Most conflict experts will tell you that one of the surest ways to escalate violence during a civil war is to hold an election.
Internal conflicts generally arise when important political stakeholders fail to agree on fundamental principles governing a country. In Myanmar’s case, the military wants to serve as the government, while the overwhelming majority of people want it to have no involvement in politics at all.
This irreconcilable difference came to a head when the military seized power in 2021, three months after losing a second consecutive election in a massive landslide, sparking an ongoing civil war. With the military now planning to administer its own election in several phases in December and January, it would be no surprise if it were to be marred by violence.
Counterintuitively, some diplomats and analysts are hoping the election could actually be a pathway to deescalation, even though major pro-democracy parties are banned and the polls will be tightly managed to ensure victory for the military and its chosen proxies.
This is because the 2008 military-drafted constitution divides power among different political offices, power that right now is centralized in the hands of the coup-maker, Min Aung Hlaing. Some in the diplomatic community hope that even a simulated election will diffuse power among different military figures, potentially opening a pathway to political reform or dialogue with opposition forces.
But the military regime’s internal logic for holding the election is something entirely different. The junta primarily intends to use it to cement its growing, begrudging acceptance by the international community, particularly by regional countries. After weathering nearly five years of armed resistance, many of Myanmar’s neighbors have come to the conclusion that the regime is here to stay. This is in some ways a self-fulfilling prophecy, as they now turn diplomatic efforts towards stabilizing the country under that accepted premise.
Nicholas Coppel, the former Australian ambassador to Myanmar, recently told Frontier Myanmar’s podcast that neighboring countries will likely accept the election results, even though they know it’s a sham, unless it’s a violent train-wreck.
“If there is a lot of violence and a lot of repression of popular discontent, I think it will be harder for neighboring countries to fully accept,” he said.
He’s probably right, but the comments reveal a perverse framing for anti-regime armed groups. The international community is essentially incentivizing them to violently disrupt the election or risk the military cementing its legitimacy.
Last year’s pre-election census itself became a target for violence, for similar reasons. In multiple incidents, soldiers and police providing security for census-takers were attacked and killed by anti-regime armed groups, which were generally evasive about whether any civil servants were also injured or killed. In at least one incident, a pro-democracy militia reportedly abducted nine census-takers, mostly female teachers. Some argued they were legitimate targets because they were assisting the regime with an exercise that could be used both as intelligence gathering and as election prep. Others said the teachers were likely forced to participate and should be left alone.
Should similar attacks be launched on polling stations in December and January, it could result in a bloodbath of civilians – both voters and the women teachers who traditionally staff voting booths in Myanmar. But the international community has signaled to Myanmar’s opposition forces that there is a clear strategic benefit for it to do so.
It’s been widely reported that the junta’s election is being pushed most emphatically by China, the junta’s main political backer. Beijing reportedly hopes to limit Min Aung Hlaing’s personal power, seeing him as erratic and incompetent, and stabilize the chaos in the country, including along its border. Other neighboring countries like Thailand and India are also seemingly on board.
Japan was one of the few regional heavyweights to speak out against the Myanmar military’s August announcement that elections would be held in December. “Japan is seriously concerned that if general elections are held without seeing any moves toward political progress, such as the release of those who are detained and sincere dialogue among parties concerned, it could only provoke further strong backlash from the people of Myanmar and make a peaceful resolution more difficult,” said the foreign minister.
Malaysia, the current chair of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, has previously said an election shouldn’t be a “priority” at the moment. Some other countries have seemingly adopted a wait and see approach, like Indonesia and Bangladesh, which have yet to weigh in specifically on the upcoming election.
Perhaps more surprising is the fact that most Western democracies have remained silent. A number of European countries believe previous efforts at resolving the conflict have been fruitless, so they may as well see where the election goes and hope an unexpected window opens.
But again, this incentivizes would-be revolutionaries to disrupt the election, both to prevent the regime’s international normalization, and because many armed groups still hope the conflict will end with the military’s total defeat rather than a negotiated settlement.
It’s not the first time the international community has failed to properly incentivize pro-democracy forces. During the 2017 Rohingya crisis, Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement shocked the world by largely siding with the military during its campaign of mass murder, rape and arson that killed thousands of Muslim civilians and displaced over 700,000.
Shortly after the 2021 coup, a small cluster of elite, English-speaking activists and politicians, mainly based in the commercial capital Yangon, insisted there had been a widespread change of heart. They said, having now experienced the military’s violence first-hand during protest crackdowns, the people of Myanmar understood the plight of the Rohingya.
The shift was exaggerated and remained largely limited to progressive activist circles. But the declaration itself was an overture to an international community that had given Myanmar the impression it cared deeply about the Rohingya issue.
Instead of welcoming this overture, Western nations largely shrugged and ignored it. Skepticism was warranted given the pro-democracy movement’s track record, but the international community could have rewarded and encouraged this olive branch with more material support to the pro-democracy movement. Such a reaction could have then further promoted a groundswell public opinion shift, which instead fizzled out when the Myanmar public realized the international community didn’t really care about the Rohingya very much at all.
While Western countries had staked out a moral position on the Rohingya crisis, regional countries also have practical reasons for encouraging ethnic harmony in Myanmar. Bangladesh has been overwhelmed by nearly 1.5 million Rohingya living in sprawling refugee camps. India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, meanwhile, are dealing with public backlash against the more moderate influx of fleeing Rohingya seeking asylum there. If any of these countries were serious about repatriation, they should be promoting acceptance of the Rohingya among the general population in Myanmar as a policy priority.
The West has also failed to incentivize armed groups that show commitments to human rights and democracy. The United States was offering some humanitarian funding to pro-democracy groups like the Karen National Union and Karenni Nationalities Defense Force, but much of that aid was cut following the re-election of Donald Trump last year.
China, meanwhile, was wary of these groups precisely because of their democratic principles and assumed links to the West, and so pressured armed groups on its border to cut ties with them. Instead, the groups that have benefited the most from outside support are those close to China, which are also among the most authoritarian. Beijing is intervening to an unprecedented degree, bringing together the authoritarian northern ethnic armed groups and the military dictatorship to work towards a political settlement. Meanwhile, pro-democracy groups are excluded by China and ignored by the West.
The lesson is that China is a more stalwart friend than the West.
Some Western and regional diplomats devoid of other ideas have decided it’s worth taking a punt on an election with little downside and some potential for a breakthrough.
But there’s no guarantee the regime’s planned election will lead to any meaningful political change. Min Aung Hlaing could simply maneuver pliant loyalists into the other political offices and continue ruling the country as an absolute dictator. After the election he could even amend the Constitution to do away with the separations of power and officially make himself supreme leader.
And there is an obvious downside: the election could lead to a surge of violence, deepen political divisions or embolden the Myanmar military to continue its campaign of carnage against its own people.