India conducted an unprecedented night test launch of the Agni-Prime medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) from a rail-based mobile launcher on September 24, according to an Indian Ministry of Defense press release. This placed India among a few countries (like North Korea and China) with deployed systems that can launch a missile from a railway wagon. The rail-based mobile launcher can move along the rail network without any unique preparation. “It provides for cross country mobility and has the capability to launch within a short reaction time with reduced visibility,” according to the press release. “It is self-sustained and is equipped with all independent launch capability features including the state-of-the-art communication systems and protection mechanisms.
However, the recent test also raises a few questions that need to be addressed: Will rail-based mobile launchers be on the run 24/7 on the Indian railway track or stored at specific hardened locations with a direct accessible link to the Indian railway system? Why did India test this system? And how will it impact Pakistan?
Agni-Prime, commonly known as Agni-P, has an operational range of up to 2,000 km. It is a Pakistan-specific missile due to its range, which increases Islamabad’s threat perception because the range offers no strategic advantage while targeting China. After all, if the missile is launched from a safe distance inside Indian territory, it could never threaten key Chinese industrial and military targets.
The Agni-P is unique among other medium-range surface-to-surface missiles in the Indian arsenal because it has a reported Circular Error Probable (CEP) of only 10 m, indicating its utility in counterforce missions.
In addition, it is propelled by solid fuel, which allows it to be stored inside a canister, enabling the Indian Strategic Forces Command (SFC) to launch it on short notice. India had been pursuing such high levels of readiness since 2013, as indicated by former Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Head Avinash Chandar, who claimed back then that all future missiles would be capable of firing within minutes after receiving an order.
The DRDO, responsible for manufacturing the Agni-series missiles, conducted the rail-based test in collaboration with the SFC. This suggests that more tests will follow soon, as the missile has entered the user trial phase.
India’s railway network is approximately 70,000 km long. The vast rail network will enhance mobility and flexibility for Indian strategic forces. It not only allows missile movements to evade detection from opponent satellites and other modes of surveillance but also enhances survivability. Railway tunnels beneath mountains and regions with thick forest cover can be used to camouflage missile-carrying rail wagons in these areas.
The rail network in Indian-administered Kashmir, in particular, has a massive tunnel network – for example, the 11.2 km Pir Panjal railway tunnel – providing more survivability to the rail-based missile launchers. Therefore, in a crisis, it is highly likely that the missiles can be stored inside tunnels similar to Pir Panjal. The proximity to Pakistan, along with the presence of hardened tunnels and forest cover, makes Kashmir a possible region for storing a rail-based Agni-P. This is one possibility among many, as the rail wagons can be deployed anywhere along the vast rail network.
As soon as a crisis commences, the Indian SFC could load the missiles stored in a canister on modified rail-launchers at a designated storage site. After the missiles are loaded, which will not take much time, they can begin their journey on the vast railway network. In addition to making the missile carriers look like regular passenger wagons, the SFC may reduce the security to a minimum to avoid unnecessary attention. This will ensure security and survivability of the missile system, providing a swift launch capability while making it hard for the opponent to detect. Once the missiles are on the Indian rail network, it will be challenging to track them in real time, due to the diverse topography that India has, from dense forest cover to mountainous terrain, and Pakistan’s limited intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
Even during this phase, detection is possible as these systems will carry specialized communication gear to remain in contact with India’s SFC headquarters. Electronic warfare equipment and signal intelligence systems can monitor emissions from this communication equipment; however, constant traveling through different terrains involving forests, valleys, mountains, and tunnels complicates pinpointing the exact location of the moving target. Therefore, India is likely to favor such a posture.
Tracking missiles moving constantly on roads and railways becomes difficult in a crisis, when the other side has limited surveillance sensors deployed in outer space. Considering this rationale, India proceeded with the decision to deploy missiles on railroads because it recognizes that Pakistan currently has a limited satellite surveillance capability. To cover the whole of India, a network of satellites is required to maintain continuous coverage of the target region since any single satellite can only pass over a specific location for a few minutes. This will require Pakistan to place a large number of satellites in orbit, which will not be possible soon.
States like the former Soviet Union developed a rail-based capability to improve their second-strike capability. However, in India’s case, this threat is negligible. China maintains a posture of No First Use (NFU), while Pakistan neither has the capability nor the intent to attempt pre-emption of Indian nuclear forces. This raises the question of why India tested a missile with such a capability.
The answer lies with India’s recent nuclear modernization drive, which is providing the country’s SFC with rapid launching and precise targeting capabilities. This overall trend signals the presence of a counterforce posture within India’s strategic thought and the country’s changing nuclear posture.
The latest missile test will increase Pakistan’s perception that India is moving away from its declared policies of NFU and Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD), and has moved closer to adopting an operational counterforce posture. Pakistan is right to identify the latest test as a serious threat, because the involved missile’s range overtly signals it can only be used against Pakistan. Moreover, the tests conducted using different launchers (road and rail), coupled with its ability to strike precisely, further increased the Agni-P’s threat to Pakistan.
The current force modernization drive initiated by India – such as canisterization, reduced CEP of missiles, efforts to enhance the efficacy of land-based indigenous ballistic missile defense systems, and development of the sea leg of the nuclear triad, along with the announcement to complete “Sudarshan Chakra” by 2035 – further intensifies threats to Pakistan. The presence of a system like the rail-mobile Agni-P may cause Indian decision makers to contemplate launching the missile against Pakistan in the next crisis. This remains a real possibility – historic nuclear saber-rattling from Prime Minister Narendra Modi affirms such a mindset in the higher echelons of the Indian political decision-making elite.
To preserve strategic stability between the two nuclear-armed states, Pakistan can invest in building a small fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which will help it to uphold an effective second-strike capability. This should be Pakistan’s top priority. Since the start of the 21st century, five crises have occurred in the region, which indicates an average occurrence of one crisis every five years. Therefore, Islamabad has to invest in these solutions sooner rather than later. Although this will put additional strain on Pakistan’s economy, acquiring an assured second-strike capability has become a compulsion for Pakistan, lest it allow the asymmetry to grow any further.