Just two days after a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel and a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) destroyer collided while pursuing the modest Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) ship BRP Suluan, a Chinese J-15 fighter jet swept dangerously close to a Philippine patrol aircraft carrying journalists. This series of incidents in the South China Sea shows how quickly tensions are escalating. Beijing is not deterred by Manila’s exposure; it is accelerating its actions.
Manila has embraced what officials call “assertive transparency,” documenting every gray zone encounter in the disputed waters then broadcasting it for the whole world to see. The hope is that exposure will embarrass China into restraint and draw international sympathy, a classic name-and-shame tactic. This approach carries a sense of déjà vu. In 2022, Ukraine also turned to “transparency,” by publicly releasing intelligence and satellite imagery to expose Russia’s military buildup. Although Kyiv did not formally adopt a name-and-shame tactic in its foreign policy, the strategy was practically cut from the same playbook. Manila should note that Russia advanced nonetheless, and China is likely to respond the same way. Just as Ukraine was Russia’s proving ground, the West Philippine Sea – the portion of the South China Sea within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone – has become China’s.
For the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), control of the South China Sea, including the West Philippine Sea, is tied directly to territorial integrity and, by extension, to regime legitimacy. A reputation battered in foreign headlines is tolerable, but the appearance of being weak is not. That is why naming-and-shaming is little more than background noise in Beijing, with each new exposé forcing the CCP to respond with a show of strength. The result is a cycle where transparency fuels escalation rather than restraint. Manila shines a spotlight to cast Beijing as the regional bully, Beijing answers with military posturing, with each incident sharper than the last to prove it cannot be strong-armed into restraint.
Chinese maritime ambitions are not a bargaining chip; they are woven into the CCP’s survival narrative. To yield at sea would be to admit vulnerability. For Manila, that means every act of exposure risks backing Beijing further into a corner, where the only response is escalation.
Considering recent incidents, General Romeo Brawner, chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, echoed President Ferdinand Marcos Jr’s warning in 2024 that the death of any Filipino in the contested waters would be treated as a red line that could trigger serious military and diplomatic responses, including possible invocation of the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States. This shows the fragile cat-and-mouse dynamic now defining Manila and Beijing’s encounters. Every confrontation is not only a test of the Philippines’ resolve but a live trial of whether the U.S. will answer the call of the MDT.
Washington consistently pledges its support for the Philippines, yet this assurance looks fragile when viewed through the prism of U.S. President Donald Trump’s unpredictable foreign policy. Trump revealed how quickly the United States can turn a security commitment into a spectacle, as when he and senior members of his Cabinet openly humiliated Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy on live television. For many in Kyiv, and for the rest of the world, that moment foreshadowed a collapse of U.S. credibility, where promises of support were undercut by political theater.
The Philippines’ appeal to principle depends on allies that are themselves navigating reputational fatigue. Washington has absorbed blows to its credibility over Ukraine and the Middle East, and Beijing knows it. The more Manila leans on exposure, the easier it becomes for China to turn the mirror on Washington and its allies and accuse it of double standards.
The Marcos administration’s efforts to broaden alliances in Europe are a prudent hedge, yet Europe itself is burdened with conflicts that Washington has increasingly set aside, from the grinding Russo-Ukrainian war to the renewed firestorm of the Palestine-Israel conflict. For Europe, the Indo-Pacific remains distant, and any guarantees will always be limited to proximity and political will. Manila cannot afford to bank on promises from capitals already stretched thin.
In the West Philippine Sea, Manila faces not only a bilateral contest with China but a test of whether deterrence built on treaties and external partners can hold in the face of an adversary that measures power not in reputational cost but in territory seized and held.
If Manila wants transparency to serve as deterrence, it cannot stop at exposure. The Philippines’ best hedge is to give transparency teeth, pairing it with denial systems, maritime domain awareness, and lawfare that imposes costs Beijing cannot ignore. Otherwise, each broadcast of Chinese aggression risks becoming less a deterrent than another reminder of how much ground is slipping away.