Much attention has been paid to the symbolism of China’s September 3 parade in Beijing to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the end of the “War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression.” Some see the parade as evidence of the solidification of an “axis of upheaval” given the attendance of the leaders of Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Others have highlighted the parade’s role in the Chinese Communist Party’s ongoing efforts to appropriate the history of China’s World War II experience to both burnish both its nationalist credentials and its agenda to de-center the United States’ role in the waging of the war and the settlement that followed.
What has not received as much attention, however, is what the display of military hardware in Tiananmen Square may tell us not only about the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the types of missions and conflicts that Beijing expects it to fight, but also its current threat perceptions.
In the first instance, as the Science of Military Strategy (SMS) – a compendium of the “views of many of the PLA’s leading strategists” on military strategy and doctrine – noted, such a “general display of military power” is a means of deterrence signaling as it demonstrates to potential adversaries that “we have advanced defense and counterattack methods” with which to retaliate.
More specifically, the hardware displayed and the official commentary around it suggest three areas of emphasis for the PLA: a continuing focus on development of capabilities to mount multidomain joint operations, adaptation to the age of drones and autonomous systems, and enhancement of conventional and nuclear deterrence.
It has been apparent for some time that the PLA envisions future conflict to encompass “multiple battlespace domains” characterized by “information-centric warfare.” The PLA’s current operational construct of “informationized warfare” thus entails the development of the PLA into a “force enabled by the widespread and streamlined use of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, data analysis, and robotics.” This was underscored by appearance at the parade of contingents of the PLA’s Space Force, Cyber Force, Information Support Force, and Logistics Support Force. These contingents displayed a range of capabilities including “electronic countermeasure equipment” capable of “disconnecting enemy networks and breaking digital chains” and “vehicles of cloud computing, digital intelligence, air-ground networks, and integrated information” that “can quickly establish new types of cyber systems to support joint operations.”
Another notable feature of the display in Tiananmen Square was the prevalence not only of a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) such as the FH-97 “stealth combat drone” – China’s answer to the U.S. Air Force’s XQ-58A Valkyrie – but also the unveiling of anti-UAV capabilities such as an “anti-UAV missile-gun integrated system, high-energy laser weapons, and high-power microwave weapons” that will comprise part of a layered “anti-UAV system.” This focus suggests that the PLA is adapting to some of the tactical innovations of UAVs apparent in the war in Ukraine, including the utility of the integration of artificial intelligence in UAVs to enhance “decision-making processes and precision targeting” and the role of “layered anti-drone defenses and autonomous logistics” to “support sustained operations.”
The display of military hardware also underscored the centrality of both conventional and nuclear capabilities in undergirding the PLA’s deterrence capabilities. With respect to the former, the parade saw a prominent place for ground-based air-defense and anti-ballistic missile systems such as the HQ-20, HQ-19, and HQ-29 that constitute part of a “multi-layer air and missile defense network” capable of intercepting “fixed-wing aircraft, drones, cruise missiles, and even short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.”
China’s nuclear deterrent, too, was given pride of place during the parade with prominent parts of the land-, sea-, and air-based legs of its “nuclear triad” – including the JL-3 submarine-launched intercontinental missile (SLBM) and the DF-61 ICBM – shown off.
Particular emphasis was given to the unveiling of the new DF-5C, a liquid-fueled ICBM that is touted to have a range of “more than 20,000 kilometers,” thus bringing “the entire globe under its strike range.” Significantly the DF-5C, according to a Chinese missile expert quoted by the Global Times, not only has an extensive range but is also road-mobile, “can carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles,” can be armed with conventional or nuclear warheads, and has a “similar precision” to the “mid to short-range missiles in the DF series.”
The prominence given to the DF-5C – combined with China’s expansion of its nuclear arsenal and deployment of advanced hypersonic missiles like the J-17, YJ-19, YJ-20 and YJ-21 – arguably speaks to China’s ongoing desire to ensure the survivability and credibility of its nuclear triad in the face of what it perceives as U.S. efforts to negate it. Indeed, the improved capabilities of the nuclear triad displayed on September 3 were framed by Xinhua in primarily defensive terms as providing China with its “strategic ‘ace’ power to safeguard the country’s sovereignty and nation’s dignity.”
The military parade has thus provided an indication not only of the PLA’s recent capability developments but also a view of how it is adapting to shifts in the nature of contemporary warfare and attempting to ensure it can, in Xi’s words, become a “world class military” capable of “firmly safeguarding Chinese sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity.”