The Britain-Russia rivalry is one of the most enduring contests in modern history, yet it is rarely recognized as such. From imperial skirmishes in Central Asia to Cold War standoffs in Europe, the struggle has never truly ended. Today, the competition still plays out across Asia, where Britain seeks to reassert its global influence and Russia looks eastward for survival and renewed prestige, colliding on frontlines that stretch from Central Asia to the Pacific.
The rivalry between Russia and Britain has often been described as a relic of empire. But far from being buried in the 19th century, it continues to shape global politics – and Asia is once again a crucial theater.
Both powers are repositioning themselves in the East. Britain, after Brexit, has branded itself as “Global Britain” with an Indo-Pacific tilt: joining the AUKUS pact and deploying the HMS Queen Elizabeth to the region. Russia, isolated from the West by sanctions and burdened by war in Europe, has leaned heavily on China, maintained its presence in Central Asia, and sought to project influence across the Asia-Pacific.
The result is a familiar pattern: the “Great Game” of the 19th century lives on in a 21st-century contest with new stakes.
Historically, the British-Russian rivalry was forged in Asia. In the 19th century, imperial Russia and the British Empire confronted each other across Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Persia. Britain feared Russian encroachment toward India, the jewel of its empire. Russia saw Britain as an ever-present manipulator of its neighbors. The “Great Game” was fought not through direct conflict but through influence, espionage, and proxy struggles across Asia’s frontier zones.
The pattern endured into the 20th century. Even during alliances in the two World Wars, trust was thin between the British and Russians. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill famously advocated “strangling Bolshevism in its cradle,” and Britain supported the White armies in Russia’s civil war. During the Cold War, London became Washington’s most reliable ally in containing Moscow. To Russian strategists, Britain symbolized the ideological core of Western hostility – and Asia was once again a contested arena, from Soviet influence in India and Vietnam to the British naval presence east of the Suez.
The collapse of the Soviet Union reshaped but did not erase this rivalry. Britain initially welcomed Russian wealth, turning London into “Londongrad,” yet relations soured amid poisonings, espionage scandals, and accusations of subversion. Moscow has come to view Britain not just as another Western critic, but as the sharpest architect of its delegitimization.
At the same time, the rivalry found new expression in Asia. Britain’s support for NATO enlargement and security cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Baltics was matched by its increasing involvement in Central Asia after 9/11, including military deployments in Afghanistan. Russia, determined to prevent Western encroachment, reinforced its security role in the post-Soviet space through organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and closer alignment with China.
Today, the rivalry has moved decisively eastward. Britain’s Indo-Pacific tilt is not only about countering China; it also signals renewed interest in Asia as a stage for global competition. Through its carrier strike group and strengthening ties with Japan, South Korea, and India, London positions itself as a defender of the “rules-based order.”
Russia, meanwhile, seeks to leverage its strategic partnership with China, deepen energy links with India, and maintain dominance in Central Asia – the region historically at the heart of Anglo-Russian competition. Moscow’s pivot East is not just opportunistic; it is a survival strategy amid Western sanctions, but it also revives the logic of the old Great Game: the East as a zone where influence is contested by outside powers.
From Central Asia to the Indo-Pacific, this enduring rivalry is reshaping regional security, forcing states to navigate an increasingly complex web of alignments and pressures.
The rivalry’s impact is most acute in Russia’s “near abroad.” Countries such as Ukraine, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan find themselves pulled between Moscow’s security guarantees and London’s encouragement of their efforts to diversify partnerships. Britain has been an outspoken advocate for NATO’s presence in Eastern Europe, a supporter of sanctions regimes, and a backer of reformist movements in Russia’s neighborhood.
Yet for the states of the region, this ongoing contest is less an external imposition than an opportunity to advance their own agendas. Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and other Central Asian states have long practiced “multivector” diplomacy – engaging Moscow, Beijing, and Western capitals alike to maximize autonomy and economic benefit.
Far from being mere arenas of influence, these states actively exploit the rivalries among major powers to attract investment, diversify trade, and enhance regime legitimacy. By dealing with all sides, Central Asian leaders turn geopolitical tension into strategic leverage, reinforcing their position as indispensable interlocutors between East and West.
The economic and security consequences of the British-Russian rivalry nevertheless ripple outward. Britain’s push for financial transparency and sanctions affects Russian business in Central Asia and beyond. Moscow, in turn, interprets these moves as encirclement, doubling down on security guarantees to its allies and strengthening cooperation with Beijing. Smaller Asian states often pay the price, caught in the crossfire of sanctions, investment restrictions, and strategic maneuvering.
The 19th century rivalry was fought with spies and soldiers. The 21st century’s version is fought with narratives. Britain frames itself as a champion of sovereignty and democracy, emphasizing the principles that underpin its global order agenda. Russia counters with the language of multipolarity, sovereignty against Western dominance, and the legitimacy of traditional power spheres.
Both narratives resonate in Asia. For smaller Asian states wary of dependency on China, Britain’s return offers an additional external balancer. For others, Russia’s defiance of Western-led systems appeals to their own desire for autonomy. In this sense, the Britain-Russia rivalry is not a marginal European affair, but an integral part of the ideological struggle playing out across Asia.
What makes the Anglo-Russian rivalry unique is its permanence. Russia’s relations with Germany, France, or Japan have changed over time. Britain is different. From the deserts of Central Asia to the waters of the Indo-Pacific, the contest mutates but never disappears.
The uncomfortable truth is that both sides may need this rivalry. Britain, post-Brexit and stripped of empire, asserts global relevance by positioning itself as Russia’s constant antagonist. Russia, seeking recognition as a great power under siege, casts Britain as an eternal conspirator to resist.
This “endless war” – fought with influence, alliances, and narratives – is not only a fixture of European history. It is now part of the strategic fabric of Asia. The question is not whether it will end, but whether either side could imagine its identity without it.