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Quislings Over Cambodia? Symbolic Labels and Political Legitimacy

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Quislings Over Cambodia? Symbolic Labels and Political Legitimacy

The recent appearance of Vidkun Quisling in the Khmer-language press underscored a consistent political message: that only the Hun family have Cambodia’s true national interests at heart.

Quislings Over Cambodia? Symbolic Labels and Political Legitimacy

Exiled Cambodian opposition politician Sam Rainsy takes part in a march with members of the Cambodian-American community in Lowell, Massachusetts, Aug. 30, 2022.

Credit: Facebook/Sam Rainsy

Amongst the fallout from the recent border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, politicians on both sides of the border have been looking to capitalize on the tragedy.

On August 12, three days before the 80th anniversary of VJ (Victory Over Japan) Day, the Cambodian pro-government news platform Fresh News published a Khmer-language article about traitors in world history. The identity of the latest figure to be added to the register of traitors was unsurprising: ex-Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP) leader Sam Rainsy, who is currently in self-exile to avoid what are seen by many as politically motivated charges.

More surprisingly, despite his name being synonymous with treachery in the English-speaking world, was a reference in the same article to Vidkun Quisling, minister-president of Norway from 1942 to 1945, who is infamous for his collaboration with Nazi Germany. This raises two interesting questions, the answers to which reveal much about the evolution of Cambodian politics since 1990, Hun Sen’s political strategy, and his exploitation of faux pas on the part of political opponents Sam Rainsy and former Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra: Why Quisling? And why now?

Political Repression and Dynastic Succession

The summer of 2025 saw countries across the world mark the 80th anniversary of the end of WWII in all its theaters. It was in this global and historical context that Sam Rainsy was labelled a “quisling.” Despite question marks over comprehension of the term’s etymology amongst ordinary Cambodians, the backdrop was politically and symbolically expedient for the news site’s editors. That said, grasping the precise significance of its usage requires its placement in Cambodia’s political context.

The fall of the destructive Democratic Kampuchea (DK) regime in 1979 and the installation of the People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) did not bring the curtain down on political violence in Cambodia. The PRK, supported by Vietnam, had to contend with and engage militarily against remaining Khmer Rouge forces and two other resistance groups. Meanwhile, dissidents in the PRK and its single party, the Kampuchean People’s Revolutionary Party – later renamed the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) – were arrested and detained.

During the 1990s, many aspects of the political environment remained fraught. Under the terms of the 1991 Paris Peace Agreements, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, a peacekeeping mission vested with the authority to organize elections in the country, was established. While the U.N.-administered 1993 parliamentary election was won by the royalist Funcinpec party, the results were contested by the CPP. The outcome was a power-sharing arrangement in which Funcinpec’s Norodom Ranariddh and the CPP’s Hun Sen, who had been prime minister since 1985, became co-prime ministers. Skirmishes and instances of political violence persisted – most notably with the 1997 grenade attack discussed below.

The 21st century has been similarly unforgiving for the CPP’s opponents. Dissident voices, such as that of the political organizer Kem Ley, have been silenced through assassination, while parliamentarians of the now dissolved CNRP, a one-time serious contender to the CPP, have been assaulted, had their homes attacked, or, as in the case of Lim Kimya, been murdered.

In addition to violence, legislation and the law have proven a useful means to strengthen the CPP’s hand and undermine that of its opponents. To take two recent examples, there have been concerns that the updated (and more punitive) law on Khmer Rouge genocide denialism will be used to muzzle political opponents and ensure that the CPP retains control of the historical narrative, reinforcing the party’s legitimacy and right to rule as the true defender of Cambodia’s national interests. Those who disagree may find themselves on the receiving end of a fine, a prison sentence, and branding as a traitor. Along similar lines was the recently passed legislation giving the government the power to revoke citizenship for “an act of collusion” with foreign powers.

Preceding or coinciding with lawfare and political violence, the language of treachery and incitement has long been weaponized to criticize regime opponents and undermine their legitimacy. This is not a new phenomenon. In 2017, former CNRP president Kem Sokha was arrested for conspiring with a foreign power and was sentenced in 2023 to 27 years in prison. The transition from father to son has not fundamentally altered the rudiments of this strategy, with opposition figures such as Sun Chanthy and Rong Chhun accused of inciting treasonous acts. These examples are illustrations of CPP attempts to control the political narrative in a way that depicts it as the sole legitimate custodian of Cambodia’s national interests.

The political career of Sam Rainsy is a microcosmic illustration of the CPP’s political strategy. On March 30, 1997, at a political rally organized by Rainsy’s Khmer Nation Party, four grenades were thrown into a crowd of approximately 200 attendees, resulting in the deaths of at least 16 people and injuries to over 100 more. Among the deaths was Sam Rainsy’s bodyguard, Han Muny, who died protecting him. No one has ever been held accountable for the attack.

Over the years, Sam Rainsy has found himself on the wrong end of Cambodian law, with prosecutions for defamation, uprooting border posts, and publishing a map showing supposed territorial losses to Vietnam leading to several stints of exile – the latest of which is ongoing. He has also suggested that the law revoking citizenship is directed at him, an interpretation that has been rebuffed by the CPP.

Another important part of the picture is the issue and galvanization of succession. Since the 2010s, Hun Sen’s eldest son, Hun Manet, has been groomed to take over the reins of power; he assumed the prime ministership in August 2023. His ascendancy was smoothed over by crackdowns on the political opposition and the appeasement of senior figures within the CPP. However, the transition from father to son is an ongoing affair. Lacking a power base or legitimacy independent of his father, occasions are sought to reinforce the rightfulness of the Hun family to rule. In recent months, Sam Rainsy and Paetongtarn Shinawatra have provided two such opportunities to stimulate Khmer nationalism and call out “traitors,” albeit of different hues.

The Hun Dynasty Strikes (Back)

The opportunity to “expose treachery” was provided by the latest border dispute between neighbors Cambodia and Thailand. The roots of the conflict lie in the colonial past. The 2025 conflict began with a skirmish in May that resulted in the death of a Cambodian soldier and triggered retaliatory actions from both sides. In late July, the dispute escalated into open conflict, with exchanges of artillery, airstrikes and rocket fire that resulted in fatalities and mass civilian evacuations.

Hun Sen’s old foe Sam Rainsy attempted to cut through the “patriotic” noise coming from the Cambodian government. On June 28, he posted a statement on his Facebook account challenging the patriotic narrative pushed by the government, and claiming that Hun Sen had stoked the border conflict after Thailand announced its intention to crack down on Cambodia-based online scamming operations – operations that he said “have become a vital source of illicit funding for the current Phnom Penh regime.”

Criticism from government quarters soon followed. The statement was seized upon by the CPP-leaning Fresh News, which published a short but scathing assessment of Sam Rainsy. It was at this stage that the traitorous specter of Vidkun Quisling entered the stage. Sam Rainsy’s name was added to the list of world traitors as he was accused of “cooperating/collaborating with the enemy” (sahakaa nung sattrou) (i.e., Thailand) and “putting down” (niyiay bongab) Cambodia’s armed forces.

Based on this, the article even alleged that his treachery was worse than that of Quisling’s. This is certainly unfair, given Quisling’s active collaboration with the Nazis and the deportation of nearly 800 Norwegian Jews from Oslo to Germany, most of whom were later murdered at Auschwitz.

However, for Fresh News’ purposes, the content and nature of Quisling’s treachery was always subordinate to its symbolic function as a container for a treacherous archetype that could be projected onto the figure of Sam Rainsy, or any other opponent. In this context, and with opposition figures being painted as colluders/traitors/quislings in an Indian media report that was subsequently seized on by Fresh News in a renewed attack on the opposition, the law on the revocation of citizenship looks ominously foreboding.

Similarly, former Thai Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra would also be used by Hun Sen, who remains a wily political operator, to turn events in his and his family’s favor. When Hun Sen released recordings of a phone call with Paetongtarn, in which she was heard calling him “uncle” and criticizing the politically influential Thai army, he would have anticipated the uproar it would cause. The result was the same: Paetongtarn was swiftly branded a national traitor by her Thai opponents and eventually removed from office for her conduct during the call with Hun Sen.

While the reference to Quisling and “quislings” in the Khmer-language press was unusual, its utilization was consistent with the tone of Cambodian politics since the advent of multi-party elections – and especially since the shift, circa 2017, from competitive to hegemonic authoritarianism. In the current circumstances, even the suggestion that there might be a political alternative to the CPP and the Hun dynasty is quickly quashed.