The transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) from the United States to the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) once again is a widespread topic of discussion and debate in Washington and Seoul. Although OPCON transition in one form or another has been an official alliance policy for two decades, if not longer, its implementation has been fitful. A constellation of cross-cutting variables has shaped the policy process, at times propelling it forward and at others obstructing it. Successive U.S. and ROK administrations have been inconsistent in how and to what extent they have prioritized OPCON transition, largely because of the cacophonous operation of the different variables.
Recent political transitions in Washington and Seoul brought into office policymakers eager to prioritize once more the policy of wartime OPCON transition, if driven by distinct and potentially clashing motivations. That U.S. and ROK officials appear to have linked OPCON transition with a broader modernization of the alliance could be a positive development, especially considering that changes to the alliance’s military command architecture reflect – and will affect – core aspects of the relationship. Nonetheless, analysts and policymakers must consider the array of variables surrounding OPCON transition and the complex ways they have interacted in the past and very likely will in the future. Otherwise, they will produce poor analysis and potentially counterproductive or even destabilizing policy.
This series of articles explores each of the key variables that have shaped the policy process around OPCON transition and how they have aligned or clashed with one another to either advance or complicate – if not outright delay – the policy. After exploring the “control rod” logic and South Korean “sovereignty narrative” in the first several articles, this article explores variations in alliance command structures over the last 20 years to help chart the path ahead.
Subsequent articles will explore the conditions of the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan, how wartime OPCON transition relates to the regional role of U.S. forces and the alliance, and the role on the U.S.-led United Nations Command in a post-OPCON transition environment.
When thinking about the South Korea-U.S. alliance’s future options, it is instructive to review past efforts. Wartime OPCON transition has been an official alliance policy since the spring of 2007. However, the policy process has been fitful and marked by several different transition plans: the Strategic Transition Plan (STP) from 2007 to 2010, the Strategic Alliance 2015 Plan (SA-2015 Plan) from 2010 to 2014, and the Condition-based Operational Control Transition Plan (COTP) from 2014 to the present day.
Along the way, wartime OPCON transition was first delayed (in the summer of 2010) from a 2012 transition date to 2015, and then in 2014 it was set on a conditions-based rather than time-based trajectory. COTP has gone through its own revisions and purportedly is far from complete, further demonstrating the ever-shifting nature of the process.
The various delays and planning shifts have been driven by a complex combination of factors, including partisan politics and swings in policy agendas between South Korean progressive and conservative leadership, the U.S. control rod logic, shifting strategic and diplomatic conditions, advancements in adversary capabilities and technologies, and evolving (though not always aligned) threat perceptions within the alliance.
Moreover, across several transition plans, the alliance has devised different types of command structures to follow the wartime OPCON transition. From 2007 to 2014 – under both the STP and SA-2015 Plan – the alliance would have dissolved the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), an integrated, combined command structure. Two separate, independent national commands would have been taken its place: the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (ROK JCS) and U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM), the latter evolved from United States Forces Korea (USFK). ROK JCS would have been the lead (“supported”) command, and KORCOM the “supporting” command. This would have been a parallel rather than an integrated command structure.
A couple of key factors underpinned the plan for a parallel structure. The administration of President Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008) promoted a narrative about taking back Korean sovereignty through wartime OPCON transition, a policy of self-reliant national defense, and a desire for a more equal alliance. Meanwhile, the Geroge W. Bush administration (2001-2009) – and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in particular – was eager to inject flexibility into a static, Cold War-era U.S. force posture on the Korean Peninsula yet highly reticent to put U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander. A parallel structure served each side’s preferences.
Interestingly, some defense officials in Seoul initially cited the command relationship between U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) and the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) as a potential model for the South Korea-U.S. alliance to emulate. Upon closer inspection, however, Korean officials dropped the idea. In the early 2000s, Washington and Tokyo were still years away from their recent effort to integrate U.S. and Japanese forces; USFJ and JSDF were simply too separate from one another. South Korean defense officials sought to avoid such a stark separation since it would be too large a move away from combined command structure within the South Korea-U.S. alliance and potentially result in too much flexibility for U.S. forces for Seoul’s liking.
Consequently, the plan for a parallel structure that existed from 2007 to 2014 retained combined elements, and is more accurately called a parallel, combined structure. The post-OPCON transition structure would have maintained combined air, amphibious, and counter WMD components, each of which would have remained under the OPCON of a U.S. officer, not only because of the United States’ more advanced capabilities in these areas but also due to their strategic import. Also, the post-transition architecture would have retained the Military Committee (MC) structure to provide unified higher-level operational and strategic guidance and direction to the national commands and would have established a military coordination center to synchronize operations at the tactical and operational levels. It would have been a parallel structure – without a single strategic commander – but had within it mechanisms for alliance coordination to maintain unity of effort.
Even so, a groundswell of conservative opposition within South Korea, among other factors, eventually led to the alliance to return to an integrated, combined command structure. Under COTP, the plan moved toward the Future-CFC (F-CFC), which will be led by a 4-star commander from South Korea. However, despite the alliance’s shift back to an integrated command concept, the effort to gradually empower the ROK JCS and USFK at the expense of the CFC as the alliance moved toward a parallel structure from 2007 to 2014 was not entirely reset even well into the late 2010s. Bureaucratic inertia toward a more parallel arrangement belied the official readoption of an integrated command construct. The recent annual Joint Communiques from the annual Security Consultative Meeting seem to indicate a concerted effort to correct that inertia and build greater integration back into alliance command relations.
There are several future options worth exploring for the alliance. These include keeping the current CFC structure and formally ending wartime OPCON transition as alliance policy; moving forward with the current policy under COTP toward a South Korean-led F-CFC; or returning to a parallel command structure. Each option presents certain pros and cons and raises important questions.
Option 1: Jettison Wartime OPCON Transition
To be clear, the first option – keeping the CFC and officially jettisoning wartime OPCON transition as alliance policy – is unlikely. Nonetheless, there may be certain benefits to doing so.
The CFC has existed and been refined for about 50 years. To be sure, there are powerful political critiques of the CFC, including the possibility it perversely incentivizes free riding by Seoul and a penchant for escalatory counter-provocation doctrine (particularly by conservative South Korean administrations). Nevertheless, it is a well-institutionalized and successful example of an integrated command. Additionally, certain thorny issues, such as how and to what degree South Korea’s Strategic Command (ROK STRATCOM) integrates with CFC, may be better addressed within an established structure rather than while that structure is being evolved.
If, moving forward, wartime OPCON transition continues to follow the same fitful trajectory as it has in the past, marked by repeated delays and conceptual shifts, might it be preferable to definitively change course and maintain CFC until the security environment on the peninsula fundamentally changes? Such a move would also preserve U.S-led unity of command and help the alliance avoid spurring further institutional and legal incongruity between a South Korean-led F-CFC and a still U.S.-led United Nations Command (UNC).
However, the drawbacks of keeping the CFC unchanged are likely to exceed the benefits. Keeping it would require setting aside two decades of established policy, which itself is tied to a broader effort to transform or modernize the alliance. For Seoul, such a move is a political non starter, especially under the Lee Jae-myung administration. Furthermore, keeping CFC would signal a turn away from the U.S. push for allied burden sharing, which President Lee has embraced.
Also, if seeking greater flexibility for U.S. forces on the peninsula is a policy goal and an integrated, combined structure hinders that goal, then keeping the CFC unchanged is not a good option. Nevertheless, it is not entirely clear why USFK could not recalibrate its force structure to support the current CFC yet simultaneously be flexibly postured for off-peninsular operations. This would seem to be more a function of a new access, basing, and overflight (ABO) agreement between Washington and Seoul than specifically a function of the alliance’s command structure.
Option 2: Stay the Course With COTP
The second option – completing COTP and transitioning to a South Korean-led F-CFC – is current policy and the most likely course of action. This option is advantageous in that F-CFC preserves the CFC’s integrated, combined structure. The bilateral consultative mechanisms and processes developed and refined over the last five decades would remain in place as would unity of command and effort. Furthermore, COTP requires Seoul to increase defense spending and take on more of a defense burden, which aligns with U.S. policy and Lee’s embrace of a more “leading” role on the peninsula.
Moreover, bureaucratically speaking, COTP is the path of least resistance. Although it has undergone revisions and updates, COTP has been the policy framework since 2015, with alliance officials working to refine the process. If the alliance decided to again shift gears and adopt another plan, it would be disruptive and potentially result in further delays.
Still, there are difficult issues and questions surrounding COTP. The question of ROK STRATCOM’s relationship to CFC would be more pertinent in a post-transition context. Once the alliance moves forward and Seoul leads F-CFC, achieving greater “military sovereignty,” there is no going back. Seoul will – as it already does – jealously guard its key capabilities and what it deems as essential autonomous space within which to operate. Additionally, in a lead role might Seoul try to employ U.S. forces under its OPCON in ways that do not suit U.S. interests or operational preferences, resulting in pressures for divergence along national lines? Joint alliance planning, exercises and training will help mitigate these risks in the future just as they do today. Yet such questions cannot be dismissed.
Another important post-transition issue for the alliance is the relationship between the chair of the ROK JCS and the 4-star ROK commander of the F-CFC. The ROK JCS serves the South Korean government in multiple ways, performing national-level man, train, and equip functions, mobilization and martial law functions, and operational command functions, while managing day-to-day security of the country. What will the dynamic be between the ROK JCS chair and the ROK commander of F-CFC if and when F-CFC is activated in a future crisis or conflict? Will the ROK CFC commander be properly empowered to make decisions in an alliance context without undue intervention or influence from the ROK JCS chair?
Also, completing COTP would make managing the relationship between the F-CFC and a still U.S.-led UNC more complicated. The two theater-level commands would no longer be led by the same individual as they are today. The 1994 transfer of peacetime or armistice OPCON from the United States back to South Korea already opened some gaps between the ROK JCS and the UNC: the former took over daily security and the lead in responding to North Korean acts of aggression while the latter continued to enforce and ensure friendly forces’ (i.e. ROK forces’) compliance with the Armistice Agreement. Wartime OPCON transition could widen those gaps. The UNC would likely continue to be responsible for armistice enforcement and remain the optimal institution for coordinating multinational support for South Korea’s security, but South Korean leaders would have to embrace it. Disgraced former President Yoon Suk-yeol did so, unlike any previous ROK president. It is unclear if his successors will continue that trend.
These various questions and issues point to a larger challenge for U.S. officials, namely, overcoming the psychological hurdle of relinquishing, even if only to a relative degree, U.S. control or influence over the environment. Although the F-CFC would maintain the essentials of the CFC structure, with most decisions made on a binational basis, completion of COTP means placing U.S. forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander. Not only does this run into a deep-seated operational aversion of U.S. leaders but the optics run counter to an America First policy.
Option 3: Return to a Parallel Structure
As a third option, the alliance could return to a parallel command structure. A parallel structure would address some of the drawbacks of the other options yet simultaneously amplify or create others.
As was the case in the alliance’s 2007-2014 wartime OPCON transition plans, a parallel structure can retain combined elements. In other words, there are degrees of “parallel,” which could mitigate against too stark a break from the current integrated, combined structure. Moreover, if moving forward with COTP and F-CFC fits the political imperative of the moment for increased allied burden sharing, a parallel structure would require even more effort on the part of Seoul.
Furthermore, politically and psychologically speaking, adopting a parallel structure would achieve a long held ROK desire for full “military sovereignty.” Concurrently, for U.S. officials, a parallel structure would sidestep the difficult question of having to put U.S. forces under OPCON of a foreign commander. Importantly, though, if the parallel structure retained combined elements, U.S. officers would still be able to shape important aspects of crisis response and conflict.
The parallel structure offers another potential advantage. In theory, the parallel structure and shifting division of labor within the alliance it entails may allow U.S. officials more leeway to adopt a flexible force posture on the Korean Peninsula. Since the United States would no longer assign its forces to an integrated alliance command, a parallel structure may reduce existing encumbrances to the off-peninsula deployment of such forces. It is conceivable a parallel structure and, relatedly, an evolved U.S. theater command on the peninsula, would allow for an increase in the rotational attachment of U.S. forces. These forces might rotate to the peninsula for extended exercises and training amid regular deployments throughout the broader Indo-Pacific region. Once again, such flexibility would not be guaranteed simply by a parallel structure, and may still require a new ABO agreement with Seoul.
Despite such potential benefits, a parallel structure raises various challenges. If the alliance shifted its wartime OPCON transition plan back to a parallel concept it would likely elicit political blowback from South Korea’s conservative camp, like it did in the late 2000s and early 2010s. Although many of the most fervent opponents of the earlier parallel plans have passed away, such opposition still exists and could pose problems.
Also, bureaucratically speaking, another shift in wartime OPCON transition plans would be disruptive. Shawn Creamer, who has produced the best analysis of the interconnections and evolution of the multiple theater-level commands on the Korean Peninsula, argued that previous delays and shifts in command concepts resulted in ad hoc and unsynchronized personnel environments. He also rightly noted that bold shifts require dedicated multi-year commitments. If the alliance is prepared to change course, once again, back to a parallel command structure, it must be prepared to devote the proper amount of time, attention, and resources to see it through. Yet, even if such a commitment is made, if a conservative administration comes to power in Seoul, the political opposition to a parallel structure within South Korea might disrupt the transition process, as it has before.
There are also strategic and operational risks to a parallel command structure. By definition, a parallel command structure forgoes unity of command since no single force commander would be designated. Although the alliance likely would aim to keep certain combined elements intact within the parallel structure, relinquishing unity of command opens more potential space for bifurcation along national lines or simply greater discordance in overall unity of effort despite a shared mission. In a parallel structure, the United States would avoid putting U.S. forces under OPCON of a foreign commander. However, unless Washington intended to abrogate its mutual defense treaty with Seoul and withdraw all U.S, forces from the peninsula after wartime OPCON transition, the United States would remain treaty bound to come to Seoul’s defense.
A parallel structure – depending on the process by which it came about and the type of U.S. force structure, posture, and capabilities that remained on the peninsula thereafter – may cause unintended effects in the minds of adversaries and allies alike. The arrangement could be seen as less credible and perceived to be marked by new vulnerabilities or fissures. Pyongyang may seek to exploit perceived weaknesses , while Seoul may seek its own ultimate deterrent to shore up credibility, namely, through indigenous nuclear armament. After all, another consequence of shifting to a parallel structure would be Seoul’s need to reassess the capabilities required to lead its own independent, national command on the peninsula. Those capabilities would differ from the capabilities required to meet the conditions for wartime OPCON transition under COTP, which, as noted, would result in the continuation of the alliance’s integrated, combined command structure, if in an evolved form.
Command Structures Are Important, But Trust Matters More
Although driven by a range of cacophonous variables, the delays and conceptual shifts in the alliance’s wartime OPCON transition policy over the last two decades indicate U.S. and South Korean officials have grappled with different command structures. That said, COTP is established policy and, unless Washington and Seoul officially decide otherwise, defense and military officials will continue moving toward the Future-CFC. But if history is any indication, officials may again decide to shift gears.
Each option above – from jettisoning transition to staying the course to shifting back to a parallel structure – presents certain pros and cons. However, the above analysis is only a start. Each option (as well as other potential pathways) requires more thorough cost-benefit analysis. Most commentary on wartime OPCON transition merely scratches the surface of the complexities involved. To be fair, even the informed public is generally ignorant of and disinterested in detailed analysis of command structures.
Yet it is important to review how the alliance has shifted between different command structures as it moved from one wartime OPCON transition plan to the next. After all, the devil is in the details. The different command structures are more than just organizational charts, operational processes, and command relations. They reveal each ally’s strategic priorities, which while mostly consistent over time, can and do evolve and could gradually diverge.
Ultimately, regardless of what command structure the alliance adopts, if both sides uphold regular, transparent, and honest communication, they will be able to navigate any future arrangement. If communication and allied trust are solid, unity of effort will persist, no matter the choice of command structure. Alternatively, even the most precisely designed and cohesive integrated structure will falter if trust is broken.