The real story in South Asia today is not tariffs or Russian oil, but Washington’s quiet reassessment of Pakistan, and its implications for both the India-U.S. relationship and China’s role in South and West Asia. While critics of President Donald Trump focus on his personality and unpredictable diplomacy, they miss a deeper truth: U.S. strategy is shifting, and it is this recalibration – rather than short-term irritants – that threatens to inject lasting volatility into ties with New Delhi.
This ongoing shift is a major departure from existing policy, where successive administrations in Washington have sought to deepen relations with India while simultaneously limiting their relationship with Pakistan. Two trends drove this policy direction: growing U.S. frustration over Pakistan’s conduct during the war in Afghanistan, and a greater focus on the strategic competition with China, which increased the centrality of India as a potential net security provider in the Indo-Pacific region. These trends granted policymakers the space to limit the relationship with Pakistan, and by extension be seen as being respectful of New Delhi’s sensitivities with regards to U.S. security and economic engagement with Pakistan.
The Trump administration, however, has apparently reconsidered this approach. Many have argued that the ongoing shift is simply a function of Trump’s own unique personality. And while this may be true to some extent, much of the change in strategy is informed by a reassessment of the United States’ global geostrategy and the ways in which the competition with China is being approached.
As far as the region is concerned, the Trump administration seems to have concluded that Pakistan offers things that are of importance to the United States, especially as it relates to the country’s role in West Asia and the Middle East. Furthermore, Pakistan is home to some of the world’s largest undeveloped copper and gold reserves, which are currently being developed by a Canadian mining company that is seeking a “G-7 financing package.” Washington does not want a Chinese flag to fly over Pakistan’s critical mineral assets, and policymakers also see U.S. investments as a means to guard against a potential Chinese military footprint in Gwadar. As such, engagement with Pakistan is being seen through a different lens, where the alignment of interests is sharper than it has been in decades.
On the China front, Washington is waking up to the reality that Beijing is now a peer competitor, with economic and technological capabilities rivaling – and in some areas surpassing – the United States. At the same time, policymakers know the deep interconnectedness of the two economies cannot be unwound anytime soon, making it imperative for Washington and Beijing to find terms of coexistence. This recalibration, in turn, reduces India’s relative salience as a partner to offset U.S. dependency on China.
Finally, the recent conflict between India and Pakistan also seems to have changed Washington’s net assessment of each country’s military capabilities. More specifically, there is a belief that India is likely to be tied up in the Himalayas for the foreseeable future. As a result, it will be much more difficult for India to commit the expected level of resources into building maritime capabilities that can position it as a net security provider in the Indo-Pacific.
Washington’s Shifting Stance
This shift in thinking comes after a prolonged period of time where Islamabad has shown a willingness to engage with New Delhi and reduce tensions. In February 2021, while tensions were riding high along the disputed border between India and China, Pakistan’s then-Army Chief General Qamar Javed Bajwa called for India and Pakistan to “bury the past and move forward.” This overture coincided with a renewed Line of Control ceasefire, a gesture meant to ease pressure on India’s northern front.
While this ceasefire holds to this day, from Islamabad’s perspective, these openings were met not with reciprocity but escalation by New Delhi. Pakistan alleges that India expanded its covert footprint in Balochistan and pursued assassination campaigns on its soil. New Delhi, for its part, resists dialogue, categorically rejects third-party involvement, and continues to accuse Pakistan of sponsoring cross-border terrorism in Kashmir.
These tensions resulted in yet another India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025, when missile and drone exchanges raised fears of nuclear escalation. Washington, which has historically played a role in de-escalating tensions, stepped in once more. This led to a ceasefire, which the U.S. president claimed to have brokered. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio praised Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shehbaz Sharif, tweeting that both countries had agreed “to start talks on a broad set of issues at a neutral site.” This episode underscored a hard truth: when South Asia flirts with nuclear war, the United States cannot afford to stand aside.
Yet prevailing wisdom in Washington has long counseled against mediation, arguing that U.S. involvement only irritates India while yielding little progress. That advice might have made sense over the last few decades, but as Washington recalibrates its global posture and confronts China’s growing presence, sitting out the India-Pakistan equation is no longer feasible.
This shift under the Trump administration has become a major source of irritation for India, which views dialogue – let alone U.S. mediation – as undermining its strategic autonomy. This reluctance is not new, but its consequences are becoming more severe.
For years, India became used to a U.S. posture that privileges Indian regional interests above U.S. strategic ones. This approach left smaller South Asian states looking elsewhere – primarily to Beijing – to balance what they perceive as Indian hegemony. With greater economic and technological resources at its disposal, China steadily expanded its footprint, undermining both India’s neighborhood policy and the United States’ strategic vision.
Policymakers in the Trump administration’s inner circle want to change this trajectory.
A Tough Choice for India
When viewed through shifting strategic realities, it becomes clear that U.S. and Indian interests regarding Pakistan are diverging. For Washington, a more normal relationship between India and Pakistan is now essential to advancing its regional objectives.
Without normalization, India will remain consumed by its Himalayan front, unable to build the maritime capabilities that the U.S. envisions as central to countering Chinese naval expansion. The rivalry also fuels proxy conflicts, destabilizing the region and complicating U.S. ambitions in places like Balochistan, where Washington seeks access to critical mineral resources as a hedge against Chinese influence.
Put simply, continued hostility between India and Pakistan leaves U.S. interests exposed on both land and sea. Unless India recalibrates, Washington will face a region where New Delhi is too tied down to serve as a counterweight to Beijing, while Pakistan tilts further into China’s orbit, at the expense of U.S. influence and interests.
For years, New Delhi grew comfortable with a U.S. posture that deferred to Indian preferences. That era is over. As far as Washington is concerned, the path to a free and open Indo-Pacific and a stable West Asia runs through both New Delhi and Islamabad. If the United States clings to the old orthodoxy of avoiding the India-Pakistan question, it will undermine its own strategic interests. And if India refuses engagement, it risks a future of sustained volatility and divergence in its relationship with Washington.