On September 10, China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, departed from the Jiangnan Shipyard in Shanghai. On September 11, Japan’s Joint Staff Office reported that at around 1:00 p.m., the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force detected three People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) vessels – the Fujian, the destroyer Hangzhou (Hull 136), and the destroyer Jinan (Hull 152) – about 200 kilometers northwest of the Senkaku Islands (known in China as the Diaoyu). The vessels were headed southwest at the time.
On September 12, PLAN spokesperson Senior Captain Leng Guowei stated that the Fujian had transited the Taiwan Strait and proceeded to relevant areas of the South China Sea for scientific research trials and training tasks, not targeting any specific entity.
Sea trials between the Fujian and its carrier-based aircraft are already underway. This is believed to be its ninth round of sea trials, suggesting commissioning is imminent. However, combat readiness or full support capabilities are not prerequisites for entering active service. After commissioning, the Fujian may continue to conduct a large number of aircraft integration trials.
Nonetheless, the objectives of these sea trials extend beyond evaluating the Fujian’s own combat capabilities. They also serve as a demonstration of China’s military power in the South China Sea, with the Philippines being the most immediate target. For Taiwan, this development signals that the PLA is about to enter a three-carrier era, which naturally enhances its force deployment flexibility and raises the level of threat to Taiwan. It is particularly noteworthy to watch whether possible military exercises around Taiwan in October feature a scenario of three carriers encircling the island. This deserves close observation.
The Fujian: Naval Signaling
Beyond combat trials, the most significant aspect of this deployment is Beijing’s display of control over the Taiwan Strait, especially following the recent passage of Australian and Canadian vessels through the strait. While foreign navies use the Taiwan Strait to send messages, China is also leveraging the strait to communicate. This reflects Beijing’s naval signaling strategy in recent years, with “showing the flag” serving as its clearest assertion of maritime dominance around Taiwan.
It should also be noted that the primary objective of the Fujian’s southward movement is the South China Sea. Following the recent confrontations between Chinese naval and coast guard vessels and Philippine ships – incidents that Manila heavily publicized while partnering with the U.S., India, Australia, and Canada in joint naval exercises – the deployment of the Fujian can be interpreted as a response. The carrier is expected to rendezvous with South Sea Fleet escort vessels and conduct joint maritime exercises, carrying an implicit deterrence message toward the Philippines.
Testing the Aircraft Carrier’s Combat Capabilities
From a military perspective, the key focus of the Fujian’s southward trials lies in testing its integration with the Sanya naval base on Hainan Island, as well as coordination with the Southern Theater Command’s naval aviation units at Lingshui Air Base. After all, an aircraft carrier’s true value comes only when paired with carrier-based aircraft.
At present, the Fujian is likely operating primarily with J-15T fighters. A critical point to watch is whether the KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft has been tested with the carrier’s electromagnetic catapults. The Fujian’s greatest innovation compared to the Liaoning and Shandong carriers lies in its use of electromagnetic catapult technology. However, under the constraints of its conventional steam power system, how many sorties the Fujian can actually generate remains an open question.
Most of the new equipment displayed by the PLA during the September 3 military parade consisted of shipborne anti-ship missiles, which are not directly suited for carrier use. The most relevant system for carrier operations is the newly unveiled KJ-600 AEW aircraft, which, in combination with the Fujian’s catapults, could potentially enable systematized air combat alongside the J-15T.
Furthermore, this deployment of the Fujian is expected to include training for naval aviators already accustomed to ski-jump takeoffs, helping them transition to catapult-assisted launches and recoveries – a process that will take time.
Thus, while the Fujian can now be formally commissioned, achieving full combat effectiveness may not occur until next year, once pilots have been fully trained to operate from its catapult-equipped deck.
Currently, PLA aircraft carriers are not assigned to any particular theater command; instead, they report directly to the Navy Headquarters. This arrangement may mirror the U.S. Navy’s approach, where ships are reassigned depending on mission requirements and force distribution. Following the PLA’s principle of “theaters as operational commands, services as force builders,” carriers are expected to be employed flexibly according to mission-oriented needs.
Potential Operation of the Fujian
The commissioning of the Fujian signifies that Taiwan will now face the threat of three aircraft carriers. Past assessments indicated that the PLAN would need at least three to four carriers: two dedicated to operations, one for training, and another for maintenance. With the third carrier now in service, it suggests that one carrier – possibly the Liaoning, the oldest and the only one not built in China – may be shifted to a secondary role.
The presence of three carriers means that in future exercises against Taiwan, aircraft carriers will become a standard feature. In the past, when a carrier went out to sea, it would need to return to port for resupply and rotation, limiting availability. With three carriers, force deployment becomes far more flexible. One carrier could be permanently stationed in the Western Pacific, similar to how the PLA currently maintains four to six warships patrolling around Taiwan. This poses a serious threat to Taiwan’s maritime lines of communication.
Furthermore, the three carriers could participate in large-scale exercises targeting Taiwan. Building on past dual-carrier deployments, the PLA may escalate to simultaneous operations with three carriers – positioned to Taiwan’s northeast, in the Western Pacific, and in the South China Sea – effectively encircling the island in a “three-carrier blockade.”
Risks to Taiwan
At present, the Fujian is not yet combat-ready. Following PLA tradition, the carrier could be formally commissioned around China’s National Day on October 1. However, as noted above, commissioning does not equate to combat effectiveness. It will likely take about three more months to train an efficient air wing, meaning that the Fujian will not contribute to a fully operational three-carrier strike capability until next year.
That said, the Fujian is highly likely to conduct joint training with the Shandong and the Liaoning. This may involve the Fujian launching KJ-600 airborne early warning aircraft while coordinating with fighters from the other carriers in joint operations, training the PLA Naval Aviation to conduct systematized air combat over open waters. While the Fujian will not immediately participate in direct exercises against Taiwan, its deployment will give the PLA greater flexibility when allocating forces for the October exercises.
At the same time, the Fujian’s presence in the South China Sea will serve to constrain U.S., Australian, and Philippine military activities in the region. For Taiwan, the immediate risk remains limited, but the indirect military-security implications and the quasi-blockade effect will gradually intensify.