The potential rivalry between Pakistan’s Pasni Port, in which Islamabad is hoping to court U.S. interest, and the China-backed Gwadar Port reflects the broader competition between the United States and China for access to resources, critical minerals, and influence across South and Central Asia. Yet beyond this rivalry lies a deeper question: Can this new phase of competition lead to the creation of a shared corridor of peace and connectivity?
In October 2025, Pakistan proposed that the United States consider investing in the construction of a deep-water port at Pasni in the province of Balochistan. Although official confirmation is still pending, according to the Financial Times, advisers to Pakistan’s military leadership have already held preliminary consultations with U.S. officials. The project is estimated at around $1.2 billion and envisions the development of a civilian deep-water port with no military purpose.
According to Islamabad’s plan, its primary goal is to facilitate the export of rare and critical minerals – including copper, antimony, and rare earth elements – with the participation of American companies. This would require building a railway line linking Balochistan’s mineral deposits with the coast.
It is worth noting that on September 9, the American company U.S. Strategic Metals (USSM) and Pakistan’s Frontier Works Organization (FWO) signed a $500 million cooperation agreement for the development of key mineral resources essential to the defense, aerospace, and technology industries. In October, under this framework, Pakistan sent its first-ever shipment of rare and critical minerals to the United States – including domestically produced antimony, copper concentrate, and rare earth elements containing neodymium and praseodymium.
Through this initial shipment and the implementation of a multiphase investment program, Pakistan now positions itself as a growing player in the global critical minerals economy. The proposed Pasni Port project thus represents Islamabad’s effort to diversify investment sources and reduce its reliance on China and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), while offering Washington an opportunity to gain an economic foothold just 70 miles from China-operated Gwadar. Officially, the project is framed as commercial, but the strategic implications are clear: Pasni could become a new anchor point for U.S. economic presence in the Arabian Sea and a counterbalance to China’s expanding influence.
China, meanwhile, has not abandoned Gwadar. Beijing and Islamabad continue to affirm that the Belt and Road Initiative and its Pakistani component, CPEC, remain a top priority – despite mounting difficulties. Gwadar faces four main challenges: insecurity in Balochistan, low cargo traffic, Pakistan’s domestic economic instability, and local dissatisfaction over limited benefits and employment. The region remains a hub of insurgent and militant activity, and attacks on Chinese engineers have forced some companies to suspend operations. Nonetheless, China is deepening its engagement: a new international airport opened in 2025, the N-10 and N-25 highways are being upgraded, and the industrial zone is expanding. For Beijing, Gwadar continues to serve as the southern gateway to its Eurasian strategy.
Amid Pakistan’s instability, China is also strengthening alternative routes. In 2025, a new rail corridor linking Chongqing with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan was launched, reducing transport time significantly. Construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway continues, with plans to connect it to the Trans-Afghan line – creating a land bridge from Xinjiang to Pakistan’s ports. Chinese companies are investing in Afghanistan’s oil and mining sectors, providing duty-free access for Afghan goods to Chinese markets, and coordinating with Kabul and Islamabad to protect Chinese infrastructure. Beijing’s approach remains cautious: it is building bypass routes through Central Asia while simultaneously seeking to integrate Afghanistan into its broader transport network.
Parallel to these moves, India’s own strategic efforts are taking shape. Following the reinstatement of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port, New Delhi has been forced to reassess its strategy and turn toward a land-based corridor through Afghanistan. India is expanding its diplomatic presence in Kabul, positioning Afghanistan as a connective bridge between South and Central Asia. The “Kabul Corridor” (Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan) is emerging as part of a new continental logic, with India seeking to balance geoeconomics and security. At the same time, New Delhi is deepening ties with the Arab Gulf states – particularly Qatar, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia – creating an India-Afghanistan-Gulf triangle that is gradually becoming an element of regional stabilization.
For Central Asia, the importance of southern routes continues to grow. Following sanctions on Chabahar, Uzbekistan has effectively shifted its focus from Iran to Afghanistan, advancing the Kabul Corridor project, valued at around $7 billion. The route could handle up to 22 million tons of cargo annually, linking Termez with Pakistani ports and providing Central Asia with a tangible outlet to the ocean. Unlike the Iranian option, it is free from direct sanctions and supported by three neighboring countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan. Tashkent’s approach is pragmatic: pursuing a stable southern exit without entanglement in major power rivalries.
In practice, both ports – Gwadar and Pasni – open direct access from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean through two key transit lines: The western route (via Balochistan), Gwadar-Quetta-Chaman-Kandahar-Herat-Torghundi-Turkmenistan; and the eastern route (via Peshawar), Pasni-Gwadar-Peshawar-Torkham-Kabul-Mazar-i-Sharif-Hairatan-Termez.
For Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, these routes represent an opportunity to diversify exports of oil, gas, uranium, and agricultural goods, reduce dependence on northern corridors, and join what is increasingly seen as a “Eurasian arc of growth.”
Security, however, remains the decisive variable. October 2025 marked one of the most volatile periods along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in recent years. According to Al Jazeera, clashes in Angoor Adda, Bajaur, Kurram, and Bahram-Chah caused heavy losses on both sides. Kabul claimed it was responding to Pakistani airstrikes on suspected TTP bases, while Islamabad denounced the attacks as “unprovoked.”
Yet through the mediation of Qatar and Turkiye, both sides agreed to a ceasefire and the establishment of a monitoring mechanism. If maintained, this truce could become the first step toward building collective security mechanisms for regional transit routes – possibly through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or a future “C5 (Central Asia) + Afghanistan + Pakistan” format.
Against this backdrop, Pakistan finds itself in a complex but pivotal position. On one hand, it remains China’s primary partner under CPEC and a key node for Chinese investment. On the other, it is seeking to restore Western confidence by opening a window for renewed economic engagement with the United States. Pasni has become a symbol of this duality – a mix of economic necessity and strategic risk. For Washington, the incentive is clear: access to critical minerals and a foothold to balance Chinese influence in the Arabian Sea. For Islamabad, it is a test of whether Pakistan can act not as an object but as a sovereign actor in global competition.
Ultimately, the Pasni-Gwadar duel represents not just competition between two ports, but a profound restructuring of Eurasian logistics. Pakistan’s southern coast may soon become the arena – or perhaps the convergence point – of three major strategic visions: American, Chinese, and Indian. While China consolidates CPEC, India seeks a land-based alternative through Afghanistan, and the U.S. explores a commercial re-entry into the region via Pasni.
If Pakistan can balance between Beijing and Washington, and if Afghanistan can maintain even minimal stability, the southern route could evolve not into a fault line, but into a new axis of Eurasian integration. In that case, Pasni, Gwadar, and Chabahar could transform from rivals into interconnected gateways – forming a “Eurasian corridor system” where geopolitics gradually gives way to geoeconomics and mutual interdependence.