Over the past two weeks, Indonesia has been rocked by some of the most widespread unrest in recent memory, with mass demonstrations erupting across Jakarta and other major cities. The protests are the result of long-running economic strain, political discontent, and public outrage at perceived elite entitlement. Tensions erupted dramatically on the evening of August 28 when Affan Kurniawan, a 21-year-old ride-hailing driver, was fatally run over by a police armored vehicle during demonstrations in Jakarta. His death became a symbol of police brutality and government indifference.
The simmering discontent quickly escalated into widespread demonstrations across the country, which have resulted in at least 10 deaths. Clashes between protesters and riot police have grown more violent, with footage of street battles dominating Indonesian newsfeeds. In Jakarta, public anger has boiled over into attacks on several police stations and the looting of at least three lawmakers’ private residences. As public trust in the police plummeted to new lows and the police force stretched thin, the government has decided to deploy thousands of soldiers to Jakarta and other major cities to reinforce the police.
A Deeper Inward-Looking Turn?
While Law No. 34/2004 on the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) permits the military to assist the National Police (Polri) in maintaining public security and order, this raises concerns that the armed forces – already increasingly drawn into civilian affairs and non-defense roles since Prabowo took office – may become further entangled in domestic law and order matters. Therefore, the current situation points to a larger crisis in Indonesia’s national defense posture itself.
Even before the protests erupted, the TNI was already being asked to take on more tasks outside its core warfighting role. For instance, in March, Parliament passed revisions to the 2004 Military Law that expand the range of civilian posts open to active-duty officers, including in the Attorney General’s Office and the National Border Management Agency. Civil society groups argue that this move amounts to military encroachment into civilian affairs. Furthermore, throughout the country, military units have been instructed to help with President Prabowo Subianto’s food security and free meal programs. Additionally, the military is set to establish 500 “territorial battalions,” some of which are already operational. These battalions are explicitly created not for combat, but rather to support socio-economic development objectives, including agriculture, food security, and animal husbandry. Critics have warned that assigning the military to tasks outside its core competencies blurs the line between civilian governance and military duties, as well as soaking up resources that could otherwise be used to upgrade many TNI’s outdated weapon systems.
Prabowo’s Hand
As a former general and Kopassus (Army’s Special Forces Command) commander, it is unsurprising that Prabowo favors a command-and-control approach. Since the beginning of his presidency, observers have noted that he has played a pivotal role in expanding the military’s reach. Adhi Priamrizki and Muhamad Haripin, researchers on Indonesian security affairs, point out that Prabowo’s cabinet is the most militarized in Indonesia’s post-1998 Reformasi era.
Additionally, former presidential staffer Yanuar Nugroho cautions that Prabowo seems to be reviving the “glory of the military,” using its speed and discipline to fill gaps in what the president perceived as sluggish civilian governance. One interpretation is that these reflect Prabowo’s deliberate decision to anchor his administration in military loyalty and discipline, which in turn contributes to his decision to support TNI’s expanding role.
Now, with the police losing what remains of their credibility in the eyes of the public, there is a real risk that the government will lean even more heavily on the TNI to maintain order in the event of another widespread unrest. In the short term, this may seem like a quick fix. However, in the long run, it could push TNI further inward, causing it to focus more on domestic policing rather than external defense.
These concerns are not without warrant. Indonesia has lived through the dangers of dwifungsi, the Suharto-era “dual function” doctrine under which the military was granted a formal role in politics, governance, and civilian life. The recent unrest has already shown how quickly the military’s role can escalate. At first, unarmed soldiers – without firearms or even riot gear – were deployed primarily as intermediaries between police and demonstrators. But the picture quickly changed.
After Prabowo’s August 30 order to police and military forces to take “firm action” against so-called anarchists among the protestors, the deployment escalated: riot control troops were deployed on the streets, some armed and accompanied by armored personnel carriers (APCs) that patrolled major cities such as Jakarta, Bandung, and Yogyakarta.
Concerns deepened further after a cabinet meeting on the protests on August 31, when it was Defense Minister Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, rather than Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security Budi Gunawan, who delivered the post-meeting press conference. Sjafrie reiterated the president’s call for the security forces to act firmly against rioters and looters. For the record, Sjafrie is a retired army general, whilst Budi is a former police general.
The fact that Sjafrie, rather than Budi, with whom the responsibility for domestic political and security affairs primarily lies, spoke on this issue sparked speculation that the military is taking a larger role in managing the crisis, and whether Prabowo’s administration now views the protests as a national security matter. Prabowo’s claim that the mass protests involved “unlawful acts” amounting to “treason and terrorism” has only deepened this speculation.
For their own part, military officials have rejected claims that the TNI is seeking to take over the role of maintaining public order from the police or that there is a conspiracy to declare martial law. TNI leaders maintain that their deployment is lawful, carried out under presidential instruction and at the request of the police.
Institutional Friction
Another risk of deeper military involvement in handling the unrest lies in the long-standing rivalry between the military and the police. After the 1998 Reformasi, the two institutions were deliberately separated: the TNI was tasked with external defense, while the police took charge of internal security. That division was intended to prevent the blurred authority seen under Suharto’s dual function. Today, those boundaries are under increasing strain.
The unrest has created an opportunity for the TNI to assume a larger role in domestic security, a trend that observers have seen since at least 2015. Part of this rivalry can also be seen in last month’s inauguration of six new Regional Military Commands (the army’s provincial-level military structure), which the army chief of staff openly stated was intended to “balance” the police, which already has a similar command structure in almost all provinces.
Adding to this dynamic is public opinion. Surveys show that the TNI remains the most trusted institution in Indonesia, while the police rank much lower. This contrast may give the military greater confidence and advantage in shaping the narrative, allowing it to step in and take a larger role during the unrest, even at the risk of encroaching on Polri’s mandate. Of course, this trust should not be mistaken for a blank check for expanded power. The fierce backlash to the TNI Law revisions in March, for example, shows that many Indonesians continue to be wary of military overreach.
Modernization Stalled
Another consequence of drawing the military deeper into domestic affairs is that it could hinder the TNI’s modernization and undermine its professionalism. Every day soldiers spend on crowd control, or other non-defense roles, is a day not spent training for “real” military operations, joint exercises, or high-end missions. Skills developed in riot control are not the same as skills needed for air defense, anti-submarine warfare, or cyber operations. Resources – whether budgets, logistics, or leadership attention – are finite. The more they are spent on domestic policing, the less is available for strengthening external defense.
This inward turn also risks weakening Indonesia’s international defense partnerships, particularly with Western countries. Media outlets and social media users have highlighted the growing role of the military in responding to the ongoing unrest, publishing reports and images of soldiers deployed on the streets. If TNI personnel are perceived as using excessive force to repress demonstrations, foreign partners may hesitate to expand their cooperation. In this context, it is worth noting that the recent unrest coincided with the country hosting the annual Super Garuda Shield Exercise, which involved over 2,000 foreign troops. It is difficult to imagine that these contingents are unaware of the turmoil unfolding around the country. The sight of excessive force being used against demonstrators and the increased military presence on the streets risk overshadowing the message of TNI’s professionalism that the exercise is meant to project.
In addition to reflecting widespread concerns about corruption and police brutality, the crisis unfolding in Indonesia strikes at the heart of the country’s defense and security posture. Leaning on the military to cover for a discredited police force risks pulling TNI back into domestic politics, slowing down modernization, and straining international partnerships.
While the unrest has started to subside, partly due to heightened security measures, tensions remain high. Civil society groups have made it clear that military involvement is one of their primary concerns at present. Their “17+8” demands explicitly call for the complete withdrawal of military personnel from the streets and for TNI to refrain from intervening in civic spaces, demonstrating the depth of public anxiety over the issue.