The recent Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, held in Tianjin, China from August 31 to September 1, provided some striking visual symbolism. Global leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, China’s Xi Jinping, and India’s Narendra Modi were seen walking together and embracing, projecting a message of unity and shared purpose on the global stage. Yet, a complex reality lies behind this tactful pageantry.
Despite the outright show of cohesion and unity, deep divisions persist among the member states on core issues such as terrorism, water rights, regional hegemony, and control over the SCO’s institutional directions. The substantive discord, hidden under the symbolic unity, underscores the limitations of strategic symbolism in resolution of internal disputes and geopolitical tensions among the member states.
The joint communique issued after the Tianjin summit appeared to have struck a delicate and rare balance in the case of terrorism. While condemning the Pahalgam attack in India and providing India with the long-desired acknowledgement of its security concerns, the declaration also condemned the Jaffer Express hijacking and Khuzdar bombing in Pakistan, giving Islamabad a feeling of diplomatic success as well. It is important to note that for Pakistan, it is the first time that any multilateral forum has explicitly referenced these attacks, which Islamabad has long linked to external involvement. Thus, both Indian and Pakistani sides were able to proclaim diplomatic success from the comprehensive condemnation of terrorism in the joint communique.
The reality though, lies in the details of the addresses by leaders from both sides. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s caution against “double standards” in the fight against terrorism – though without explicit mention of Pakistan – left little to no doubt in the minds of the audience. He also reiterated India’s “red lines” of sovereignty.
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif raised concerns against the “use of terror as a tool,” an equally pointed reference but without clearly naming India. He also mentioned the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, reiterating Pakistan’s position that regional stability fundamentally hinges on water security and treaty obligations.
As subtle as these barbs may be, they indicate a clear undertone of different threat perceptions and different preferences by both states.
Meanwhile, India and China projected an image of partnership on the sidelines of the SCO Tianjin summit. Modi and Xi, building on Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to New Delhi, reaffirmed a pragmatic and balanced relationship, acknowledging progress on border stabilization, greater people-to-people engagement, expanding economic ties, and shared leadership in multilateral forums. The rhetoric clearly depicted a thaw, showing that Beijing and New Delhi are inclined toward cooperation rather than rivalry.
Yet underneath these optics, the limitations of China-India cooperation were clearly evident. In contrast to the firm Chinese alignment with Moscow, Modi refrained from offering explicit support for Russia in the Ukraine conflict. In a carefully calculated diplomatic itinerary, Modi visited Japan just before arriving in Tianjin, and intentionally left China before the 2025 Victory Day parade in Beijing – to which he was invited – showing India’s hesitancy in openly embracing alignment symbolism.
Most tellingly, Modi’s speech at the summit contained lines like “connectivity that bypasses sovereignty loses both trust and meaning” pointing toward the longstanding Indian objections to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
These nuanced yet telling choices by New Delhi reflect a carefully calibrated approach: India is using the SCO summit as a symbolic signal to the United States and the West, while still keeping the door open by avoiding an outright tilt toward China and Russia.
For his part, Putin leaned toward familiar themes at the summit, naming the SCO as a “powerful locomotive of multipolarity” and a foundation of “fairer, balanced” world order shaped in contrast to the crumbling Euro-Atlantic centric order. True to his traditional playbook, the Russian president’s emphasis remained on hard security. Putin’s pledge of support for new regional counterextremism and anti-narcotics centers in Tashkent and Dushanbe signaled continuity with Russia’s longstanding view of the SCO as a Eurasian security stabilizer.
When Putin did address economics, he echoed Beijing in demanding a “genuine multilateralism.” He urged reducing exposure to Western sanctions and proposed trade in local currencies, joint SCO bonds, and parallel payment systems. These ideas evidently lack institutional grounding, however, showing that Moscow’s role at the summit was more declaratory than directive.
Hence, Russia’s presence at the summit was motivated by its need to maintain visibility rather than driven by concrete proposals or initiatives that would direct the organization’s trajectory. Putin’s role in Tianjin may have been symbolically powerful, but it contrasts with China’s ability to translate symbolism into actual institutional initiatives, something long demanded of the SCO by its members.
Despite various frictions reflected between the key members at the Tianjin Summit, China ensured that the gathering produced tangible and concrete outcomes. From announcement of a 10-year roadmap for cooperation to the creation of the SCO Development Bank, Xi floated institutional proposals that were not just abstract slogans but actionable deliverables. This was China’s bid to give the SCO much-needed tools to retain its relevance in a shifting global order. These moves were complemented by the launch of six cooperation platforms covering green industry, energy, the digital economy, scientific and technological innovation, higher education, and vocational training.
In contrast to Russia’s reliance on its rhetoric and India’s guarded posture, China’s activism stood out by pushing forward concrete mechanisms. Within the SCO, China appeared as the primary agenda-setter, reiterating the organization’s resilience despite many geopolitical divisions among the member states.
While a few members traded barbs and some remained consumed by their need to resist Western dominance through symbolism, China remained forward-looking to keep the SCO’s momentum intact. This ability to transform summits into platforms of actionable deliverables rather than just slogans and mere declarations is something that was direly needed for the SCO and its quest for relevance. Beijing proved itself as the organization’s anchor and in doing so ensured that the SCO remains a relevant regional and global actor.
The Tianjin Summit was a stark reminder that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is neither the bloc of harmony its pageantry suggests nor the fractured forum its critics might dismiss. The institutional deliverables suggest that all might not be lost. Above the typical symbolism, the SCO managed to achieve most of what was needed to substantiate the relevance of the forum in the regional and global context. The momentum that was witnessed at the summit can only translate into real change if the organization can transcend rivalries among the member states.