The APEC Summit 2025, scheduled to open on October 31 in Gyeongju, South Korea, has attracted considerable attention from the international community. This is not only because South Korea is assuming the role of host for the first time in 20 years since APEC 2005, but also due to the confirmed participation of U.S. President Donald Trump. On the Chinese side, President Xi Jinping has yet to issue an official response; however, Trump’s announcement that a bilateral meeting with Xi would take place on the sidelines of the summit suggests a strong likelihood of Xi’s attendance.
In addition, the Russian news agency TASS reported that South Korea has extended an invitation to Russian President Vladimir Putin, though Moscow has left open the question of participation. Should this year’s summit bring together both the United States and China, and potentially Russia, it would constitute a notable diplomatic achievement for the Lee Jae-myung administration, reinforcing South Korea’s role as a “bridge between East and West” and signaling its efforts to reclaim a leading position in Asia after years of political, economic, and social turbulence.
Ahead of APEC 2025, three major diplomatic issues are of particular concern. First, the potential for progress in China-U.S. relations within the framework of the summit. Second, the prospects for South Korea to improve and expand bilateral ties with participating major powers, especially the U.S., China, and Japan. Third, the feasibility of resuming North Korea-U.S. negotiations or inter-Korean dialogue, particularly if the U.S., China, and Russia all confirm their participation in Gyeongju.
Regarding China-U.S. relations, Trump’s confirmation that he will attend, coupled with his statement that he would meet Xi Jinping on the sidelines, is a significant signal. If materialized, this would mark the first encounter between the two nations’ leaders in South Korea in 13 years, since the meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Hu Jintao during the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in March 2012. Moreover, APEC 2025 would represent the first face-to-face dialogue between Trump and Xi in more than six years, following their meeting at the G-20 Summit in Osaka (June 2019). It would be the first such meeting since Trump began his second term.
With such a series of firsts, the Gyeongju summit may serve as a prelude, paving the way for subsequent high-level visits. Both Washington and Beijing require official as well as informal channels to address key issues such as tariffs, trade conflicts, and supply chain resilience. Prior to this, the two sides had already demonstrated goodwill through a telephone conversation described as “highly productive.”
Against a backdrop of intensifying China-U.S. competition, South Korea inevitably faces mounting pressures. The failure of the previous administration to balance relations with the two powers remains a costly lesson for President Lee Jae-myung. With his doctrine of “pragmatic flexibility,” Lee seeks to strengthen the alliance with the U.S. while simultaneously stabilizing relations with China. Should both Washington and Beijing attend the Gyeongju summit, it would provide South Korea with an important opportunity to operationalize its balancing strategy and improve bilateral ties with its two most critical partners.
Unlike former progressive leaders such as Roh Moo-hyun or Moon Jae-in, Lee does not approach Washington from a stance of “relative autonomy” or seek to reduce dependence, the policies that once caused strains in bilateral ties. Instead, he opts for a softer, more flexible approach, prioritizing dialogue despite U.S. tariff pressures. The successful hosting of the South Korea-U.S. Summit in August 2025 stands as one of his administration’s achievements, simultaneously consolidating the alliance and securing an agreement to reduce tariffs on South Korean exports to the U.S. to 15 percent, down from the originally proposed 25 percent.
Nonetheless, challenges persist. A $350 billion investment agreement with the United States has been likened to a latent risk, potentially exposing South Korea to financial risks absent a currency swap arrangement and careful policy coordination. Moreover, the detention of 300 South Korean nationals during a U.S. crackdown on illegal labor in early September 2025 fueled anti-American sentiment domestically, further complicating bilateral relations.
With respect to China, Xi Jinping’s potential attendance at APEC could signal a “thaw” in China-South Korea relations, which deteriorated under President Yoon Seok-yeol due to Seoul’s perceived pro-U.S. tilt. Yoon even attempted to blame Chinese political interference to justify his declaration of martial law in December 2024 – allegations dismissed groundless not only by Beijing, but by South Korea’s Constitutional Court, which impeached Yoon in April 2025.
Lee’s cautious diplomacy has been evident since his inauguration: his first overseas trip was to Japan rather than the U.S. or China. Furthermore, while preparing for summits with Tokyo (August 23) and Washington (August 25), he dispatched a special delegation to Beijing led by former National Assembly Speaker Park Byeong-seug. Similarly, while Lee himself did not attend China’s military parade to mark the 80th anniversary of victory in World War II, he sent current National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-shik in his stead. Such steps reflect a careful and meticulous balancing act: avoiding provocation toward China while maintaining cooperation with the U.S. and Japan.
One of the most anticipated uncertainties of APEC 2025 is whether Gyeongju will become the “stage” for historic handshakes, potentially revitalizing inter-Korean or North Korea-U.S. dialogue. The handshake between Woo and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the Beijing military parade in early September 2025 rekindled hopes for inter-Korean engagement.
Despite Seoul’s overtures, North Korea’s responses have offered little optimism. Pyongyang openly criticized South Korea-U.S. joint exercises, dismissed the Lee administration’s three-phase denuclearization plan as essentially unchanged from that of his predecessor, and declared denuclearization to be “unconstitutional,” reaffirming its refusal to abandon nuclear weapons.
At the same time, Pyongyang has left the door open to talks with Washington, provided the U.S. abandons its “futile obsession with denuclearization,” recognizes reality, and pursues genuine peaceful coexistence. Notably, this statement came only three days after Trump announced his planned meeting with Xi, suggesting that Pyongyang continues to monitor China-U.S. dynamics closely. While the likelihood of a Kim-Trump meeting at APEC 2025 appears slim, improved China-U.S. relations through the summit could open the way for a North Korea-U.S. summit following Trump’s anticipated visit to China in early 2026.
For South Korea, pursuing direct dialogue with the North in isolation would prove highly challenging. Instead, Seoul may leverage the support of key partners at APEC 2025. In a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi on September 17 in Beijing, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Hyun emphasized that Xi’s presence at the summit would not only promote bilateral relations but also positively influence efforts to revive inter-Korean dialogue.
As for Russia, although its participation remains uncertain, Seoul’s invitation highlights the Lee administration’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Given Russia’s strategic partnership with North Korea, strengthening ties with Moscow could provide Seoul with another channel to facilitate dialogue with Pyongyang and further operationalize its pragmatic yet flexible diplomatic strategy.
Overall, APEC 2025 in Gyeongju is more than a forum for economic cooperation; it may also serve as a crucial venue for dialogue, negotiation, and the management of disputes among major powers. The summit constitutes a critical test for South Korea’s diplomatic orientation under President Lee Jae-myung in its early phase, and whether his approach of “pragmatic flexibility” can deliver substantive outcomes.