed. Even as the focus of the global community on the war on terror has waned considerably, the world cannot afford to underestimate the LeT. Western policymakers must avoid complacency. Acknowledging and scrutinizing the group’s transnational links and funding mechanism is critical as the LeT is a consequential jihadist actor with eyes beyond the Indian subcontinent.