From August 31 to September 1, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its summit in Tianjin, the largest in the group’s history. The real spotlight, however, was not on the official agenda but on the rare joint appearance of Chinese President Xi Jinping, Russian President Vladimir Putin, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Images of the three leaders walking together and shaking hands quickly became global symbols of political significance.
This scene sparked immediate reactions worldwide. Many observers argued it went far beyond diplomatic protocol, symbolizing a potential convergence of major powers and raising the specter of an emerging “axis.” For policymakers in Washington, the tableau seemed to challenge the Western-led campaign to support Ukraine against Russia and efforts to deter Beijing through minilateral security arrangements such as the Quad. In the United States, some viewed Modi’s presence as undercutting long-standing efforts to draw India firmly into Washington’s strategic orbit, while others warned that closer coordination among Beijing, Moscow, and New Delhi could complicate U.S. influence in Asia. In this climate, the idea of a China-India-Russia “axis” has gained currency, reflecting a mix of unease and suspicion.
Beijing has sought to distance itself from such interpretations. In his keynote address, Xi Jinping urged SCO members to embrace “true multilateralism” and reject hegemonism, signaling that cooperation with Russia and India would continue to be framed as “partnership without alliance.” His bilateral diplomacy reinforced this message. In talks with Modi, Xi emphasized that “the boundary issue should not define the entirety of the relationship,” while Modi countered that peace along the border was essential for progress. With Putin, Xi reaffirmed the high level of strategic coordination but again underscored sovereign equality, international rule of law, and multilateralism.
The official message was clear: Beijing is willing to deepen ties with Moscow and New Delhi, but it will not embrace an explicitly anti-Western bloc.
Beijing’s Concerns Regarding the China-India-Russia Axis
Despite the summit optics, Beijing is acutely aware that structural obstacles prevent the emergence of a durable axis. The most persistent challenge lies in China’s relations with India, where unresolved border disputes and deep-seated mistrust remain a constant constraint. The 2020 Galwan Valley clash, which resulted in fatalities on both sides, underscored just how fragile the bilateral relationship remains despite decades of dialogue. For Beijing, the border issue is more than a territorial dispute – it is a reminder of how difficult it is to establish genuine strategic trust with New Delhi.
Although China has sought to stabilize ties, including signaling that the “boundary issue should not define the entirety of the relationship,” it cannot ignore India’s expanding involvement in the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy. India participates in the Quad alongside the United States, Japan, and Australia, and has also strengthened security and technology cooperation with Washington. Recent events have only sharpened Beijing’s unease. In August 2025, India’s navy joined exercises with the Philippines in the South China Sea for the first time, a move China views as a direct challenge to its maritime claims. At nearly the same time, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., visiting India, declared that Taiwan’s security was a concern for Manila – an explicit alignment with U.S. positions. These developments both unsettled and angered Beijing, reinforcing its conviction that India is edging closer to Washington’s strategic orbit.
For China, the near-term goal with India is therefore modest: prevent escalation along the Himalayan border, preserve stability where possible, and keep communication channels open, while avoiding concessions that would compromise sovereignty. Beijing recognizes that trust cannot be quickly or comprehensively rebuilt. Instead, it aims for pragmatic management of disputes while pursuing selective cooperation in trade or multilateral forums, without illusions of forging a true alliance.
With Russia, the dilemma is different. Moscow’s strategic dependence on Beijing has grown since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, as sanctions forced Russia to pivot eastward in energy exports, financial systems, and diplomacy. Yet Beijing has carefully avoided casting the relationship as a formal alliance. Xi has repeatedly stressed the principle of “no alliance, no confrontation, not targeting third parties,” a mantra designed both to reassure foreign audiences and to preserve China’s freedom of maneuver. The SCO Tianjin Declaration notably omitted any mention of the Russia-Ukraine war, underscoring Beijing’s determination not to be seen as endorsing Moscow’s conflict directly. For Beijing, the relationship with Russia is valuable, but it must remain flexible and deliberately ambiguous, preserving both leverage and international room to maneuver.
The Lack of a Shared Strategic Vision
The broader reality is that China, Russia, and India lack a shared strategic vision that could underpin a durable bloc. For Beijing, the United States and Europe remain its most important economic and technological partners. China’s growth and modernization are tied to continued access to Western markets, investment, and know-how, making it unrealistic to jeopardize these ties for deeper alignment with Moscow. This explains why Beijing repeatedly emphasizes that the SCO is “not an Eastern NATO” and prefers functional, issue-specific cooperation – such as on counterterrorism, supply chain resilience, and regional stability – over institutionalized military or political alliances.
China’s overriding priority is to preserve a favorable external environment for development, which requires relatively stable relations with advanced economies. Although China-U.S. rivalry has intensified in trade, technology, and security, Washington remains the single most powerful actor in the global system. And with Donald Trump back in power, Beijing sees an opportunity to stabilize security relations with the United States while deepening economic and political ties with major EU states. Chinese leaders understand that leaning too heavily on tactical partners like Russia could alienate Germany, France, and the United Kingdom – states whose markets, energy resources, and technologies are vital to China’s modernization.
For Beijing, the Tianjin summit was less about forging a new trilateral axis and more about managing global perceptions. The image of Xi, Putin, and Modi together was potent, but China’s message remained clear: it seeks cooperation with Russia and India under the rubric of “partnership without alliance.” Tianjin therefore revealed not the birth of a bloc, but the new dynamic of China’s diplomacy: willing to stand with non-Western partners firmly, yet determined to avoid Cold War–style alliances. Beijing’s long-term trajectory remains flexible and pragmatic – aligning when useful, but resisting any formal “axis” that could endanger its global balancing act.