The recent NATO summit in The Hague delivered a significant development as member states committed to increasing defense spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035. This decision was shaped heavily by pressure from U.S. President Donald Trump, who loathes what he perceives as free-riders and expects burden sharing. The pledge includes at least 3.5 percent of GDP to be spent on military forces and equipment, and up to 1.5 percent for broader security-related infrastructure.
For Australia, this sets a problematic benchmark. While Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has said, “I think that Australia should decide what we spend on Australia’s defense. Simple as that,” the strategic and political pressure to increase investment is growing. With the AUKUS partnership under Pentagon review and doubts manifesting about Australia’s strategic readiness, this moment presents a critical opportunity for Canberra to demonstrate that it remains a reliable, forward-leaning partner in an increasingly contested strategic environment.
AUKUS was conceived as a generational strategic leap for Australia. The trilateral security agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States would provide Canberra access to nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs), deeper defense industrial integration, and participation at the forefront of allied military innovation. But in the weeks since the Pentagon announced a review of the agreement, AUKUS skeptics in Australia have grown more vocal.
The centrality of their criticism is that the United States cannot be counted on as a reliable partner. This argument also cautions against establishing a dependency on the U.S., as that would grant Washington significant leverage and coercive power. There is also notable concern that the submarines may never arrive and that the entire endeavor risks becoming a costly distraction with limited return.
AUKUS carries inherent risks, but walking away from it would impose far greater costs on Australia’s strategic calculus and position in the region.
First, consider the question of reliability. Dissenters argue that the United States is retreating from global leadership, and with another Trump administration in power, U.S. foreign policy has become more transactional and exploitative, which has spiked uncertainty. Yet this risk is not one-sided. If allies like Australia hesitate or scale back, it reinforces the perception in Washington that others are unwilling to shoulder their share of the burden.
The reality is that the United States is prioritizing relationships where it believes partners are making concrete investments to protect their own security interests. Washington’s willingness to back all alliances unconditionally while carrying most of the burden is unlikely to return. In this environment, AUKUS falls squarely into this category as one of the few partnerships capable of meeting these tests, provided Australia follows through on its commitments.
Second, concerns about the delivery timeline of submarines are legitimate. Australia is not projected to receive its own SSNs until the early 2030s, with full operational capability that would still be additional years away. This timeline has come under renewed scrutiny in Washington, where analysts and some former officials from Trump’s previous administration have warned that submarine sales to Australia could be reconsidered if they are judged to undermine U.S. naval readiness at a critical moment.
The Pentagon review, led by Elbridge Colby, faces the reality of industrial bottlenecks in U.S. shipyards, which are delivering only about 1.3 submarines annually, well short of the 2.3 required to fulfill both U.S. fleet needs and Australian requirements. While Australia’s $3 billion contribution is substantial, some U.S. voices argue that additional investment or accelerated Australian defense spending may be required to maintain political support for the sale of Virginia-class submarines.
Yet what often gets overlooked in the debate is what AUKUS Pillar I already delivers. This includes a rotational presence of U.S. submarines through Western Australia, a buildup of port infrastructure, and a new generation of Australian workers gaining experience alongside allied naval crews. Just as importantly, Canberra now has access to nuclear propulsion know-how previously restricted to only one partner, the U.K. These developments are not theoretical promises. They are already taking shape as enhanced maintenance facilities in Australia mean more allied submarines are in the water, more of the time, and closer to the Indo-Pacific theater. This increasing operational reality is steadily expanding Australia’s role in undersea power.
Pillar I also delivers tangible operational strategic advantages that matter now. With U.S. and British submarines operating out of HMAS Stirling, allied boats are geographically closer to Indo-Pacific hotspots, thereby facilitating a higher operational tempo. Moreover, by spreading sustainment hubs across multiple allied bases, this distributed network builds resilience in the workforce. Taken together, these measures are delivering real effects today and in places where they are most needed.
Third, the argument about value for money misses the larger strategic picture. Defense expenditure is not simply a commercial transaction but is an investment in building up capabilities to enhance deterrence. In terms of immediate return on investment, AUKUS is already changing the regional security calculus. It provides a degree of high-end deterrence through the rotational presence of U.S. and U.K. nuclear submarines that is far more potent than any domestic capability Australia could field while waiting for its own fleet of SSN AUKUS boats to be built with British expertise. More than that, this partnership weaves Australia into an industrial and operational ecosystem with two of the world’s most capable navies. It signals to adversaries that Australia does not stand alone, and to allies that Australia is ready to share burdens, not outsource responsibility.
That said, AUKUS is not self-executing. The path forward demands fundamental shifts, particularly on Australia’s part. Defense spending at 2.03 percent of GDP is no doubt a significant sum, but it is insufficient to deliver on the government’s own stated strategy of denial. This is why the U.S. call to lift the figure to 3.5 percent is not Washington strong-arming an ally. Rather, it is a realistic reflection of the scale of resources required for Australia to meet its own rhetoric, especially when Australia’s National Defense Strategy talks about facing “the most challenging strategic environment since the Second World War.” To make this partnership credible, success will demand more than money. It will require political ownership, faster implementation, clearer governance, and a whole-of-nation approach to national security.
AUKUS Pillar II, focused on advanced technologies, also needs significant course correction. As it stands, the program is currently adrift. It has no clear focus or priorities, few visible results, and a noticeable lack of political leadership to guide its development. The result is an initiative that risks becoming rich in capability but poor in strategy. Rather than treating innovation as a wish list, Pillar II must shift from being driven by technology to being driven by threats.
Australia should develop marquee capabilities that solve real operational problems in the Indo-Pacific. This includes capabilities for countering coercive maritime patrols, addressing the growing threat to undersea cables, and building multidomain persistent surveillance. If Pillar II is rebuilt to deliver real deterrent outcomes instead of just technology demonstrations, it can become the critical force multiplier that provides genuine advantage right now.
Finally, as I have previously argued, none of these financial or technical fixes will matter if the political foundation for AUKUS is not cemented with the public. This is a generational commitment, designed to last three decades, and in that time, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States will hold a combined total of 23 elections. For AUKUS to survive, the public in each country will need to understand that it is essential to their security rather than an elite compact. Otherwise, its future will be in doubt.
Under any other administration, the Pentagon’s AUKUS review might be dismissed as procedural, just like the one conducted by the United Kingdom. But Canberra must acknowledge that the review is unfolding in the context of Trump’s renewed demand that allies spend more for their security, constrained U.S. industrial capacity, rising strategic urgency over China, and a new defense benchmark set by NATO allies at 5 percent of GDP. This charged environment indicates that the sale of Virginia-class submarines is negotiable despite the agreement. Even if that is not the case now, it can be reopened down the track if Washington believes it can extract more dollars from Canberra or push for clearer commitments about the availability of the Virginia subs for U.S. operations in a potential conflict over Taiwan. Likewise, it might force U.S. policymakers to rethink whether it is worthwhile selling a core capability they are short of to an ally that is reluctant to spend more for its own security despite the worsening threat environment.
The good news for Australia is that as the review moves forward, support for AUKUS on Capitol Hill appears to be growing. In August, senators from both parties introduced the AUKUS Improvement Act to ramp up defense collaboration. This legislative push followed a joint letter by bipartisan leaders in the House to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reaffirming their commitment to the agreement. In that letter, they highlighted legislative milestones, such as authorizing the sale of Virginia-class submarines, approving Australia’s $3 billion contribution to the U.S. submarine industrial base, and backing Pillar II technology sharing. The combined message from both chambers of Congress is clear: AUKUS is not just an executive branch priority, it is a congressional mandate with robust political backing.
The real test, therefore, is not whether reviews occur, but whether Australia responds to this powerful show of support with urgency and clarity. If Canberra matches this legislative momentum with its own decisive budgetary and industrial action, it can put any doubts to rest and strengthen its role within the partnership.
Despite the uncertainty over the Pentagon review, there is a clear path forward for Australia. Strong bipartisan support in Congress, demonstrated through landmark AUKUS-enabling legislation and recent public endorsements, is a firewall against abrupt policy reversals. Canberra’s best strategy is to leverage that goodwill decisively by accelerating its defense posture, funding critical enablers, and signaling that Australia remains a dependable, forward-leaning ally.
This moment is not one of rupture, but of reckoning. AUKUS’ success demands bold political leadership, real investment, and a strategic mindset oriented toward delivering deterrent effects, not years from now, but now. As the only partner without a nuclear submarine capability, Australia must increase defense spending to protect its own security interests, prioritize Pillar II capabilities and give this pillar a clear, threat-driven purpose, and demonstrate progress with credible outcomes. The stakes are high, and the time to act is now.