The Bangsamoro peace process in the southern Philippines faces one of its most sensitive periods since the signing of the peace agreement in March 2014 between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the largest Muslim armed group in the Philippines. A recent Supreme Court ruling suspended the first elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), originally scheduled for October 13, after declaring two regional redistricting laws unconstitutional.
The Court found that the Bangsamoro Autonomy Act (BAA) No. 77 grouped non-contiguous localities in violation of the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL)’s criteria for parliamentary districts, while an earlier law, BAA No. 58, was rendered invalid following its legal ruling in September that separated Sulu from the region. The Court held that the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) must first pass a new law compliant with the BOL and reschedule the elections on or before March 31, 2026, effectively delaying the polls until such legislation is enacted.
This pause, while legally grounded, will have significant political and security implications for the region, testing the durability of the political transition in the BARMM.
Election Postponement and Public Confidence
The suspension of elections has understandably prompted various reactions. Many peace stakeholders were not surprised by the legal ruling, yet there was clear frustration over the perceived interference from the central government in Manila. This frustration has been visible in protests in the capital, underscoring the centrality of democratic rights and political legitimacy in the transition. When communities are excluded from decisions over who governs them, particularly in the BARMM, where key positions are appointed rather than elected, the risk is that confidence in the entire transition is undermined.
Legal and technical decisions, however well-justified, can be perceived as imposed, feeding alienation and eroding the trust on which such fragile peace processes depend. This erosion of trust is evident in the growing impatience of local civil society. Many groups have gone so far as to call for the resignation of the head of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on Peace, Reconciliation, and Unity (OPAPRU), the government agency mandated with implementation of the peace agreement.
This frustration has only deepened following the former BARMM chief minister’s statement that he did not resign, contradicting the OPAPRU head’s earlier claim and reinforcing perceptions on the ground that he was removed under pressure. In its most recent statement, the five-member Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT), composed of representatives from two local and two international non-government organizations, nominated by the MILF and the Philippine government, and one distinguished international person to head the team jointly appointed by both, noted that the trust between the MILF and the Philippine government is now “at an all-time low.” The TPMT was formed under the peace process to monitor and assess the implementation of the Bangsamoro peace agreement.
These tensions reflect a broader concern: that when implementation departs from the joint spirit of decision-making that guided negotiations, even institutions designed to safeguard the transition risk losing credibility. These observations underscore that legal compliance alone cannot substitute for sustaining trust between the two parties to the peace agreement. This was evident in August, when the MILF ordered its local commanders not to engage with the OPAPRU, effectively halting the final phase of decommissioning and signaling its loss of trust in the leadership of the OPAPRU.
The broader challenge now is that the public may not fully grasp the legal reasoning behind the court’s decision. How the BARMM leadership and MILF respond at this juncture is therefore critical. This means that clear, consistent messaging, meaningful inclusion of local communities, and transparent communication about next steps, particularly regarding the passage of a law to reschedule the elections in line with the ruling, are essential to maintaining credibility and public confidence.
Internal Strains Within the MILF
The transition in the BARMM is further complicated by factionalism within the MILF. One faction currently governs the BARMM through a national government appointment, while the other enjoys broader legitimacy, having led the MILF during the peace negotiations and serving as the BARMM’s interim chief minister to oversee the transition until March, when President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. appointed a successor. These differences become more visible in moments of uncertainty, such as the present situation, and managing them without eroding trust remains a critical challenge.
For instance, the MILF’s decision not to decommission its remaining 14,000 forces in July, citing the government’s incomplete compliance with its commitments, illustrates how tenuous the situation remains. The MILF’s ability to keep local commanders aligned depends on the confidence that the transition is genuinely Bangsamoro-led and advancing according to the negotiated peace deal. Last month, some former members of the Philippine government’s negotiating team, including its former chief negotiator, stressed the importance of maintaining a unified MILF structure, warning that a split in the MILF could leave its local ground forces more susceptible to radicalization or criminal activity as cohesion and oversight weaken. For now, the MILF appears able to rein in local commanders amid the election delay. However, this influence is contingent on sustained trust in the group’s leadership and the sense that the transition is anchored in Bangsamoro ownership. Ensuring cohesion is therefore a safeguard for the broader legitimacy and stability of the peace process.
Normalization and Security
The normalization track of the Bangsamoro peace process has seen tangible, albeit uneven, progress. Of the 26,145 combatants that have been decommissioned, only 1,286 came from MILF-recognized camps, revealing the complexity of reintegration and the gap between formal milestones and the realities on the ground. The Joint Peace and Security Teams (JPSTs), composed of MILF combatants as well as personnel from the Philippine National Police and Armed Forces of the Philippines, remain a critical mechanism for maintaining peace, supporting ceasefires, and assisting in local dispute resolution. However, their effectiveness is contingent on the confidence that decommissioning will move forward in tandem with other commitments. Under the peace agreement, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces – the active MILF combatants serving in the JPSTs – are among the last to be decommissioned, making the timely completion of their transition to civilian life a key test of the peace process.
Key commitments under the peace agreement, including the disbandment of private armed groups and the gradual reduction of military forces in the BARMM, are intended to consolidate civilian authority. Progress on these fronts has been slow, leaving parts of the region heavily militarized and complicating the full implementation of the peace agreement. In addition to affecting local stability, such heavy militarization also limits the Philippine military’s ability to reorient itself toward external territorial defense priorities, particularly in contested maritime areas to the west of the Philippines. The continued presence of violent extremist groups, entrenched private armed actors, and state security forces underscores the fragility of local security. The 2017 Marawi siege serves as a reminder of how quickly violence can escalate if normalization commitments are not fully realized, threatening both local stability and the broader goals of the peace process.
Implications for Governance, Trust, and International Relations
The impact of the suspension of the Bangsamoro elections and uneven progress in the normalization process extends beyond the immediate politics in the BARMM. In terms of interim governance, delays and perceived national government meddling threaten to weaken the legitimacy of both the BARMM leadership and the MILF, especially when communities feel excluded from decision-making processes. Communities may feel alienated unless they see concrete gains from the transition and meaningful inclusion in political life. Civil society actors, who often quietly bridge local divides and monitor the realities of the political transition, remain essential in sustaining confidence at the grassroots level.
On the security front, confidence between MILF combatants and state security forces remains indispensable, especially given the risks that are still posed by violent extremist groups and private armed actors. As the BTA has yet to pass legislation enabling elections to comply with the Supreme Court’s ruling, political anticipation is mounting ahead of the mandated election timeline. The manner in which elections are eventually legislated, timed, and conducted, and whether the redistricting law in the BTA adheres to impartial criteria and is free from the vested or partisan interests of its 80 appointees, could determine the success or failure of the BARMM transition.
The outcome of the peace process in the BARMM also has potential international implications. International actors who have long supported counterterrorism, humanitarian action, and peacebuilding efforts in Mindanao are closely monitoring the peace process. A stalled transition could complicate cooperation on both security and development, while visible progress would bolster regional stability and reinforce the Philippine government’s commitment to promoting democratic principles in Bangsamoro.
Ultimately, the ability of BARMM leadership, the MILF, and the Philippine government to navigate the current period of pre-election uncertainty, and beyond, will define the durability of the current peace and the prospects for genuine autonomy in the region.