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Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism Efforts Complicated by Political Differences

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Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism Efforts Complicated by Political Differences

The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government’s prioritization of dialogue with the TTP is at odds with the federal government’s focus on military operations.

Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism Efforts Complicated by Political Differences

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly building, Pakistan.

Credit: Wikimedia

Pakistan’s efforts to counter the ongoing surge in terrorism are hindered by internal political divisions, particularly due to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) government’s intention to diverge from federal policies. This has resulted in a scenario where the Pakistani political leaders are finding it difficult to work on a comprehensive strategy to tackle the terrorism threat.

Pakistan is grappling with threats from militant groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The TTP threat has surged in the past few months, despite Pakistan’s recent significant military successes in operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasad.

Internal political dynamics, including differing strategies pursued by the federal government and the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI)-led provincial government in KP, have complicated counterterrorism efforts.

Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy has historically fluctuated between kinetic operations against militant groups and dialogue. For example, during Imran Khan’s tenure as prime minister from 2018 to 2022, the PTI pursued a negotiation-heavy policy to manage the TTP threat. Khan’s approach involved resettling thousands of TTP militants in Pakistan as part of rehabilitation and talks with the group. Back then, this was framed as a pragmatic step to de-escalate violence in the province.

However, critics in Pakistan’s policymaking circles argued that this was also an attempt by the KP-based political groups to appease the Afghan Taliban in order to win their cooperation against the TTP. The policy was seemingly aimed to foster goodwill with Kabul. However, it backfired as it only ended up emboldening militants who had returned to Pakistan, and allowed space for cross-border infiltrations.

Islamabad appears to have learned the hard lessons of appeasement.  Consequently, its current Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N)-led coalition government, as well as state institutions, have firmly ruled out negotiations with the TTP.

However, in KP, where the PTI holds power, the no-talks-with-the-TTP policy shift does not seem to have been fully embraced by the provincial government.

KP borders Afghanistan and bears the brunt of TTP attacks. Therefore, it needs to be a frontline partner in national efforts against the TTP. Instead, the PTI government’s political rhetoric often opposes the federal government’s directives to deal with the threat.

The PTI continues to adhere to the idea of dialogue and low-key operations at a time when all efforts by the federal government in this regard have failed. While this stance is seemingly rooted in a desire to minimize civilian casualties, it has largely been weaponized by the KP government for political leverage against the federal government. KP government officials often frame operations as overly aggressive or unnecessary, and that these could worsen the already fragile security situation in the region.

This rhetoric from the KP government risks eroding public support for law enforcement agencies, which face militant threats on a daily basis. A recent example illustrates this discord.

The KP government independently expressed its intent to host discussions with the Afghan Taliban on security issues. Chief Minister Ali Amin Gandapur announced that the Afghan Taliban had agreed to negotiate with a committee formed by the KP government to facilitate talks. Gandapur also accused Islamabad of non-cooperation and painted the federal government as inflexible in its approach. This move not only bypassed constitutional protocols — foreign affairs and national security are federal domains — but also created a narrative that KP is actively seeking a resolution to the issue while the center remains inert.

In recent months, Pakistan’s federal institutions, alongside allies like China, have repeatedly engaged the Afghan Taliban to press them to curb TTP activities. Last month, at a trilateral meeting, Pakistan and China jointly put pressure on the Taliban regime to emphasize that it was important to rein in militant groups.

Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar said last week that the “Afghan government has included hundreds of pro-TTP elements into its governance fold.” He said Pakistan has asked the Afghan Taliban to either take action against TTP or hand them over to Islamabad.

Arguably, the Taliban regime’s operations against the TTP are at the surface level only and not carried out with full commitment. According to security officials, these operations are often coordinated with the TTP to appear as armed action against the group. However, in reality, the Afghan Taliban have done little to disrupt the TTP’s presence in Afghanistan. According to Pakistani security officials, more than 120 Afghan nationals have been killed by Pakistani security forces in 2025 while fighting alongside the TTP.

The subject of illegal Afghan refugees has also become another bone of contention between KP and the federal government. Gandapur recently expressed his government’s resolve not to force any Afghan national in the province to leave the country. Authorities in the province will not become part of the federal government-mandated expulsion drive of illegal refugees, he said.

Gandapur’s announcement directly opposes the federal government’s policy to speed up the return of illegal Afghan refugees in Pakistan. The government has argued that the issue has become a security concern, as the TTP and other militant groups are exploiting Afghan refugee networks for logistics and recruitment in Pakistan.

Arguably, the KP government’s opposition to policies like repatriation of illegal Afghan refugees fuels narratives that depict the state as overly punitive. Such rhetoric also boosts extremist propaganda and supports recruitment efforts of militant groups. Militants thrive in chaos, and any signs of political instability and differences could provide fertile ground for their activities.

To some extent, the KP government’s focus on dialogue stems from frustrations with previous military-heavy approaches that displaced communities in the province. While this may be a concern, openly defying the federal government’s directives will also not help the province contain the ongoing militant surge in the region.

It is important that the KP government works with the federal government to devise a balanced strategy to deal with the TTP threat. Unfortunately, when a ruling party in a key province is seen as prioritizing point-scoring against rivals over an important issue, it fragments the idea of the whole-of-the-nation effort to counter militancy.

Clearly, Pakistan’s counterterrorism success hinges on transcending partisan politics. Political leadership in Pakistan must prioritize collective security and back all counterterrorism efforts with resolve and clarity. Without this, the TTP and other militants will continue to exploit divisions.