The eruption of tensions across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in mid-October – marked by a week of cross-border shelling and gunfire that killed dozens – was not an aberration.
Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan have historically been tense, despite the two countries sharing deep cultural roots and a shared history. The central issue in their ongoing discord is the Durand Line, which Afghanistan has consistently dismissed as an artificial or imaginary demarcation. In contrast, Pakistan firmly maintains that the Durand Line is a legitimate and internationally recognized border, supported by historical and legal evidence.
The seeds of bitterness between the two countries were sown following the partition of India and the creation of Pakistan in 1947, when Afghanistan demanded the establishment of an independent Pashtunistan. This proposal suggested that Pakistan should allow the Pashtuns in its Pashtun-dominated areas the option to secede and form an independent state. As a result, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan’s admission to the United Nations, arguing that Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (formerly known as the North West Frontier Province) should not be recognized as part of Pakistan until the Pashtuns there were given a chance to choose independence.
Despite Afghanistan’s objections, Pakistan was admitted to the United Nations, after which Kabul initiated a series of attacks against Pakistan. On September 30, 1950, Pakistan was attacked by Afghan tribesmen, supported by regular Afghan troops, who crossed the border approximately 30 miles northeast of Chaman in Balochistan. Pakistani forces quickly repelled the assault, driving the invaders back across the border into Afghanistan within six days of fighting.
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan again deteriorated in 1955 when Islamabad announced plans to bring its tribal territories under direct administrative control. This move prompted a fierce response from then-Afghan Prime Minister Sardar Mohammed Daoud Khan, who condemned Pakistan’s actions in a radio broadcast from Kabul on March 29. Within days, anti-Pakistan demonstrations – reportedly backed by the Afghan authorities – erupted across major Afghan cities. Mobs tore down Pakistani flags and raised the Pashtunistan banner over the Pakistan Embassy in Kabul. The crisis led both countries to recall their ambassadors, freezing diplomatic relations until they were eventually restored in 1957.
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations worsened again in 1960-61 when Afghanistan launched its Bajaur campaign. In late September 1960, Afghan irregulars crossed into Pakistan’s Bajaur area but fled after clashing with local tribesmen and suffering heavy casualties. Afghanistan had also stationed regular military forces and resources, including tanks, along the border near Bajaur. Pakistan responded by using its airpower to bombard Afghan forces, which quelled hostilities. During this period, Afghan forces also infiltrated Dir but were repelled by Pakistani forces.
In May 1961, clashes broke out again on another stretch of the border, this time at the Khyber Pass, where regular Afghan forces attacked Pakistani posts. The Pakistani air force bombed Afghan positions in response. Following additional skirmishes in the fall of 1961, Afghanistan and Pakistan formally severed diplomatic relations. The shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, mediated a détente between the two nations in 1963. The resulting peace would last only for a decade.
Sardar Daoud Khan deposed his cousin, King Mohammad Zahir Shah, on July 17, 1973. With Zahir Shah’s dethronement, Afghanistan and Pakistan’s relations entered a new phase of turbulence, as Daoud was a fervent advocate of the Pashtunistan cause. His commitment to the Pashtunistan idea significantly contributed to the collapse of the peace deal between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Soon after taking power, he brought the border dispute to the forefront, advocating for an independent state that included not only Pakistan’s predominantly Pashtun regions but also its majority Baloch areas. His regime supported Pashtun and Baloch nationalist groups by providing them with sanctuary, arms, and ammunition. Pakistan regarded these actions as a severe provocation and a direct threat to its territorial integrity. At the time, Pakistan was still recovering from the loss of East Pakistan – now Bangladesh – in 1971 and its government was deeply afraid of losing more territory to ethnic-based independence movements.
To counter the growing Afghan threat, the then-Pakistani president, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, crafted a two-pronged strategy. The first aimed to quell nationalist uprisings within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, then known as the North West Frontier Province. The second, referred to as the forward policy, involved supporting militant Islamist factions inside Afghanistan.
Pakistan’s support for violent Islamist groups in Afghanistan was a direct response to the Afghan government’s sponsorship of separatist movements within Pakistan during the Daoud regime. Pakistan’s support for these groups increased during the 1980s, amid the Afghan-Soviet war, and continued into the 1990s when Pakistan backed the Taliban during Afghanistan’s civil war. Taliban finally established their first emirate in 1996 after years of bloodshed.
Pakistan believed that groups primarily identified by religion might be less likely to support ethno-nationalist demands, such as those that drove Afghan policy toward Pakistan’s Pashtuns and Baloch populations. Pakistani leaders also thought that Islamist groups in Afghanistan would be more hostile toward India, and this assumption proved correct initially. The only time since Pakistan’s creation that Afghanistan maintained warm relations with Pakistan while being hostile to India was during the Taliban’s rule in the 1990s.
While Pakistan’s support of various Islamist factions in Afghanistan was justified as a strategic necessity, the country would later learn just how dangerous such a policy could be.
The 9/11 attacks changed everything. When the Taliban refused to bring al-Qaida, the terrorist group behind the attack on U.S. soil, to justice, the United States invaded Afghanistan, and the Taliban regime was toppled. While Pakistan was one of only three countries to recognize and support the Taliban government at the time, it was also the only regional state to provide airbases for the U.S.-led invasion.
After their ouster, the Taliban retreated into Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they received sanctuary and support during their two-decade-long insurgency against U.S. forces. Initially, Pakistan believed that the Taliban would remain its allies once they regained power; however, this calculation proved to be misguided after Pakistan aided the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. The Taliban, feeling betrayed, continued to display cordiality on the surface while harboring intense resentment toward Pakistan – a bitterness that revealed itself when the Taliban regained power.
During the period of the Afghan Republic, relations between the two countries remained strained, marked by border clashes and distrust. However, unlike the current Afghan Taliban government, both the Karzai and Ghani administrations maintained an anti-terrorism stance. The Ghani government, in particular, had imprisoned hundreds of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) fighters and their leaders – many of whom were later released by the Taliban, who are supporting the TTP in their ongoing conflict against Pakistan.
When the Afghan Taliban took over Kabul in 2021, celebrations swept across Pakistan – from government officials to ordinary citizens – who viewed their return as a victory. However, this euphoria was short-lived. The Taliban government soon began supporting militant groups like the TTP, leading to an increase in attacks on Pakistan. This surge in violence sparked deep frustration within Pakistan, escalating into deadly border clashes and airstrikes between the two countries.
Like past Afghan governments, the Taliban do not recognize the Durand Line. Some in the leadership claim it to be an imaginary boundary, insisting that the Pashtun land inside Pakistan belongs to them. Their claims have become even more radical than those of the former Pashtun nationalists whom Pakistan suppressed.
Recent clashes along the border, combined with the sharp surge in terrorist attacks in Pakistan, have shattered the long-held illusion among many Pakistanis that the Taliban would be a reliable partner. Defying Pakistan’s expectations, the Taliban have worked to strengthen ties with India, with their foreign minister openly issuing warnings to Pakistan from Indian soil – an unprecedented and alarming move that Pakistan never anticipated.
Pakistani policymakers are now likely to understand the truth in former U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s statement: “You can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbors.” This warning seemed particularly directed at Pakistan, which remains in conflict with the Taliban, while other neighboring countries are safe.
This brief history highlights the failure of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy and the misplaced hopes of the country’s successive policymakers. Although the two neighbors have agreed to a ceasefire for now, history suggests that clashes are soon likely to erupt again.