The Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement (SMDA) concluded between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia on September 17 has surprised many in South Asia and the Arab Gulf countries. The development followed close on the heels of the leaders’ summit of the Arab League and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation at Qatar, which came weeks after Israel’s military strikes on the Hamas leadership in Doha. While the summit condemned Israel’s attack, it had fallen short of concrete action.
The Saudi-Pakistani SMDA took the world by surprise and has evoked some excitement in the region. However, it has also raised several questions. What is the role and responsibility of either country in the event of an attack on the other? Who does the pact seek to deter? Will Pakistan use its nuclear weapons on behalf of Riyadh, and what will this mean for Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’s neighborhood? Importantly, how does the United States view this development?
Both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have decades-old defense ties. Since 1962, Pakistan has trained more than 8,200 Saudi armed forces personnel. In 1982, the two countries formalized their military cooperation under the protocol agreement, which was catalyzed by the Siege of the Holy Mosque in Mecca in 1979, and regional tensions, such as the Iran-Iraq war, and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
Since then, Pakistan has assumed a greater defense role in the region. During the first Gulf War, Pakistan stationed 10,000 troops, and at one point, Islamabad deployed 20,000 soldiers in Tabuk and the Eastern provinces, under the Saudi-Pakistan Armed Forces Organization.
The Threats that Bind
While tensions in the Gulf region are not new, these have multiplied in recent years. There have been multiple flashpoints involving Israel, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Iran and its regional proxies. With Iran and Israel carrying out strikes on Doha, it was obvious that the Arab Gulf countries would not remain insulated from broader regional tensions. Meanwhile, for Pakistan, the 87-hour war with India in May this year and New Delhi’s unilateral abeyance of the Indus Waters Treaty, and the persistent threat of terrorism have forced it to search for credible partners to provide it with a steady supply of oil, and timely economic assistance, both in times of peace and hostilities.
A mutual defense agreement between Pakistan and the Saudi kingdom was in the works for years. The Israeli military strikes on Doha on September 9 may have sped up the finalizing of the pact and propelled Islamabad and Riyadh to sign the agreement on September 20.
The agreement conflates an attack on either country as an attack against the other. This has prompted some to sound the alarm about what it means for a crisis between India and Pakistan. Would the Saudis back Pakistan against India? India’s former Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal called Riyadh’s agreement with Islamabad a “grave misstep.”
However, in the event of India-Pakistan hostilities, Riyadh is unlikely to send troops to Pakistan, primarily because India is Riyadh’s second-largest trading partner. Indeed, in recent years, Riyadh has preferred to step in quickly to defuse an India-Pakistan crisis rather than take sides. It played an active role as a crisis manager to end hostilities between India and Pakistan in 2019 and 2025.
More importantly, until now, it is Riyadh that has relied on Pakistan for military personnel and not vice versa. And it is unlikely that Islamabad will send its troops to be deployed in a military stand-off between the Saudis and Tehran or the Houthis. This is for three reasons: First, Pakistan wants to avoid the extension of Shia-Sunni fissures to its domestic situation. Second, Islamabad will be inclined to preserve the Beijing-mediated thaw between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Third, Tehran’s cooperation is critical for Islamabad to quell militancy in Balochistan.
For now, Riyadh’s chief motivation is to deter via conventional show of power, hostile actions from Tel Aviv. For Pakistan, the deal brings the prospects of financial and military support from Riyadh but at the cost of deeper entanglement in Gulf rivalries, which Islamabad has historically tried to navigate cautiously.
For Riyadh, this defense agreement ensures the creation of a requisite security environment to diversify its oil-dependent economy as part of Vision 2030. To this end, Pakistan and the Saudis will reinforce existing military cooperation in multiple areas: increasing joint military exercises, improving Riyadh’s capacity with training personnel, enhancing intelligence sharing, increasing the number of Pakistani defense personnel deployed in Saudi Arabia, and improving integration of Saudi Arabia’s conventional command and control. Yet, the bigger question of SMDA remains: whether its deterrence provisions implicitly cover guarantees of extended nuclear deterrence. This ambiguity stems from both historical precedent and recent political signaling.
Nuclear Umbrella or Not?
For decades, speculation about a Pakistani-Saudi nuclear connection has lingered in the background. Former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s references to the so-called “Islamic Bomb” in the 1970s, and Riyadh’s financial bailout of Islamabad after the May 1998 nuclear tests, fed recurring rumors that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, or technology, might one day be available to Saudi Arabia. While these suspicions were long treated as speculation, the ambiguity around the new SMDA and the statements that followed have reignited this debate.
A few developments, in particular, have sparked the nuclear question. First, a Saudi analyst close to the Saudi royal court, Ali Shihabi, has described nuclear power as an integral part of the deal. Earlier, an anonymous Saudi official also suggested that the agreement “covers all military means,” leaving observers to wonder whether this vague phrasing includes nuclear capabilities. The remark echoed Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s earlier assertion that Riyadh would seek nuclear weapons if Iran were to develop them. Second, and more directly, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif stated that under this “comprehensive agreement, whatever capability we have will be made available to Saudi Arabia.” Later, he retreated from his earlier position and stated that nuclear weapons “are not on the radar.” Although Khawaja Asif has a history of loose nuclear signaling and controversial political statements, his initial remarks nevertheless sent shockwaves across the international community, suggesting a potential operational role for Pakistan’s arsenal beyond its declared India-centric doctrine.
Inconsistent rhetoric risks undermining Pakistan’s carefully crafted nuclear posture. For decades, Islamabad has emphasized that its nuclear program is only to deter Indian aggression. Extending any perception of nuclear guarantees to Saudi Arabia provides critics with an opportunity to question that narrative.
Any slight hint of Saudis getting nuclear assistance, in terms of technology and capacity building, will definitely heighten apprehensions in Iran, Israel and the U.S. Although the current silence from Israel and the U.S. suggests that either they are still assessing the contours of this agreement or they have been informed through backchannels about questions on extended — i.e., nuclear — deterrence. Otherwise, as a traditional guarantor of security in the Middle East, Washington may see this arrangement as a challenge to its role in the region, which neither Pakistan nor Saudi Arabia would want. In his recent address to the 80th Session of the U.N. General Assembly Iranian President Pezeshkian described the Saudi-Pakistan defense deal as a “comprehensive regional security system” in a bid to clear the air.
Toying with Nuclear Conjecture
Implications of nuclear conjecture also cut across regions. For South Asia, it complicates the India-Pakistan nuclear calculus, raising the specter of Pakistan’s arsenal being factored into conflicts beyond the subcontinent. To counter that multi-regional threat, two allies, India and Israel, can collaborate to open coordinated fronts for Pakistan in South Asia and the Middle East to overwhelm its capabilities. For the Middle East, with speculations of nuclear overtones, it also escalates the stakes in the Saudi–Iran rivalry, which could encourage Tehran to double down on its own deterrence measures. For Saudis, the agreement may strengthen their deterrence posture but risks creating a dependency on Pakistani guarantees, raising questions about Riyadh’s long-term strategic autonomy.
Ultimately, while the SMDA has been framed as a defensive pact, there are concerns that need to be addressed. There is a lack of clarity whether this deal is more about the intent of the Saudis to diversify their security partnerships or about the battlefield commitments. More importantly, Islamabad will need to figure out a balance between its primary commitments in South Asia, as well as additional responsibilities in the tense region of the Arab Gulf.