On September 21, the Taliban rebuffed U.S. President Donald Trump for the second time in the last nine months. A day earlier, Trump had demanded control of Bagram air base in Afghanistan and had even threatened “bad things” if his demand wasn’t entertained.
The Taliban spokesperson was categorical in his September 23 reply: “We will never agree to bargain away or hand over any part of our country.”
On being summoned for an emergency meeting by Emir Hibatullah Akhunzada following Trump’s comments, Taliban defense and foreign ministers and intelligence chiefs rushed to Kandahar. There were separate meetings as well among the Taliban leadership.
The recent rejection of Trump’s vague threats didn’t occur in a vacuum.
In January 2025, the Taliban had rejected Trump’s demand for the return of weapons and military equipment, worth $7 billion, that were left behind by American forces as they exited the country in a hurry in 2021. The weapons “are now in the possession of the Mujahideen [or Taliban forces] as spoils of war,” the same spokesperson had reiterated.
In his September 23 remarks to the media, Taliban spokesperson Zabihullah Mujahid broached topics beyond the rejection of Trump’s demand. He confirmed that the Taliban have been engaging with the U.S. on a wide range of topics such as prisoner exchanges, diplomatic relations, and economic investment in the past several months. He went on to use the interview to elaborate on the Taliban’s foreign policy, which he characterized as “balanced and economy-centered.”
“Just as we want relations with China, we also want ties with the U.S. Just as we want ties with Russia, we want ties with Europe,” Mujahid said.
A couple of weeks ago, while in Kabul, I had the opportunity to listen to the Taliban Acting Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi emphasize the regime’s “balanced and economy-centered” foreign policy, while reiterating the Islamic Emirate’s yearning for engagement and recognition. Behind this rather innocuous phrasing, however, is the assertive position that the recognition it seeks must not be seen as a concession, but is a legitimate right due to Afghanistan, even under Taliban rule, as a “responsible member of the international comity of nations.” As one of the elements of this responsibility, the Taliban have asserted, on multiple occasions, that they will not allow Afghan soil to be used against any country. They emphasize sovereignty, peaceful coexistence, and noninterference.
The Taliban have been opposed to linking their domestic policies, mostly toward girls and women, with the prospect of recognition. During interactions with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) officials in Kabul, I was told that the “disproportionate focus on internal policies” by the international community has “overshadowed the achievements” of the Islamic Emirate, which is an “Afghan, Islamic, and traditional movement.”
Two aspects are salient. First, there is no major division among the Taliban in matters of foreign policy. The latest reaction to Trump’s threat, and the gathering of senior ministers and officials for an emergency meeting, demonstrated that Kandahar remains the ultimate authority in laying out the way the Taliban will interact with the world. Second, the Taliban will not trade their domestic policy choices for achieving “recognition,” even if they desperately need to boost the Afghan economy. The last four years has only seen a progressive hardening of their postures.
An important reason why the Taliban have managed to stick to their position so arduously has to do with their success in overcoming, albeit partially, the international isolation imposed on them. This has provided them with a measure of space for maneuver. Though Russia, to date, is the only country to recognize the Taliban, a dozen and half others are “engaged” with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan. Some of these engagements include the appointment of ambassadors to Kabul and the acceptance of Taliban representatives as diplomats in their own country, as in the cases of China among others. Some, like Malaysia, continue to operate embassies in Kabul, though without ambassadors.
Almost all of the countries Afghanistan shares its borders with engage in some fashion. Many others have also engaged – like India, which is apprehensive of being left behind when its rivals, China and Pakistan, are making big inroads in Kabul.
On the one hand, external actors appear overwhelmingly to be driven by their own parochial concerns. On the other hand, the Taliban regime, by claiming a desire for “balance,” has sought to avoid being sucked into a zero-sum game. In this sense, Taliban foreign policy resembles that of Kabul’s early Cold War stance.
Call it realism or opportunism, the Taliban’s core principle of “balance,” if not “geoeconomics” is shaping foreign policy decisions of some countries in favor of engagement with the Islamic Emirate. Nothing explains this better than the cases of India and Pakistan.
Pakistan, despite its problems with the Taliban for the latter’s hobnobbing with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), is still considering appointing an ambassador to Afghanistan. India, in its bid to reclaim its influence in Kabul, is gradually inching toward doing business with the Islamic Emirate, too. The Afghan embassy in New Delhi still flies the flag of the Republic, but is run by diplomats approved by the Taliban.
Ultimately, though, as Muttaqi pointed out, what Kabul seeks is not to be a geopolitical battleground: “Afghanistan’s proximity to India does not indicate its enmity with Pakistan, and vice versa.”
In this sense, the motives behind Trump’s latest gambit clash with Afghan concerns. Washington appears to believe economic needs will cause Kabul to engage in transactional diplomacy, which is likely an inaccurate reading of the situation. In any event, the United States’ occasional reiteration of support for rights of girls and women is grossly insufficient to bring about change. The continuing sanctions and non-recognition hurt all 44 million Afghans, including girls and women. The international community’s hope for any leverage with the Taliban and change inside Afghanistan will be an outcome of actual engagement rather than posturing and one-off geostrategic plays.