Since the fall of the Awami League (AL) government in Bangladesh on August 5, 2024, following a student-led mass uprising, religious violence has surged in the country. Attacks on religious minority communities, especially Hindus, have grown. Besides, differences within the Muslim majority over doctrinal interpretations, control of religious sites, and political influence have come to the fore, erupting in violent clashes.
Muslims comprise 91 percent of Bangladesh’s population, and the community is not monolithic.
There are Qawwmi scholars, who are mostly madrassa-centric; Ahl-e-Sunnah or Barelvi followers, who emphasize Sufi rituals; Deobandi revivalists, who promote a more fundamentalist interpretation of Islam; and Salafi, Wahabi, or Sunni reformists. They have all coexisted. But increasingly, their ideological differences have turned violent.
For many years, Bangladesh was a Sufi-influenced, tolerant society in which Hindus and Muslims lived side by side, celebrating each other’s festivals and respecting local traditions. However, after the 1971 Liberation War, political Islam gathered momentum, and Islamic elements were institutionalized in governance during the regimes of General Ziaur Rahman in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and General H.M. Ershad in the 1980s, when religious networks grew their influence over politics and society.
During the 1990s, financial and ideological support from the Gulf states strengthened Wahabi, Salafi, and Deobandi groups. Meanwhile, Qawwmi madrassas mushroomed across the country, providing religious education to many thousands of men even as they expanded their influence over religious, social, and political institutions.
In the long run, the various interpretations of Islam became entangled with local struggles for power and competition, creating a ground for conflict.
Intra-Muslim violence has grown over the past year. On December 18, 2024, violent clashes erupted between followers of Maulana Saad Kandhalvi (Sadpanthis) and Maulana Zubair Ahmad (Jubairpanthis) in Tongi, Gazipur, over control of the Ijtema (an annual Muslim congregation) grounds. The confrontation left at least four dead and 50 injured.
On September 5 this year, hundreds of people attacked the shrine of Nurul Haque, also known as Nural Pagla, in Goalanda, Rajbari, then went on to exhume his body and set it on fire, over a dispute over the grave’s design. One person was killed and more than 20 were injured in the violence.
On September 6, there were clashes between Qawwmi madrassa students and Sunni Muslim Jashne Julus followers at Hathazari in Chittagong, which left hundreds of people injured. The situation came under control only after the army was deployed.
At Paba in Rajshahi, hundreds of people attacked a khanqah (Sufi lodge) during a three-day Milad-un-Nabi (Prophet’s birthday) celebration. Police present at the site were unable to prevent the assault. Shrines in Barguna, Dinajpur, and Mymensingh were also vandalized and food prepared for devotees was destroyed.
In the first five-and-a-half months after the Hasina government’s fall, at least 44 attacks occurred on 40 shrines across Bangladesh, with Dhaka Division witnessing 17 incidents, Chittagong 10, and Mymensingh 7. These attacks have created a climate of fear, discouraging devotees and ordinary citizens from visiting their respected holy sites.
Aside from shrine attacks, mob violence on alleged blasphemers has also increased. On August 20, a Belgian expatriate’s ancestral home was attacked for alleged blasphemy.
Several factors are driving this increase in religious violence. Political changes in Bangladesh have resulted in weak law enforcement, encouraging violent expressions of disputes. Core doctrinal differences are typically portrayed by groups as the “true” or “pure” version of Islam; in the eyes of their followers, this legitimizes not only their position, but also confrontation with potentially rival groups. These views are energized by social media, which rapidly disseminates rumors and mobilizes crowds. Moreover, widespread youth unemployment and disaffection among graduates of madrassa education have made young men more aggressive. They can be easily incited to engage in violence, whether over issues of faith or on orders from their religious leaders.
Moreover, Islam-based right-wing politics is on the rise. The influence of Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and other similar parties has been steadily growing. For the first time in history, candidates backed by JI’s student wing, Islami Chhatra Shibir, won all the major posts in the Dhaka University student union election. A similar outcome was seen in the Jahangirnagar University student polls. This clearly indicates that people are leaning toward right-wing politics.
Although these religion-based parties are not openly attacking each other at the moment, the rise of the right has created an atmosphere where groups that engage in vandalism and attacks on different intra-doctrinal institutions feel more strengthened.
If the right wing wins the next national election, such violence and disorder will likely continue. At present, Bangladesh does not have a strong secular-liberal political force. The leftist parties have also failed to secure meaningful ground in post-Hasina Bangladesh.
Besides, the mob justice culture, which began on August 5, 2024 with the vandalism and looting of government establishments and the homes of ministers and leaders of the ousted AL regime, has continued to gather strength. Lately, many businesses and individuals have fallen victim to mob violence. This growing tendency to unite in anger — whether through physical destruction or spreading hatred on social media — is dangerous and threatens Bangladesh.
A nation where the majority community burns each other’s holy places and even the dead are not left in peace cannot promise safety to anyone. If the majority tears itself apart in this way, what hope is left for the minorities in the upcoming days?
That is the question now hanging over Bangladesh.