Recently China hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in Tianjin, followed by a grand military parade in Beijing. Both these events attracted the eyes of the whole world. Based on comments from foreign media, it seems the general consensus is that China is forming an anti-Western alliance. Based on my own observations in Beijing, this is not the right conclusion.
There are two clear indications that China is not willing to directly confront the United States and the West but is instead seeking a middle path.
First, at the SCO summit, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin were seen talking together with China’s President Xi Jinping at the venue, which attracted media attention. Some commentators suggested that this indicated the three countries were attempting to jointly counter the West. In my view, the evidence is insufficient.
For instance, before Modi’s visit to China, Indian media had been speculating about a possible China-India-Russia trilateral summit, but it did not materialize. Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the three countries had held formal trilateral meetings on multiple occasions. So why didn’t it happen this time?
Perhaps Modi was unwilling, especially since India needs to maintain a balance in its relations with the West.
However, I believe that China also has no intention of giving the international community the impression that China, Russia, and India have become quasi-allies confronting the West. Such a scenario would ultimately benefit Russia the most, as Putin has largely severed political, economic and cultural ties with the West and has little left to lose. China, unlike Russia, still needs to maintain engagement with the West.
Moreover, the idea of China, India, and Russia forming a quasi-alliance finds no support among the Chinese public. For instance, ordinary Chinese people are displeased with Modi’s decision to attend the SCO summit while skipping the military parade in Beijing. Additionally, within the SCO, India remains the only member that does not endorse China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
I once wrote an article analyzing this issue for a Chinese media outlet. Hundreds of Chinese netizens commented below the article, almost all of them criticizing Modi and saying that India still does not trust China. Media commentary suggests that Indians view China in much the same way. Therefore, while China-India relations may improve, they fundamentally cannot align to present a united front externally.
The fact that China, Russia, and India did not hold a trilateral summit indicates that neither China nor India wants their relations with the United States and the West to deteriorate further.
The second story occurred after the military parade in Beijing – China, Russia, and North Korea leaders also did not hold a trilateral summit.
Similar to the Modi-Putin-Xi interaction at SCO summit, the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea were photographed together. They even watched the parade together on the platform of Tiananmen – but this was not an official trilateral summit.
In terms of viewing the military parade, China’s choice to highlight Russia and North Korea as its two closest partners was driven by both historical and practical reasons. The parade marked the 80th anniversary of the War of Resistance Against Japan. Historically, China, Russia, and Korea (at that time, Korea had not yet been divided into two parts) were comrades who resisted the invasion of Japanese militarism for the longest time and paid the highest sacrifices during the war. These three nations had been fighting Japan since at least the early 1930s.
After the parade, U.S. President Donald Trump reminded China on social media to acknowledge the U.S. assistance during World War II. In fact, China had already made relevant arrangements during the military parade, including inviting descendants of the Flying Tigers to attend the event. Moreover, Chinese official media had been highlighting the U.S. contribution in their coverage in recent days. However, it is undeniable that the United States did not formally enter the war with Japan until after 1941, and thus cannot overshadow the prolonged resistance against Japanese militarism by China, Russia, and Korea.
From a practical perspective, Russia is China’s most reliable friend, while North Korea is China’s only military treaty ally. Therefore, Putin and Kim had to be placed nearest to Xi during the parade. Even if Trump had attended, he might have stood next to Putin. In that case, China, Russia, and North Korea would still have presented the same lineup photo to the world. Hence, I believe some Western analysts have overinterpreted this photo.
In doing so, most media overlooked the fact that China, Russia, and North Korea did not hold a formal trilateral summit. The rationale behind this is similar to why China, Russia, and India did not hold a trilateral meeting: China is unwilling to give the international community the impression that it is aligning with North Korea and Russia to confront the U.S. and the West. China still shares many common interests with the West.
Iran’s presence at the SCO summit and military parade was also highlighted. The EU foreign minister, Kaja Kallas, argued that the four countries of China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran had become a “direct challenge to the international order,” which is also a narrative some international media outlets relish. In my opinion, it’s a misunderstanding too.
A few months ago, I wrote an article suggesting that Iran should abandon its nuclear program, implement reforms and opening up, and ease relations with the West, otherwise, it would inevitably face military strikes from Israel and the United States. That is exactly what happened. The view I expressed then reflects, to some extent, the perspective of some Chinese people toward Iran.
I often write commentary pieces on Middle East issues, and I’ve noticed that ordinary Chinese readers are increasingly disappointed with Iran in their comments. Some even believe that Iran is not worthy of being China’s ally – that it is too conservative and too weak, and that aligning with such a country would harm China’s image and become a burden on its international strategy.
For example, it was reported in the media that after the war with Israel, Iran wanted to purchase China’s BeiDou navigation system, fighter jets, and anti-missile defense systems. Almost unanimously, Chinese netizens opposed the idea, arguing that such advanced equipment should not be provided to Iran. Given Iran’s poor security record, they believe the secrets of Chinese technology would inevitably be leaked to the West.
Therefore, the so-called “axis of four countries” does not exist, though there certainly is deeper cooperation among relevant parties. China considers each of these relationships separately, and conducts its diplomacy accordingly. In my opinion, China will carefully calibrate its engagements and avoid showcasing these partnerships in a way that could damage its relations with the United States and Europe.
That said, such restraint is conditional: the U.S., Europe, and other Western countries should respect China’s interests and avoid provoking it on core issues such as Taiwan and South China Sea. Otherwise, Russia, North Korea, and Iran may increasingly become cards China plays against the West.