The Pulse

India at the SCO Summit: One Platform, Multiple Messages

Recent Features

The Pulse | Diplomacy | South Asia

India at the SCO Summit: One Platform, Multiple Messages

Modi’s visit to China was his first in seven years. It was also his first in-person presence at the SCO in three years.

India at the SCO Summit: One Platform, Multiple Messages

From left: Russian President Vladimir Putin, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the SCO summit in Tianjin, China, Sep. 1, 2025.

Credit: X/Narendra Modi

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to China would have been closely watched in world capitals. There were both bilateral and multilateral elements to the visit. While Modi was in Tianjin to attend the multilateral Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the summit was equally important.

The visit came at a time of global flux. In addition to the Russia-Ukraine war and Israel’s war on Gaza, U.S. President Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs on the United States’ trade partners has shaken up international trade. Given that context, it was only natural that the SCO summit was of interest, given that the meeting was hosted by China, the world’s second largest economy, and attended by India and Russia among others.

But scrutiny was even more intense because of some additional factors.

For one, this was Modi’s first visit to China in seven years. India and China have begun to slowly normalize ties that were ruptured by a bloody border clash in 2020.

This was also Modi’s first in-person presence at the Russia- and China-led SCO forum in three years. The 2023 SCO summit, which India hosted, was a virtual one.

There was speculation that it was Trump’s imposition of a 50 percent tariff on India, the highest rate in the world — this includes a 25 percent tariff to penalize India for buying Russian oil, which Washington says is fueling the Russia-Ukraine conflict — that was the primary reason for Modi traveling to China. However, the visit was reportedly planned well in advance of the sharp deterioration in India-U.S. relations.

In his speech at the SCO summit, President Xi Jinping urged the setting aside of differences, supported openness and inclusivity, and strongly advocated opposition to “Cold War mentality, bloc confrontation, and bullying practices.” The last has been interpreted as a repudiation of Trump’s threatening countries with tariffs.

A development strategy for a decade starting in 2026 and closing in 2035 was unveiled at the Tianjin summit. It is expected to set the tone and direction for the SCO’s growth. The meeting expressed firm support for the multilateral trading system, said Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, in what can be seen as a snub to the United States. Four new SCO centers that would focus on countering security threats, combating transnational crimes, improving information security, and strengthening cooperation in fighting drug trafficking were inaugurated at the Tianjin event. Member states also gave their nod for the establishment of an SCO development bank that would boost infrastructure development among SCO member states, Wang added.

For India, the SCO summit was useful to send out signals to the U.S. and the world.

India has always prided itself on its ability to engage with all groups with different objectives and ideologies. Being part of the Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa (BRICS) grouping and also being able to hold talks with the Group of 7 (G-7) industrialized nations is one example. India calls it multialignment — anathema to the U.S. in general and Trump in particular, who views BRICS as anti-West. Trump has threatened BRICS members with penalties should they think of jettisoning the use of the dollar. Being seen with its SCO partners helps India burnish its non-West multialigned credentials.

Another signal that India sent out was that it would not give up on its close ties with Russia or stop buying fuel and arms from its long-standing friend.

During Trump’s first term in office (2017-2021), India cut off oil supplies from Iran due to American pressure. Not this time, though.

Trump and his officials have doubled down on India and Modi for New Delhi’s purchase of oil from Moscow. Trump’s Trade Advisor Peter Navarro’s criticism has been particularly trenchant. However, New Delhi has been measured in its responses to American provocations. It did not respond directly to Navarro’s criticisms, but the Indian government put out statements pointing to the U.S. and European Union’s own trade with Russia.

The United States has also criticized India for buying military hardware from Moscow. The former Soviet Union was India’s key source of defense equipment during the Cold War years, when the U.S. supported Pakistan with weapons.

News reports say that although Russia remains the top supplier of India’s arms imports, Moscow’s share in India’s defense hardware purchases has fallen. Recent data from SIPRI indicates that India has been diversifying its defense purchases by buying from countries like the U.S., France, and Israel as well. Indeed, an India-U.S. joint statement issued in February after Modi and Trump met at the White House lists the many U.S. platforms India has bought since 2008.

Another reason for India to ignore calls from the U.S. to cut defense ties and collaboration with Russia is that during the India-Pakistan military clashes in May, it was Russian weaponry, like the S-400 air defense system and the India-Russia co-produced BrahMos missile, that played a decisive role in giving India the upper hand.

No wonder then that in Tianjin, Modi was seen greeting Russian President Vladimir Putin with a hug. He also traveled in Putin’s car to the venue of their bilateral meeting. There was visible warmth between the two leaders as they sat down to review bilateral relations. Modi took the opportunity to reiterate an invitation to Putin to visit India later this year for their annual bilateral summit – a practice first started in 2000.

These gestures, together with photographs and videos of an impromptu exchange of pleasantries among host Xi, Putin, and Modi, which show the three leaders smiling broadly and at ease in each other’s company, were clearly aimed at signaling to Trump that India will not be dictated to when it comes to choosing its friends and partners. It also signals the possible revival of the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping, once regarded as dead due to China-India tensions.

The growing proximity of India, Russia, and China in regional groupings fits in well with India’s efforts to normalize ties with Beijing. This began even before Trump pushed India-U.S. ties into a downward spiral.

Signaling the importance of normalizing relations with China, Modi told Newsweek in an interview in April 2024 that there was a “need to urgently address the prolonged situation on our borders so that the abnormality in our bilateral interactions can be put behind us.”

Then, in October last year, India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along their disputed border to bring down tensions. Since then, Modi and Xi have met twice — in Kazan, Russia, soon after the agreement was reached, and now in Tianjin on August 31.

At their meeting in Tianjin, Modi and Xi described their countries as development partners rather than competitors.

But there are challenges to overcome. India faces a huge trade deficit with China. Importantly, there is China’s close relationship with Pakistan. During the India-Pakistan clashes in May, Beijing was reportedly helping Pakistan — the two countries describe their relations as one between “iron brothers” — with real-time satellite intelligence inputs.

Besides, in May, China stopped the export of critical fertilizers to India during its crucial summer sowing period. It also curtailed exports of rare earth magnets used in the manufacture of electric vehicles, soon after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang promised to remove export restrictions on these magnets during his visit to India in August.

Given this backdrop, India can be expected to be cautious while recalibrating its ties with China. While India’s economic dependency on China is high, it needs to reduce the risk of its exposure to China as it looks to grow its economy.

Given global trade and political uncertainties, China would want India on its side. But should China and the U.S. reach a political and economic understanding to manage their differences, India could find itself in a bind, especially if Beijing makes hostile moves toward the Indian economy and along the unsettled China-India border.