Since the start of the invasion of Ukraine, analysts have noted that Russia’s economy has been severely constrained by international sanctions, particularly in energy exports and international banking, with more than $300 billion in foreign assets frozen.
The Russian economy, long dependent on natural resource exports to fund its budget and war machine, also faces shortages of critical goods and high-tech imports. Cut off from Western markets on both the supply and demand sides, Moscow has had little choice but to pivot economically to China, rerouting the bulk of its energy exports to Beijing.
Since 2022, Russian imports from China have surged by 121 percent, sustaining Russia’s wartime economy with industrial, consumer, and dual-use technology products such as drones and other equipment. Politically, the two countries are closer than ever. Their so-called “limitless partnership” continues to flourish despite occasional setbacks in trade.
This year, China’s President Xi Jinping traveled to Moscow for three days as a guest of honor at the Victory Day military parade in May, and Russia’s President Vladimir Putin reciprocated by attending China’s recent Victory Day parade in Beijing. Such symbolic displays of political allegiance have reinforced the alliance amidst the changing political landscape in Washington.
Against this backdrop, China’s political and economic support has become a decisive factor shaping Ukraine peace talks, Russia’s future prospects, and the balance of power among Moscow, Washington, and Beijing.
What the Normalization of Russia-U.S. Relations Would Mean for Beijing
The new administration in Washington has upended decades of U.S. policy toward Moscow. Its push for a rapid peace deal in Ukraine can be seen as part of a larger strategy: stabilizing Europe to reduce U.S. exposure on the continent and, more importantly, disengaging Russia from China.
Both Russian and Chinese elites, nonetheless, view this strategy as a sign of desperation, as Washington’s rhetoric towards Ukraine shifted from unequivocal support to pressuring the nation to cede its constitutional territories under Putin’s demands.
The overall situation somewhat echoes the Cold War, when the U.S. positioned China as a quasi-counterbalance to the Soviet Union. The Trump administration appears to be attempting to play the Russia card much like Nixon used the China card in the 1970s. Chinese elites recognize this as part of the broader U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific and its focus on strategic competition with China.
Therefore, amid discussions of Russia-U.S. normalization, it is becoming more evident that it is in Beijing’s best interest to maintain the current status quo. An isolated Russia, reliant on Chinese markets yet not entirely defeated in Ukraine, allows Beijing to advance its foreign policy goals while Washington’s focus is scattered between a variety of conflicts.
The Ukraine war in particular plays a pivotal role as an obstacle to normalization and shifting focus to China. For Beijing, anything that influences the prolongation of the conflict serves its long-term ambition to reshape the regional and global order.
How Russian Elites Spin China’s Role
On the other side of the equation, Russian elites clearly understand China’s long-term goals and ambitions and are pragmatically leveraging the Ukraine peace deal in their negotiations with both Washington and, more subtly, Beijing.
Moscow does not want the war to end without its geopolitical ambitions recognized and its status as a great power affirmed. Despite the benefits of a potential Russia-U.S. rapprochement, Putin, who has survived nearly four years of sanctions and isolation, is holding fast to maximalist demands. The incentives presented at the Alaska Summit did little to shift his position.
On the contrary, Moscow is internally preparing for a protracted war with potential NATO involvement in the future. Externally, Russia is signaling the formation of an anti-West coalition with China and North Korea. Alongside recent violations of NATO airspace in Poland, and subliminal political statements on the sidelines of the Alaska Summit by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, all factors signal that Russian elites are set on achieving their goals.
In this context, Moscow benefits from dragging out negotiations. By leveraging military potential while keeping Ukraine’s territory as a long-term goal, Russian elites gain time. They also strengthen ties with Beijing, ensuring political and ideological cover if talks fail. Waiting out the current U.S. administration is part of this calculation.
Evidence of the China Factor
China’s role is not hypothetical. Moscow, as part of the peace talks, proposed that Beijing act as a security guarantor for Ukraine, which was swiftly rejected by Kyiv. It was a calculated move, as it became apparent that Ukraine would not accept the terms. This collusion became another obstacle that caused the negotiations to stall and provided Russia with another argument against peace negotiations.
Meanwhile, in the circumstances of a disunited West, dwindling military aid, and decreasing political backing from Washington, Moscow believes that capturing the entirety of Ukraine is only a matter of time. Russia has already restructured its economy for a protracted war, and for China, continued conflict is advantageous for its goal of avoiding increasing strategic competition with the United States.
China has gone further by buying liquefied natural gas from the sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project in northern Siberia, a bold demonstration of its willingness to defy Western sanctions. At the same time, not only has Washington delayed its China tariffs for another 90 days, but it also remains ambiguous regarding further sanctions on the Russian economy. These moves once again show the importance for Washington to disentangle Russia from China.
Scenarios and Implications
Moscow, and by extension, Beijing, both continue to benefit from stalled peace negotiations, vague demands, and ongoing Russian advances in Donbas. The peace talks face three possible outcomes, each shaped by the China factor.
In a protracted war with no ceasefire, Russia consolidates geopolitical gains while restructuring its economy and military for potential NATO conflict. China maintains access to energy imports at minimal political cost, and the U.S. loses leverage in Europe and cannot fully pivot to Asia.
A peace deal with concessions offers Russia short-term relief and time to rebuild and provides the U.S. partial stabilization in Europe. This kind of a peace deal also cracks the China-Russia axis, while imposing a short-term setback on China’s influence.
A fair peace agreement, however, limits Russian and Chinese ambitions while allowing the U.S. to normalize the European situation and fully focus on the Asia-Pacific.
Policy measures in pursuit of this goal should include maintaining and expanding sanctions on Russian oil and gas, including rapid secondary measures targeting China, providing unwavering support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and accelerating Ukraine’s integration into the EU or establishing alternative security guarantees with European member states.
The China factor has become the decisive element in peace talks over Ukraine. So long as Beijing backs Moscow, Russia has little incentive to compromise, and Washington’s efforts to disengage Russia from China remain unlikely to succeed. The war’s resolution, and the future balance of power will depend as much on Beijing’s calculations as on Russia’s battlefield gains in Ukraine.