The Gaza conflict has been one of the most horrific crises to test human rights commitments and adherence to ethics. It has become a defining moment in reshaping Arab political elites’ perceptions of global powers. Although the United States’ influence in this war is decisive, Arab elites’ focus was not limited to Washington and the West. China also became a central subject in Arab intellectual and strategic debates.
China had previously sought to project itself as a neutral and constructive force through initiatives such as the Global Security Initiative and its mediation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yet Beijing adopted a notably cautious approach toward the Gaza crisis. From the Arab perspective, China is viewed as an attractive economic and anti-Western partner, yet its relative silence regarding Israel’s actions has cast doubt on the sincerity of its morally oriented discourse.
This raises a key question: Do Arab elites still see China as a benevolent neutral power, or as a pragmatic, self-interested and balancing power lacking moral commitment?
Before the Gaza War, China’s image in the region was that of a non-interventionist power – the mediator of the March 2023 Iran–Saudi rapprochement, the signatory of hundreds of billions of dollars in contracts with the Persian Gulf states, and the strategic partner behind the Belt and Road Initiative. This approach gave Arab nations the impression that, unlike the United States, China prioritized stability and development over ideology and political coercion. Yet the Gaza War challenged this perception.
In the early weeks of the conflict, Beijing maintained an ambiguous stance: condemning violence in general, calling for a ceasefire, and mildly criticizing Israel. For many Arab political elites, this position appeared overly cautious. They had expected China to take a moral and explicit stand in support of the Palestinians. Although Chinese media gradually shifted from neutral wording to accusing Israel of gross violations of international law, Beijing refrained from taking concrete steps to pressure Israel to end the war. This created a dual image of China among Arab leaders: Beijing is still seen as an economic alternative to the West, yet is increasingly viewed as politically hesitant and lacking geopolitical assertiveness.
However, Arab elites’ attitudes were far from uniform. Their reactions ranged from admiration to skepticism and even outright criticism. It is obvious that political elites have refrained from overtly criticizing China due to diplomatic considerations and national interests, but the position of these countries can be understood from the statements of their intellectual and media elites. Let’s look at four important Arab countries: Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.
Qatar has arguably been the most critical of China’s approach to the Gaza War. Given Qatar’s close alignment with the Palestinian cause, Al Jazeera and Qatari think tanks criticized China’s passivity amid the massacres in Gaza. While officials diplomatically described Beijing’s role as constructive, Qatari media viewed Beijing’s stance as largely symbolic. Al Jazeera argued that China’s position was “more rhetorical than practical.”
An Arabic article titled “China and the Palestinian Issue: Verbal Support without Pressure on Israel” published on Al-Araby, explicitly stated that China’s stance toward the Palestinians is one of verbal support only. The article noted that Beijing is not putting pressure on Israel. However, even in these criticisms, there is a kind of realistic acceptance: Qatari elites acknowledge that China is becoming part of the inevitable power equation in the region.
In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) adopted a distinctly pragmatic stance. For Abu Dhabi, China should not be judged or measured by Western standards. Rather, Beijing symbolizes a “futuristic power” – one that promotes stability, trade, and technocratic governance. Emirati officials view China’s neutrality in Gaza not as weakness but as a deliberate policy of “profitable impartiality.”
“China remains a key player in the global economy and its economic trajectory is very important for Abu Dhabi,” Massimo Falcioni, chief competitiveness officer at the Abu Dhabi Investment Office (ADIO), said in a recent interview with China Daily.
This view has led Emirati analysts to consider China as a potential mediator in resolving critical regional issues. Mohammed bin Al Nahyan, Emir of the United Arab Emirates, stressed at the opening session of the 10th Ministerial Meeting of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum that the UAE believes that peace in Gaza is possible through cooperation between Arab countries and China, along with international efforts.
In Saudi Arabia, political leaders considered Beijing’s cautious position a calculated move, aware that any explicit stance could jeopardize joint investments. Yet Saudi intellectuals and media figures – particularly after Washington’s overt support for Tel Aviv – called on China to take a clearer position to establish genuine strategic balance. Independent Arabia argued that “Beijing exploits the Gaza crisis to advance its strategic interests while maintaining rhetorical solidarity with Palestinians.”
In Egypt, reactions were complex. Veteran journalists and analysts with a pan-Arab background described China’s restraint as consistent with its “soft diplomacy.” The Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies (ACPSS) noted that China supports Palestinian refugees and calls for ending the war but cannot fully meet Arab expectations due to its own strategic limitations.
Meanwhile, younger Egyptian scholars in international relations argued that China is quietly building a “gradual soft influence” through economics, culture, and technology – an influence less immediate but more enduring than U.S. military intervention. These scholars also believe Beijing, with Egyptian and Iranian backing, aims to erode U.S. dominance in the Middle East.
Two competing discourses have thus emerged among Arab elites regarding China’s role. One portrays China as a cautious yet indispensable partner; the other sees it as a morally insufficient but balancing power.
Ultimately, the Gaza War pushed Arab elites from idealism toward realism in their perception of China. For them, Beijing is not a savior but a balancing instrument – a way to manage dependency without severing ties with the United States.
Apart from the critical view of some Arab media, the Gaza crisis caused Arabs to look at China as an alternative power. Although its position is ambiguous, the fact that China was raised alongside the U.S. in the discourse of Arab elites indicates the breaking of the U.S. monopoly on shaping regional narratives.
At the same time, the Gaza War demonstrates that China still avoids assuming political and security responsibilities in the region – a necessary step if it wishes to become a credible geopolitical actor. Beijing’s passive position provides an opportunity for the United States to play a major role and keep the Arab countries on its side.
For its part, China seeks presence without deep engagement and influence without responsibility. This strategy, while cost-effective, risks undermining its international prestige as a global leader. Unless China redefines its normative diplomacy, it will remain an economic giant but a geopolitical dwarf in the Arab imagination.