In 2023, during the Indonesian presidential election campaign, the eventual victor, Prabowo Subianto, asserted that he was a “staunch defender of human rights.” Shortly after his inauguration as president in October 2024, Prabowo established a standalone Human Rights Ministry, which Indonesia’s human rights minister, Natalius Pigai, argued “signifies that the president is paying special attention” to human rights.
However, despite this, 11 months into Prabowo’s presidency, his government has not addressed the longstanding culture of impunity related to human rights violations in Indonesia, including killings, torture, and sexual violence perpetrated by Indonesian security forces. It is highly likely that Prabowo’s government will perpetuate this culture of impunity, limit justice for victim-survivors, and obscure past human rights abuses committed by Indonesian security forces. Prabowo and members of his Cabinet are implicated in some of these human rights violations, have sought to deny, minimize, justify, and avoid accountability for these violations, have bolstered the Indonesian army’s power, and are hostile toward accountability mechanisms.
In 2022, eight years after making his own pre-election pledge to address historical human rights abuses in Indonesia, Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo, created a team to investigate and make recommendations to his administration for nonjudicial solutions to 12 cases of human rights abuses committed between 1965 and 2003 which had previously been investigated by the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission, Komnas HAM. In its report, the team recommended that Jokowi recognize these human rights abuses. Subsequently, in 2023, Jokowi publicly asserted that “gross violations of human rights did occur” in these 12 cases and said that he “deeply regretted” these rights violations.
Jokowi’s statement was significant, as expressions of regret from Indonesian presidents regarding past human rights abuses are rare. Most Indonesian governments have obscured, minimized, or attempted to justify human rights abuses perpetrated by its security forces. Despite this, Jokowi’s statement was limited, as it did not recognize that these killings, torture, and sexual violence perpetrated against Indonesian civilians were, in many cases, ordered, planned, or conducted by Indonesian security forces, nor did it recognize other human rights abuses perpetrated by Indonesian forces against civilians. Jokowi’s statement also did not outline judicial measures to address the culture of impunity associated with these human rights violations and thus restricted justice for victim-survivors and their families, who have long advocated in favor of judicial measures.
The clearest example of this culture of impunity regarding these cases of human rights abuses is Prabowo himself. Although Komnas HAM concluded that Prabowo, then the leader of Kopassus (the Indonesian army’s Special Forces Command), ordered the 1997-98 abduction of over 20 Indonesian pro-democracy activists by army officers, Prabowo was demoted but not tried for his involvement in these abductions. He now serves in Indonesia’s highest political and military office. Prabowo also served as minister of defense from 2019-24 and during this period, was promoted to the rank of honorary four-star army general by Jokowi.
Similarly, no individuals have been tried for their involvement in the 1965-66 mass killings, when at least half a million Indonesian communists, leftists, and alleged communists were killed by the Indonesian army (TNI), religious organizations, and vigilante groups. Furthermore, no military forces involved in the 1999 killing of up to 39 civilians in Aceh have been prosecuted, nor have the Indonesian army officers and police who killed nine Papuans civilians in Wamena in West Papua in 2003. Where trials have occurred, notably in the case of the 1998 Trisakti incident and Semanggi II incident in 1999, in which student protesters were killed by the Indonesian military in Jakarta, alongside the 1997-98 abductions, senior officers have not been held accountable.
This culture of impunity persists, in part, because there is little support within Indonesian society to secure justice for past human rights abuses, while there is strong opposition from military elites, and little appetite to address these human rights abuses among successive Indonesian governments.
Although Prabowo has admitted to involvement in the abductions of pro-democracy activists, he has sought to minimize these human rights abuses by arguing that he released the activists. He has denied being involved in killing any of the activists, one of whom was found dead, and denied knowledge of why 13 of the activists remain missing. Prabowo has also attempted to absolve himself of responsibility for the disappearances and justify these human rights violations. For example, in 2009, in relation to the abductions, Prabowo argued that they were “not my project and orders.” Similarly, in 2014, Prabowo stated that “it was my superiors who told me what to do.” In 2014, Prabowo also asserted that the abductions were “operations that were legal at the time” and he did not feel guilt. Given Prabowo’s attempts to downplay and justify these human rights abuses, it is highly unlikely that his administration will address the culture of impunity regarding these abductions.
Shortly after being sworn into office, Prabowo appointed Mugiyanto Sipin, one of the pro-democracy activists abducted in 1998, as Indonesia’s deputy minister for human rights. It is important note that this appointment was likely motivated by Prabowo’s desire to neutralize claims that he has perpetrated human rights abuses and improve his image rather than being driven by a commitment to address Indonesia’s culture of impunity. Prabowo’s appointment of Mugiyanto also fits within a longstanding practice of Indonesian presidents including their former opponents in their Cabinets (albeit these opponents are typically presidents’ electoral opponents).
Prabowo has also been accused of involvement in the 1996 killing of civilians in West Papua, a territory where a pro-independence movement has existed since it was colonized by Indonesia in the 1960s. Given this, his administration is likely to occlude human rights abuses perpetrated by Indonesian security forces in West Papua and maintain impunity regarding these human rights violations, including the aforementioned killings of Papuan civilians in 1996 and 2003, and the 1998 Biak massacre, where the TNI killed, raped, and tortured Papuan civilians who raised and guarded the banned Morning Star flag of the Papuan independence movement.
Prabowo’s Cabinet and adviser appointments also demonstrate that he is uninterested in promoting human rights and ensuring accountability for past abuses. For example, last year, Prabowo appointed Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin as minister of defense despite the fact that during Indonesia’s colonial rule over East Timor (1975-99), Sjamsoeddin was implicated in the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre, which saw the killing of up to 271 Timorese civilians by the Indonesian military. Sjamsoeddin has not been tried for his involvement in the massacre, nor have many other TNI officials implicated in the killings.
Prabowo also appointed the former commander of the TNI, Wiranto, who was implicated in the killing of up to 2000 Timorese civilians in 1999 by the TNI and TNI-backed Timorese militias and led the TNI during the Biak massacre, to the position of special adviser to the president for political and security affairs. Wiranto has not been held accountable for his involvement in these human rights abuses. Prabowo has also been implicated in the 1983 Kraras massacre of more than 300 Timorese civilians, in which he has denied involvement, and has also been accused of being involved in the 1978 killing of key Timorese pro-independence resistance figure, Nicolau Lobato.
These appointments suggest that it is highly unlikely that Indonesian security forces who perpetrated widespread human rights abuses against Timorese under the Indonesian occupation will be held accountable during Prabowo’s presidency.
Other members of Prabowo’s Cabinet have attempted to minimize and deny cases of past human rights abuses. In October 2024, Indonesia’s Coordinating Minister for Law, Human Rights, Immigration and Corrections, Yusril Izha Mahendra, argued that violent incidents that occurred in 1998 in Indonesia did not constitute gross human rights violations and asserted that there had been no gross human rights abuses perpetrated in Indonesia in recent decades.
Yusril’s assertion is questionable, as Komnas HAM has issued findings that violent incidents that occurred in Indonesia in 1998 constituted gross human rights violations and that gross human rights abuses were perpetrated in Indonesia as recently as 2003. Yusril’s statement constitutes an attempt to obfuscate and downplay the 1998 abductions of pro-democracy activists, the 1998 Trisakti incident, and the May 1998 riots, which included organized groups, under the orders of the security forces, perpetrating mass rapes and sexual assaults against Chinese Indonesian women, and for which no perpetrators have ever been tried.
Additionally, earlier this year, Indonesia’s Minister of Education and Culture, Fadli Zon, referred to the 1998 mass rapes as “rumors” and “just a story” and asserted that “was there really mass rape? There’s never been any proof.” Fadli’s statements represent an attempt to deny these human rights abuses and obscure the fact that a 1998 fact finding team set up by then Indonesian President B.J. Habibie to investigate the May 1998 riots found that 85 women had been raped during the riots.
Accountability for past human rights abuses, for example, through a judicial process, is also unlikely given Prabowo’s hostility toward institutions and processes that seek to hold political elites accountable. For example, despite asserting that he is committed to democracy, Prabowo has, for some time, opposed direct elections and, after his election, described democracy as “tiring… messy and costly.” In the lead up to his presidency and since his election, Prabowo has also restricted opportunities for Indonesian journalists to put questions to him.
Earlier this year, the Indonesian parliament passed amendments to the 2004 Indonesian Military (TNI) Law, which were supported by Prabowo’s government and which augment the TNI’s power and could also bolster impunity for past human rights abuses. These amendments increase the number of civilian institutions in which TNI personnel can work while remaining in active military service. The revised law, which took effect in March after being signed by Prabowo, also provides additional avenues through which current military personnel implicated in human rights abuses could serve in civilian roles.
Last year, the family of one of the pro-democracy activists abducted in 1998 who remains missing publicly asked, “will the case [the abductions] just disappear just because he’s president?” Given the Prabowo administration’s inaction thus far, this concern appears regrettably well founded.