Since September 2023, Afghanistan has been receiving its refugees on a scale rarely seen in recent history.
More than 4 million Afghans have returned from Iran and Pakistan over the last two years, both voluntarily and by force. The number of returnees is still rising as Iran continues mass deportations, and Pakistan is set to start another round of deportations in September, including people with legal status. Germany also recently deported 81 Afghan migrants, Tajikistan may soon resume deportation, and the Taliban are “ready and willing” to work with U.K. politician Nigel Farage to accept the deportation of Afghans from the U.K. in return for aid.
Among these returnees, many are young Afghans who have lived, studied, or worked in host countries for years. The Taliban regime, local and international NGOs and agencies, including UNHCR and the International Organization for Migration, and private actors, are providing some assistance at border crossings and beyond. But such support is short-term and insufficient to meet the livelihood needs of many returnees.
Past experience shows that many Afghan returnees – especially youth – struggled to rebuild their lives, as the trauma of displacement lingered long after their return. Forced returnees faced additional challenges, such as losses of economic opportunity, weak local support systems, unpaid debts, and the stigma of deportation. A June 2021 report by the Mixed Migration Center, based on interviews with 706 returnees (including deportees) from Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Europe, found that nearly 90 percent received no assistance upon arrival, particularly those from Iran and Pakistan. About half cited difficulty finding decent work, with the rate rising to 58 percent among returnees from Iran. Two-thirds reported being unable to find a job at all, and many expressed an intention to re-migrate.
Reintegration has consistently failed in Afghanistan, under both the former republic and the Taliban. Today, however, the stakes are higher. Returnees are coming back at a time when the Taliban government lacks international recognition widely, development aid has been halted, the country’s central bank assets remain frozen, climate change impacts are on the rise, and the job market continues to shrink. Poverty and unemployment are widespread, technical capacity in public administration has eroded, the education system is deteriorating, and girls are barred from secondary and higher education. Almost no pathways exist for sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan under the Taliban. Moreover, the Taliban’s governance – based on ideological loyalty and patronage networks – further excludes many returnees who lack connections or hold different views.
The loss of financial remittances adds to the crisis. Many returnees were primary breadwinners sending money home; in 2021 alone, Afghanistan received nearly $124 million in remittances from Iran and $58 million from Pakistan.
Consequently, due to a lack of sustainable reintegration, Afghan youth are left with three grim options: flight, radicalization, or psychological despair.
Flight
According to the Afghanistan National Youth Policy, introduced by the former government, anyone in the 18-35 year age group was considered “youth.” With one of the youngest populations in the world – 63 percent under 25, according to UNFPA – Afghanistan’s returnee crisis disproportionately affects young people. A Save the Children report published last month estimated that one child is returning from Iran or Pakistan every 30 seconds. While this figure covers those under 18 years of age, it suggests that a large share of returnees either fall within, or will soon enter, the youth category, making them a growing segment of the population returning from neighboring countries.
Patterns of the past also indicate a strong tendency to re-migrate. A 2021 study by the Mixed Migration Center found that 29 percent of returnees from the EU planned to re-migrate elsewhere, 24 percent intended to re-migrate to Pakistan, 36 percent to Iran, and 19 percent to Turkey. Returnees from Iran were the least likely to stay in Afghanistan. These intentions are likely even higher among the current wave of returnees (2023-2025), many of whom will attempt dangerous, irregular journeys to Western countries, exposing themselves to trafficking, abuse, and smuggling. Those unable to re-migrate are likely to join Afghanistan’s already swelling ranks of the internally displaced population, extending existing informal settlements and further straining cities that are already short of resources.
Radicalization
The absence of sustainable reintegration measures heightens the risk of young returnees being drawn into violent or criminal groups. Past examples illustrate the danger, as anecdotal evidence suggests. Thousands of Afghan refugees, mainly driven by poverty and the promise of Iranian passports or legal documentation, were recruited by the Iranian government to fight in Syria. Similar dynamics could unfold in Afghanistan today, where marginalized youth face few economic and social alternatives.
Returnees are often more vulnerable than local populations. Disrupted social networks, psychological stress from displacement, economic hardship, and social exclusion combine to create fertile ground for extremist recruitment or radicalization. While studies on the link between poverty, education, employment, and radicalization show mixed results, evidence suggests that socio-economic marginalization increases vulnerability to extremist narratives – a pattern observed in some countries.
In Afghanistan today, groups such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), al-Qaida, and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan are reported to remain active. Various reports confirm ISKP’s continued presence and threat despite a reduction in its attacks since the Taliban takeover. With limited livelihood options or inclusion, many returnees risk becoming targets for recruitment by these groups.
Psychological Despair
The ban on girls’ education beyond the sixth grade, alongside restrictions on employment in most sectors and on freedom of movement by the Taliban, poses significant challenges, especially for young women, and including the returnees. With irregular re-migration often less accessible to them, many face halted education and career paths. These constraints have already sharply worsened the mental health of Afghan women; nearly 68 percent report their condition as “bad” or “very bad.” Poverty compounds this crisis, with some women forced into extreme measures – trading their children and selling their kidneys for survival.
Returnee women also face risks of forced marriage and domestic violence, contributing to already surging rates of self-harm and suicide. For those who previously lived with more freedom abroad, the sudden loss of opportunity and autonomy is especially devastating. This sudden reversal not only affects them directly, but it also reverberates through families, generating stress, domestic anxiety, and emotional strain on parents and siblings.
The failure to reintegrate returnees is not just a missed development opportunity; it fuels instability, gendered harm, psychological despair, and renewed displacement. Preventing this requires sustainable reintegration, with the Taliban government responsible for providing opportunities for livelihoods, education, and social inclusion. However, the Taliban’s lack of resources and international recognition means that substantial support should come from the international community, delivered through local and international organizations, while also encouraging the Taliban to fulfill its responsibilities. Crucially, to secure international development aid, the Taliban should adjust some of their policies, particularly regarding women’s rights and education.