Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the West’s perception of China has shifted significantly, especially in Europe. China is no longer viewed as only an economic security threat but also as a hard security challenge.
Prior to 2022, China was primarily considered an economic threat, or at most a “soft” security issue. This meant that China could undermine Europe’s hard security indirectly, for example, by acquiring ownership of infrastructure such as ports and railways. This could hinder NATO’s military mobility and provide China with access to potentially sensitive data that could be exploited by Beijing and/or transferred to Russia.
The alignment between China and Russia, which became apparent in February 2022, has altered the West’s perception of China significantly. China is supporting Russia; this is a fact. Without China’s political, economic, technological, and dual-use support, Russia would be unable to continue its war against Ukraine. Russia’s other political friends are unable to replace China.
In other words, China has the power to end the war by simply cutting off its aid to Russia. Neither Iran nor North Korea has the capacity, political weight, or influence to enable Russia to continue the war alone. Only China can do so. However, it is well known that this will not happen. This may lead to the conclusion that China is responsible for the protracted conflict in Europe.
Therefore, it is tempting to treat China and Russia as a single security threat to Europe and/or NATO. There are several arguments that support this way of thinking. First, the prospect of a split between the two countries, or even a slight rift, is highly improbable. What binds them together is not trust or a personal friendship between Russia’s Vladimir Putin and China’s Xi Jinping but rather shared hard interests. These interests are not national, but rather those of Putin and the CCP. Maintaining their authoritarian regimes is more important to them than their differences.
It may sound strange, but the ultimate goal for the governments of both China and Russia is to survive. Both Beijing and Moscow perceive the existence of the democratic West (and the United States in particular) as a threat.
In China’s case, the country has been decoupling from the West for some time, and under Xi, the social contract has changed. Security now takes precedence over economic and social development in the face of a perceived Western threat, primarily from the U.S. Once China’s security has been achieved, the focus will shift back to development, as it has since the time of Deng Xiaoping.
For Russia, a China-centered global system would be more beneficial than a Western-led one. Russia’s elites have already accepted dependency on China, as well as a partial loss of Moscow’s sovereignty. Both countries are ready to bear, or have already borne, some losses. China’s losses mostly relate to its international image, mostly in the West, while Russia’s relate to its growing dependence on China.
Despite these points, China’s role in supporting Russia is not a black-and-white issue for Europe. In fact, China poses a much more sophisticated hard security problem for NATO and Europe than Russia does. There are three main reasons why it is unwise to treat Russia and China as hard security actors in the same way.
First, China makes a distinction between the war in Ukraine and a potential war between Russia and NATO. In other words, the war in Ukraine is not important to China because it is a proxy war. Russia’s hypothetical aggression against a NATO member would be an entirely different situation. China would definitely want to avoid this kind of war.
Not only would a Russia-NATO war lead to the closure of the European market, which China still needs, it could also lead to World War III. The latter is a real fear in China. China’s recent references to World War II, including the distortion of historical facts to emphasize China’s victory alongside the Soviet Union over Nazism, and the assertion that the post-war order must be maintained, support this premise.
A third world war could also lead to the use of nuclear weapons. This would not only cross China’s red line, but also encourage other Asian countries, such as Japan and South Korea, to develop a nuclear capability.
In other words, China’s support for Russia in its war against Ukraine does not necessarily mean that Beijing would offer the same support in the event of a Russian invasion of a NATO member. (That said, it is sensible to consider the worst-case scenario in order to be well prepared for this kind of war.)
Furthermore, there seems to be a broad consensus that China has been trying to prevent Russia from using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. Although there have been no official Chinese communiques criticizing Russia for threatening to use nuclear weapons, Chinese experts I met in Beijing in May told me that I should “read between the lines” and that “the nuclear issue is extremely high on the Chinese agenda.” This suggests that Xi and Putin may be discussing nuclear issues in private, with Xi’s role being to mitigate Putin.
The problem with China’s perception of a war between Russia and NATO is that Beijing does not seem to believe that it could happen. China views Ukraine as strategically unimportant and is unconcerned about potential Russian aggression against NATO. This suggests a lack of interest in European security, providing no reassurance to Europe from Beijing. However, in light of recent significant Russian drone and military jet provocations in Europe – not only in Central Europe (Poland and Estonia), but also in Western Europe (Denmark and Germany) – the question arises: what is China’s position on these events? Is China starting to consider the possibility that Russia might seriously provoke or even attack NATO? Shall Europe emphasize those events by talking to the Chinese?
Second, although both China and Russia ultimately want to survive, China is playing hardball with Russia. China’s economic and dual-use support for Russia is highly lucrative for Beijing. By flooding the Russian market with finished goods, China is creating economic and security dependence, which is accelerating deindustrialization in Russia.
Furthermore, China is able to acquire energy resources at a very low price because Russia is under significant pressure. For example, Chinese and Russian firms recently reached an agreement advancing the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline. Details on pricing remain undecided, but there are rumors that Putin and Xi have agreed to see very cheap Russian gas pumped to China.
In other words, Chinese economic support for Russia is a very good business for Beijing. It is a political and economic power play in which China has the upper hand. The fact that China is undermining Russia economically is in Europe’s interest. Is the West, or at least Europe, ready to admit that?
Third, rather than viewing China and Russia as a single security threat, the West – Europe in particular – should emphasize their differing interests in order to increase the cost to China. However, the focus should be on strategic differences rather than minor or tactical ones. One of the main strategic differences between Russia and China concerns U.S. military engagement in Europe. While China is interested in maintaining the U.S. focus on and troop presence in Europe, Russia is interested in the opposite. In this particular case, where Europe and China share interests, there is room for Europe to play smartly with China.
Treating China and Russia as a single threat could be dangerous, particularly for Europe. The West’s priority should be to prevent the alliance between China and Russia from growing stronger. The worst-case scenario for Europe would be allowing China to act with impunity and openly side with Russia. Preventing this will require highly sophisticated diplomacy, primarily from Europe. This would mean not only criticizing China for supporting Russia, but also identifying topics that are extremely important for both China and Europe from economic and security perspectives, but that definitely do not align with Russia’s interests.