Despite two decades of military crackdowns, peace talks, and policy experiments framed around economic development, the insurgency in Thailand’s southernmost provinces rages on. Fatigue has understandably set in among observers and attention easily drifts to more dynamic conflicts, among them the Cambodia-Thailand border clash, which opened the space for great power intervention and shook up Thailand’s political leadership.
Still, Thailand’s southern insurgency is not something that can be swept under the rug, even if each short-lived Thai government might wish to sidestep it. The recent uptick in violence makes that abundantly clear.
The conflict between the Thai security apparatus and local Malay-Muslim separatist groups in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat has claimed more than 7,700 lives since 2004.
Despite some moves toward peace in early 2024, when the two sides agreed to a peace roadmap in February, the situation in the Deep South is once again deteriorating. While the attacks on monks and vulnerable civilians are not unprecedented, this year has seen back-to-back incidents – targeting young monks and novices, a 9-year-old child, and senior citizens, including a blind woman – that reflect the conflict’s escalating ferocity.
The Barisan Revolusi Nasional (BRN), region’s leading rebel group, has also stepped up its targeting of local Melayu defense volunteers, whose jobs are to guard checkpoints and facilities. This marks a change from the past norm in which defense volunteers were not targeted, provided that they kept away from intelligence gathering for the Thai government and from joining military operations.
More worryingly for the wider public, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were uncovered at multiple locations in Thailand’s internationally-known tourist destinations along the southwestern Andaman coast – Phuket, Phang Nga, and Krabi – in June. As the Bangkok Post reported, this was the first coordinated operation beyond the conflict zone of the Deep South in a decade. Intelligence sources suggest that the operation was possibly orchestrated by the once-prominent but now weakened Patani United Liberation Organization, with BRN operatives hired for the actual execution. Whatever the case, the fact that the suspects were from Pattani was telling enough.
There was an earlier incident in March, too, when four men from the Deep South were caught in Phang Nga while transporting AK-47 assault rifles and ammunition. These operations may do little tactically, but what is beyond doubt is how the southern insurgents are intent on leaving stronger psychological imprints.
Expecting a quick and effective resolution is, of course, not realistic when the conflict is fueled by ethno-nationalism with the addition of localized jihadist elements, and dates back to the early 20th century. The Deep South was formally incorporated into the Kingdom of Siam under the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty, at which point it began shifting away from a more independent sultanate under Siamese suzerainty toward increasingly rigid Thai Buddhist-centric governance. Needless to say, the shift helped create desires for increased autonomy and grievances over the marginalization of Malay identity.
At the same time, Thailand’s counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts, which are rooted in the country’s past success against communist insurgents, need revision. If the conflict in the Deep South is established as an ethno-nationalist movement with localized jihadist rhetoric, the old formula of development projects to address economic inequalities combined with security crackdowns is clearly a poor means of building lasting peace. Following this line of logic, then, it can be argued that the Thai state’s failure to resolve the insurgency might be less about capability and more about its political calculus. In other words, there are structural incentives that make peace politically undesirable.
Four interrelated factors help explain the undesirability of peace. The first – and one few in uniform would want to admit – is that certain elements within Thailand’s security establishment benefit from the low-intensity conflict. The insurgency has justified extraordinary budgetary allocations to the military and internal security apparatus, often with minimal oversight. Inevitably, these budgets have fed into the patronage system that extends from Bangkok to the farthest checkpoints in Narathiwat. Peace, in this context, risks threatening power and profit.
The second factor is the BRN’s growing confidence. The once fragmented and opaque group has consolidated control over public messaging and virtually all armed operations. Strikingly, this is a consolidation built on hyper-secrecy and sanctuary across the border in Malaysia, aided by tacit backing from sections of the Malaysian government apparatus, whose sympathy is underpinned by shared socio-ethnic links. The BRN therefore has little reason to seek compromise with a Thai state it deems illegitimate.
The third factor, which reinforces the second factor, is the BRN’s “shadow state,” which mirrors the institutions of formal governance and extends its influence into schools, mosques, cooperatives, and even state-funded agencies. By recruiting youth early, funding itself through local taxation and donations, and enforcing its authority through coercion and social pressure, the BRN has effectively out-administered the Thai state in parts of the Deep South. It is also becoming more financially self-sufficient.
The fourth factor that follows naturally as a result is the absence of a credible peace strategy. Talks are episodic and performative, led by negotiators who lack both mandate and continuity. From the Thai side, there are certainly authorities who are serious about ending the conflict. The problem is that they continue to regard the BRN disproportionately as a security problem rather than a political movement. Although these forces have achieved tactical victories, such as arrests or arms seizures, these have come at the expense of strategic stagnation. Whether they have access to the real BRN leadership is another point of consideration. As for the BRN, engagements with the Thai government are better viewed as attempts at co-optation rather than pathways to genuine peace settlements, especially when the real BRN leaders may not even be directly represented at the negotiating table.
In short, even if certain elements in Bangkok are content to let the conflict simmer in a contained way, that is a dangerous bet with the BRN’s growing intransigence and boldness. And the longer the status quo endures, the more difficult it will be to change course.
Seriously curbing the insurgency will obviously require Thailand to move sharply away from its current approaches. There would first need to be greater restraint on Thailand’s heavy-handed practices. Emergency decrees, arbitrary detention, and torture – though less common these days – have done more to fuel the insurgency than suppress it. That resentment is reinforced by the continued use of information operations to push the official narrative. A tilt toward a population-centric COIN approach would, in ways big or small, increase the legitimacy of the Thai state, undercutting the BRN’s narrative of occupation and oppression in the process.
Part of that population-centric COIN approach would involve coming up with a counter-shadow state strategy aimed at dismantling the BRN’s parallel institutions through targeted, lawful, and community-led operations. Relatedly, resources need to be invested in systematic counter-radicalization initiatives for young people, particularly in schools, where BRN influence has made deep inroads. Malaysia and Indonesia have established relatively successful programs to prevent and counter violent extremism, and Thailand could learn from those. Besides, energy should be devoted to disrupting the BRN’s financial lifelines. Because a significant share of the BRN’s funding comes from local dues and donations, tackling them requires intelligence more than intimidation.
Finally, the constructive internationalization of the conflict would not be against Thailand’s interest as feared. This means trying to move beyond seeing Malaysia as a threat or a half-hearted facilitator and demanding more concrete cooperation, particularly in denying BRN leaders a safe haven or operational freedom across the border.
The continuation of violence in the Deep South is ultimately systematic. It persists because it serves economic, political, and ideological interests on both sides. For the BRN, the conflict is basically a vehicle for its identity and autonomy. For elements in the Thai state, it secures budgets, authority, and relevance. Bringing real peace would not only require those incentives to change but would also require a strategy that treats the conflict as a legitimacy crisis rather than a full-on security problem. Such a strategy values reform over repression, inclusion over intimidation, and accountability over ambiguity. Anything less is a pause button, not real progress.