Conventional wisdom in Japan has long held that young people are political non-entities. Take, for example, a quote from Takashima Soichiro, then mayor of Fukuoka City, in a 2022 interview: “The population of elderly people already outnumbers the younger generation, so even if every young person voted, it wouldn’t make a difference. The aging and declining birthrate has progressed to the point where change is impossible.”
Takashima’s pessimistic observation reflected the general understanding that the sheer size of the elderly population made it difficult for the voices of the youth to be heard during elections. At the time of the interview, the term “silver democracy” had already become commonplace in political discourse.
However, the results of the most recent upper house election seem to cast doubt on the long-standing assumption that young people are politically irrelevant. The reason is that the two parties that gained the most – in both seats and proportional ballots – were the Democratic Party for the People (DPFP) and Sanseito, both of which were overwhelmingly supported by young voters. According to exit polls, both the DPFP and Sanseito significantly outperformed the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) among voters aged 18 to 40. In the proportional ballot – an indicator of actual popularity – the two parties came in second and third place, respectively, making them the first- and second-largest vote-getting opposition parties.
Following the election, both parties have continued to maintain higher approval ratings than the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), which has long been the main opposition party. That’s why the CDP, despite having the most seats among opposition parties in the Diet, described its performance in the election as a “de facto defeat.”
Not long ago, Japanese youth were widely seen as loyal supporters of the LDP. In November 2021, for example, media outlets were asking: “Why does the youth vote for the LDP?” However, the party’s recent dramatic decline in youth support suggests that their loyalty was not rooted in ideology, but rather in the perception that the LDP was a party that – at least in appearance – fought for their interests. Much of this image could be attributed to the policies and rhetoric of the late Abe Shinzo, who served as prime minister from 2012 to 2020.
Although Abe’s politics were more conservative than those of the average voter, his willingness to challenge the status quo – through policies such as constitutional revision, implementing an “extraordinary” monetary policy, and promising to act as a “drill” that could break through vested interests – resonated with the youth’s general openness to new ways of doing things. Abe’s influence partly explains why Sanseito – whose views align with some of Abe’s more controversial positions, such as historical revisionism and traditional social policies – has performed well, particularly among voters in their 40s who were politically shaped by Abe during their youth.
At the core of the appeal of both the DPFP and Sanseito is the same dynamic that once attracted young voters to Abe: a perceived willingness to fight for their interests. This perception is shaped by both substance and appearance. In terms of substance, both parties advocate for a significant overhaul of the status quo, with a particular focus on economic policy. In terms of appearance, both are led by young, media-savvy leaders who often present themselves as cheerful and approachable figures.
This stands in stark contrast to LDP Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru and CDP leader Noda Yoshiko, both of whom are older and tend to appear stiff during interviews and press briefings. The impact of a leader’s physical appearance cannot be denied in an era where most voters are beginning to use social media as their primary source of political information, and where heuristic cues play a critical role in shaping perceptions. There is analysis suggesting that the vast majority of YouTube content related to the LDP was negative.
The electoral success of the DPFP and Sanseito has proven that, if united as a single bloc, young voters can inflict significant electoral damage on the ruling party. However, for these parties to become viable governing alternatives, they will need to develop strategies to broaden their policy platforms – particularly to appeal to older voters – while still maintaining their image as agents of change for the youth. That said, as existing parties with strong elderly support bases gradually edge toward disappearance – a possibility that the parties themselves foresee – those voters may eventually become up for grabs. All generations in Japan have an opportunity to become a catalyst for political transformation.