Taiwan faces a striking contradiction. While Beijing accelerates its military buildup and 2027 looms as a potential window for action against the island, Taiwanese society shows a declining sense of urgency about war. Recent recall elections, which failed to unseat any opposition lawmakers despite anti-China rhetoric, suggest that the ruling Democratic Progressive Party’s (DPP) slogan – “Resist China, Protect Taiwan” – no longer mobilizes voters.
It’s not that the public trusts Beijing. Instead, gray zone tactics and gaps in government policy have dulled perceptions of the imminence of threats Taiwan faces, eroding deterrence from within.
A Shrinking Sense of Urgency
Despite Taiwan’s efforts to strengthen its defense – extending mandatory military service and setting up the whole-of-society defense resilience (WOSDR) framework – the public does not appear convinced. A survey by the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) asked respondents whether they believed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) might launch an attack within the next five years. When first conducted in August 2022, 28 percent answered “yes.” By March 2025, that figure had declined to 23 percent, reflecting a consistent downward trend.
The trend is striking given that 2027 has been identified as a potential window for Chinese action: Xi Jinping has reportedly instructed the PLA to prepare by then, while his pursuit of a fourth term could heighten political incentives for escalation. The U.S. Department of Defense has also shifted its narrative. Whereas officials once described war with China as “neither imminent nor unavoidable,” U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth recently warned that Chinese aggression “could be imminent.”
Yet Taiwanese society seems unmoved. The disconnect stems partly from Beijing’s choice of strategy. In the South China Sea, Beijing has employed overtly aggressive measures. For example, in June 2024, a China Coast Guard incident resulted in a severe injury to a Filipino officer; in August 2025, a Chinese naval vessel reportedly collided with a Chinese coast guard ship during its pursuit of a Philippine coast guard ship.
Against Taiwan, however, Beijing has adopted a subtler approach: frequent air and naval intrusions, but calibrated to avoid bloodshed. By emphasizing legal claims rather than overt violence, China has gradually conditioned Taiwanese society to lower its guard.
The Messaging Gap
Taiwan’s government has not bridged the gap between its warnings and its policies. Since its establishment in 1993, the National Security Council has never issued a comprehensive national security strategy. Unlike Washington or Tokyo, Taipei lacks an official framework that clearly defines the security environment, identifies likely wartime scenarios, and explains the purpose of specific policies.
This absence undermines credibility. When opposition lawmakers attack trainings for civil defense and urban warfare as reckless, the administration merely repeats that the programs are for “self-defense.” It does not explain why such preparation is necessary against Chinese tactics of encirclement and paralysis. Similarly, the WOSDR framework, one of President Lai Ching-te’s flagship initiatives, emphasizes disaster relief in its public messaging. While well-intentioned, this cautious framing distances defense from politics and leaves the public unclear about the urgency of preparations.
The handling of China’s cognitive warfare further complicates the picture. While Beijing’s interference is real, the DPP’s eagerness to highlight it without offering concrete evidence has backfired. Frequent but unsubstantiated claims have reinforced the perception that “China influence” is a catch-all deflection from domestic problems. This dilutes the seriousness of the threat and risks playing into Beijing’s own strategy of sowing division.
As a result, the public views the China threat as distant, secondary to pressing domestic issues such as wages, housing, and governance. Although Taiwanese voters do not welcome Beijing’s influence, they apparently find the Taiwanese government’s warnings unconvincing.
This poses risks beyond politics. A population that does not perceive urgency will be less willing to prioritize higher defense budgets, new forms of military training, or mobilization measures over domestic issues, such as wages and housing. Taiwan’s deterrence rests not only on weapons but also on citizens’ psychological and physical readiness. If society drifts into complacency, the credibility of deterrence erodes.
Learning From Past Crises
Taiwan has overcome crises before by pairing clear government strategy with public cooperation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government explained the nature of the threat, outlined border and health measures, and specified how citizens could contribute. The result was remarkable: Taiwan’s mortality rate of 0.17 percent stood far below the global average of 1.07 percent. This experience demonstrates that Taiwanese society is resilient and cooperative – when given clarity and leadership.
A similar approach is required today. Instead of relying on slogans and warnings, Taiwan must articulate the security environment in concrete terms, explain China’s likely courses of action, and link its policies to specific scenarios. Strategic clarity should guide public messaging as well as resource allocation, training, and institutional reform.
What Taiwan could Do
First, Taiwan needs a formal national security strategy, one that outlines China’s capabilities, identifies multiple wartime scenarios, and specifies how the government intends to respond. Such a document would help legitimize defense initiatives and counter opposition criticism with evidence rather than rhetoric.
Second, Taipei should strengthen public communication. The government must move beyond general warnings to explain why extended conscription, urban defense drills, and civil defense programs are essential. This requires treating citizens as partners in deterrence, not passive recipients of policy.
Third, Taiwan must incorporate more scientific elements into its defense narrative, especially when discussions of defense policy are politicized by domestic political dynamics. This includes adopting approaches such as enemy courses of action assessments and systems analysis, to demonstrate that its policies are effective. Without rigorous analysis, reforms risk appearing symbolic rather than substantive.
Finally, the government must exercise restraint in political accusations. Opposition parties should not be casually labeled as Beijing’s proxies without evidence of coordination, financial flows, or chains of command. Overusing the “China influence” narrative risks undermining credibility, weakening unity, and feeding Beijing’s divide-and-conquer strategy.
Restoring Credibility
Taiwan’s security challenge is not simply China’s growing power but also its own fading vigilance. Deterrence depends on both strength and determination. If Taiwan’s warnings continue to outpace its policies, public indifference will deepen, China may mistakenly assume that the Taiwanese people lack the will to resist and be tempted to act rashly. But with concrete measures, comprehensive defense strategy, and resolve, Taiwan can reverse this erosion.
Lai has built his reputation on direct engagement with society. He now faces the test of transforming that skill into strategic leadership. Just as Franklin D. Roosevelt rallied Americans with clear explanations during the Great Depression, Lai must unite Taiwanese society around a realistic defense strategy. Without such clarity, “Resist China, Protect Taiwan” risks becoming a hollow phrase. With it, Taiwan can strengthen deterrence and ensure that complacency does not pave the way for catastrophe.