The North Korea-Russia relationship has transformed into an alliance-like structure that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its national interests not only in Europe, but increasingly in the Asia-Pacific as well. These ties go deeper than for-profit military and economic cooperation and are rooted in ideological alignment, long-term strategic interests, and unprecedented integration of North Korea’s military and industrial sector into Russia’s war machine and vice versa.
The relationship between Pyongyang and Moscow is one of the few tangible accomplishments of Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine and his wider push against the West. The alliance now provides strategic leverage in Russia’s negotiations with the Trump administration over Ukraine, and increasingly, military leverage for potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula and with NATO.
Under such circumstances, the presence of North Korean troops beyond Russian territory, and Russian military advisers on North Korean soil, could simply be a matter of time. We should also expect to start seeing sophisticated Russian military technologies in the Korean People’s Army (KPA).
The alliance did not come to fruition overnight. Its buildup had three catalysts that transformed and strengthened the ties between North Korea and post-Soviet Russia. Examining the drivers and trajectory of this alliance is crucial to understanding how North Korea has gained leverage in shaping potential conflict on the Korean Peninsula and in future negotiations with Washington. At the same time, it reveals how Moscow could use Pyongyang to strengthen its strategic position, exert pressure on Europe, and advance its broader foreign policy objectives.
Catalyst #1: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 became a breaking point for authoritarian regimes. Officials in Beijing, Tehran, and Pyongyang focused on the Western response to the invasion.
Not only was a sovereign nation’s territorial integrity blatantly violated, but the invasion also sent a message that, despite economic and military backing, the collective West was unwilling to engage nuclear aggressors beyond sending ammunition.
North Korea, isolated since the COVID-19 pandemic and having backed out of denuclearization talks in Hanoi in 2019, received a unique chance. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine gave Pyongyang breathing room to enhance diplomatic and ideological cooperation with its patrons and rethink its strategic posture.
Consequently, as a bid to politically appeal to an isolated Moscow, North Korea was one of the first countries to officially recognize annexed Crimea, and later, annexed Ukrainian territories in Donbas that were added to the Russian Constitution.
North Korea also saw a new opportunity to profit from selling arms on the open market to Russia. Thus, as early as 2022, Pyongyang pushed for a closer relationship with an openly anti-West and ideologically aligned nuclear superpower.
Catalyst #2: Kim’s Visit and the First Direct Arms Shipments
In July 2023, Russia joined hands with China to break North Korea’s isolation. A Russian delegation led by then Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu joined a Chinese delegation in Pyongyang at the celebration of the 70th anniversary of “Victory Day” in the Korean War.
For North Korea, which was seeking to reduce its economic dependence on China and ease crises from the pandemic and political instability, the visit created an opportunity to push for direct ties with Russia’s lucrative defense sector, which by 2023 was pulling over 30 percent of Russia’s total federal budget.
Russia’s direct request for ammunition from North Korea, due to depleted stockpiles during the 2022–2023 campaign in Ukraine, created a unique opportunity not just for military trade, but for a deeper partnership encompassing logistical shipping, rail links, and barter benefits in key goods and products.
After two more visits by Russian defense delegations and the Kim-Putin summit in September 2023, evidence of this mutually beneficial military partnership surfaced in Ukraine.
Since July 2023, North Korea has provided Russia with ballistic missiles, Guided Multiple Launch Rockets (GMLRs), artillery and mortar shells – enough to fill over 20,000 shipping containers and supply an estimated 40 percent of Russia’s artillery shell consumption.
In return, Russia supplied North Korea with anti-aircraft missiles, drone technology, economic goods such as grains and oil, and potentially nuclear-program related financing. Pyongyang could have received nuclear-powered submarine propulsion systems too. As an added bonus, this cooperation also allowed Pyongyang to battle-test its Hwasong-11 ballistic missiles and other long-range equipment on Ukrainian cities.
Successful and mutually beneficial military cooperation, with the integration of Pyongyang’s military production capabilities and ammunition stockpiles into Russia’s strategic planning, therefore, became the second catalyst and backbone of the alliance-to-be.
Catalyst #3: Heavy Equipment, KPA Troops on the Ground, and Formalization of an Alliance
Each partnership needs to be jurisdictionally vetted. The most unprecedented turning point for the partnership, consequently, came in June 2024, with the signing of the North Korea-Russia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty during Putin’s visit to Pyongyang. Article 4 of the treaty, which came to effect on December 4, 2024, laid a framework for the alliance.
What followed was unparalleled in modern history. In fall 2024, NATO intelligence reported North Korean troops entering combat in Russia’s Kursk oblast. Since then, Pyongyang has sent more than 15,000 troops to assist Russia in recapturing territory in Kursk.
After initial denials, the presence of KPA troops was officially recognized by both Pyongyang and Moscow in April 2025. Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin both praised the heroic feats of the KPA and their successful contribution to Russia’s war.
KPA troops also brought heavy weaponry. OSINT reports showed equipment such as M1989 Koksan howitzers, towed mortars, GMLRs, and Bulsae-4 anti-tank guided missiles. These were used in combat by both Russian and North Korean troops, which was later corroborated by North Korean state media footage in August 2025.
While KPA troops are no longer actively participating in combat, the strategic implications of their experiences are far-reaching. KPA participation in the war in Ukraine gave North Korean troops firsthand experience against NATO-trained Ukrainian forces, while providing an opportunity to develop tactics to counter Western strategies. This is a combat lesson with significant implications for the Korean Peninsula.
The alliance also allowed for comprehensive modern warfare training. North Korean troops have received critical training in both anti-drone tactics and first-person-view drone operations, raising significant security concerns for the Korean Peninsula and for U.S. forces stationed in South Korea. New drone technology, including long-range Shahed-136 and Geran drones has already been transferred to North Korea, increasing Pyongyang’s long-range and low-cost strike capabilities.
The Battle-Tested Alliance: A Threat to Global Security
In the last three years, Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin have gradually built a cooperative mechanism that is more efficient than most security alliances.
The alliance, based on strategic coordination, military support, training, technological transfers, and close personal ties between Putin and Kim, became the first of its kind due to the mutual benefits for each side. Strategically, in addition to China, North Korea has gained a crucial partner for any future conflict on the Korean Peninsula, securing technology, advisers, and political backing to counter the United States. Putin, on the other hand, gained critical support for his war machine in the form of continuous supply of ammunition, weaponry, and, most importantly, supply of motivated and well-trained troops.
Russian academic experts are already theorizing about how the alliance could be used as leverage in negotiations with the new U.S. administration by both Russia and North Korea. Within the alliance, the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty will remain a mechanism allowing Russia to utilize North Korean troops at will and North Korea to request technologies and assistance. News reports already indicate Pyongyang is sending more troops, as well as sappers and workers for Russia’s military-industrial sector, reinforcing the entanglement of the defense sectors of both countries. Russian military analysts claim that North Korea is their only true ally and report that North Korea has over 100,000 volunteers ready to assist Russia.
These mechanisms and the depth of cooperation are looming signs of the severity of the North Korea-Russia threat. European nations and South Korea are alarmed, and the U.S. security strategy in these regions is being scrutinized.
At the military parade in Beijing, Kim reiterated his commitment to supporting Russia as long as it takes. He framed it as part of his country’s fraternal duty to Russia, which also indicates that if Russia engages in conflict other European nations, willing and ideologically charged KPA troops could be used by Putin.
Even more alarming, recent analysis found that Pyongyang has shipped billions of dollars’ worth of ammunition to Russia and received only a marginal return. This fact suggests that North Korea values the alliance less for profit than for ideology, technology, and long-term strategic gain. Such discrepancies in benefits from the relationship suggest that Kim Jong Un is making a strategic bet on Putin’s personal backing and support in the future, as relationships between authoritarian leaders often hinge on mutual favors and tacit support.