One noticeable difference from the 2024 race is the emphasis on avoiding intra-party acrimony, given the steep electoral the LDP now faces.
Prime Minister Ishiba Shigeru has decided to step down as president of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), and eventually from his role as head of government. His announcement on September 7 came after a 50-day “political vacuum” during which Ishiba reportedly made every attempt to avoid resignation – including threatening to dissolve the House of Representatives – as the once remote possibility of a recall election became inevitable.
His fate was ultimately sealed following mounting pressure from both allies and opponents within the LDP, who were increasingly concerned that “party unity” was under threat. A “gadfly” like Ishiba, in the final analysis, proved to be a party man above all.
Now, the LDP will choose a new leader, and Japan will have a new prime minister, to be selected by a vote among Diet members.
The five candidates vying for the ultimate prize – the premiership – are mostly the same figures who competed in the LDP presidential election a year ago. Farm Minister Koizumi Shinjiro and former Economic Security Minister Takaichi Sanae, though both defeated by Ishiba last year, are considered top-tier contenders; they placed third and second in the 2024 race. Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa may turn out to be a dark horse, while rising conservative Kobayashi Takayuki and veteran lawmaker Motegi Toshimitsu – once described by U.S. President Donald Trump as a “tough negotiator” during trade talks – are trailing behind.
Several candidates from last year’s LDP presidential race have chosen not to run this time. Finance Minister Kato Katsunobu and former Digital Minister Kono Taro have both announced their support for Koizumi. Kamikawa Yoko, one of the two female candidates from last year, has not publicly endorsed any candidate.
Among those not running, perhaps the most notable and consequential is Ishiba himself. Given the large share of votes that brought him to power last year, especially among party members, his continued popularity combined with his absence from the race has candidates scrambling to win over his base, portraying themselves as heirs to his mantle.
Hayashi has positioned himself as Ishiba’s natural successor, emphasizing his role as the “number two” in the outgoing administration. Koizumi and Kobayashi have both pledged to carry forward parts of Ishiba’s legacy, particularly the establishment of a Disaster Management Agency. Ironically, Kobayashi had criticized this proposal last year, but the influence of Ishiba’s supporters now appears too significant to ignore.
The potent issue of “unity” has, at least rhetorically, forced the frontrunners to scale back some of the bold promises they made a year ago. In his candidacy speech, Koizumi notably avoided mentioning some of his more controversial proposals as an LDP politician – such as the introduction of a selective surname system and the loosening of dismissal regulations. On the former, he stated that his beliefs remain unchanged but emphasized the need for further consultation among party peers. Even his campaign slogan has been notably toned down. Last year’s slogan, “Settlement,” carried an unsubtle message that he was willing to endure party divisions to implement policy. This year, his catchphrase is more conciliatory: “Rebuilding the Party.”
Like Koizumi, Takaichi’s policy positions have moderated, with an eye on votes from moderate-leaning Diet members. If there was one issue that thwarted Takaichi’s ambition to become prime minister – despite being the most popular candidate among rank-and-file party voters – it was her promise to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. While this is an act conservatives tend to rally around, it risks severely straining relations with China and South Korea.
It has been reported that outgoing Prime Minister Kishida Fumio was cautious about supporting Takaichi in the second round due to concerns that a visit to Yasukuni would damage his legacy of Japan-South Korea rapprochement. As a result, he reportedly instructed members of his faction to throw their support behind Ishiba. When asked whether she would visit the diplomatically controversial shrine, Takaichi somewhat deflected the question, responding only that her gratitude to the war dead will never change.
Takaichi’s moderation has also been reflected in her recent statements on fiscal and monetary policy. She has been one of the fiercest critics of the fiscally conservative Ishiba administration and a favorite among the fiscally dovish right-wing base. When Ishiba made it clear that no legislation to cut the consumption tax would be introduced or promised, Takaichi publicly expressed her disappointment. On the monetary front, she once warned the Bank of Japan that it would be “stupid” to raise interest rates at this time.
However, Takaichi’s fiscal dovishness is now framed in more ambiguous terms. She has described the core of her economic policy as “Responsible Fiscal Stimulus” – a phrase that appears designed to appeal to both sides of the debate.
The absence of Ishiba, combined with the risk-averse attitudes of the current candidates, is nudging them toward the political center, under the logic of party unity. In some respects, this dynamic reveals the LDP’s desperate situation. The party’s foundations have been shaken to such an extent that a bold, forward-looking overhaul – something Koizumi seemed to represent in last year’s leadership bid – is now seen as a threat to the party’s very survival.
This is not the LDP of the past. During the 1970s, the party endured fierce internal power struggles, resulting in a new prime minister roughly every two years. Corrupt campaign finance practices, once a prerequisite for rising through the party ranks, ultimately brought down Tanaka Kakuei. Ohira Masayoshi did not hesitate to challenge Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo in a party primary – and won. But karma also caught up with Ohira: after an electoral defeat triggered an internal campaign to oust him, he was forced to dissolve the House of Representatives. The stress of the ensuing crisis worsened his health and ultimately led to his death. However, despite the chaos that engulfed the party during that period, the LDP’s hold on power remained unquestioned. There was simply no alternative.
But now those alternatives are taking shape. The upper house election in July – the same poll that eventually cost Ishiba his job – has signaled the emergence of a truly competitive multiparty system in Japan. Populist parties, advocating for policies that deliver tangible and visible results, are increasingly taking center stage. Maintaining the status quo is no longer sufficient for the LDP to retain power – and clinging to it may prove to be the party’s undoing.