The actions of the Donald Trump administration could undo decades of U.S. strategic thinking toward India. President Trump is pushing India away, overturning Washington’s longstanding policy of cultivating closer ties with India in order to counter China. From insensitivity to India’s position toward Pakistan to the imposition of tariffs on Indian imports at a rate of 50 percent, U.S. policies have surprised Indian leaders.
Both the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) and the opposition Indian National Congress (INC), when it was in power, pursued policies to strengthen the India-U.S. relationship, such as joining a nuclear deal in 2008 and participating in a resurrected Quadrilateral Security Dialogue in 2017. However, there has also always been a strain of skepticism toward the United States among both the political class and the public, due to the robust Indo-Russian relationship, which has withstood the test of time, and the warm history of Pakistan-U.S. ties during the Cold War and in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks. This may explain why the Indian public views the United States as the second greatest military threat to their country, after China.
This has led some to question whether India erred in drawing so close to the United States in the past two decades. There has been some talk about a closer Russia-India-China partnership to counter the United States. But the most important element of this would involve a rapprochement between India and China after years of souring ties. In a sign of détente, India and China have agreed to resume direct flights for the first time since 2020, when the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army clashed at Ladakh along their disputed border. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to travel to China on August 31 to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. All of this raises a larger geopolitical question: what if India chose to lean toward China instead of the United States?
A Sino-Indian détente would not be the strangest thing. The history of geopolitics is filled with formerly adverse states forming alliances, usually due to changing factors in the world around them. While China and India have a difficult strategic rivalry, there is no deep, ancient bitterness or cultural hatred. For much of history, China and India were simply not on each other’s radars in any meaningful geopolitical sense. Arguably, if the two countries resolved their border dispute, tensions would be diffused, and they could become “normal” economic competitors. But that argument ignores contemporary realities.
In the early 20th century, Great Britain and France, after centuries of rivalry, came to a series of agreements on outstanding issues and eventually allied against the shared threat of Germany. The alliance between the German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Empire is an example of a less equal outcome to an interstate rivalry and is more instructive for India. Austria and Prussia — the state that created the German Empire — had fought for centuries, but had formed an alliance by the late 19th century. The German Empire, which was significantly more powerful than Austria-Hungary, conceded a sphere of influence to the latter in its Balkan backyard. But as time went on, Austro-Hungarian strategic interests increasingly became subordinate to Germany’s, and the eventual outcome was the German army’s takeover of the Austro-Hungarian army’s command structure during the First World War.
A Sino-Indian partnership would more closely resemble that between Germany and Austria-Hungary than between Britain and France. An Indian partnership with China could work, but China would have to concede India its own geopolitical sphere in South Asia, though that would not include Pakistan, a country that China has cultivated close ties with. A mere three months ago, China was providing Pakistan material support in a war against India during Operation Sindoor, so Beijing is unlikely to give up that relationship. Thus, to begin with, neither India nor China would be fully satisfied with this arrangement.
A Sino-Indian partnership could work if China treated India somewhat as an equal, because India is too large to be semi-vassalized like Laos or pushed around like the Philippines. This is also tricky because China sees itself as a dominant power in Asia, and treats other major powers in the region, such as the United States and Japan, as rivals.
For how long would a close China-India partnership be sustainable? It would require egregious factors, such as an intense rivalry or even war against a common enemy, for Sino-Indian rapprochement to hold for the long run. It is hard to imagine China permanently conceding a part of what it believes is its sphere of influence to India.
Likewise, it is hard to imagine India permanently subordinating its strategic interests to China, as Austria-Hungary did with Germany. India would have to acquiesce to a strong Sino-Pakistani relationship. India has also cultivated strong ties with Japan, Vietnam, and more recently, the Philippines, all of which would have to be conceded toward Chinese interests.
A Sino-Indian rapprochement would ultimately disadvantage India because China would emerge as the power more likely to shape the partnership to its advantage. As Sumit Ganguly noted in Foreign Policy, “the asymmetries in [China’s and India’s] economic and military capabilities are glaring and getting worse.”
Chinese and Indian analysts are both aware of this. According to an analysis by a Chinese expert, translated by Aadil Brar, “Dhruva Jaishankar — son of Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar — argued that, ‘Taiwan’s absorption [into China] would dramatically increase the likelihood of an Asian unipolar order, which India cannot accept.’” If India chooses to lean toward China, it would essentially accept a Chinese-led Asian order, which would radically alter its geopolitical situation.
India cannot accept an Asian unipolar order. India can, however, accept turbulence and temporary setbacks in its relationship with the United States. India and the U.S. are unlikely to ever develop a relationship so adversarial that India would be incentivized to ally with China against Washington. American and Indian strategic interests do not suffer the sort of strategic incompatibility that the Sino-Indian relationship does. They do not have any major points of geopolitical tension. As the world continues to become more multipolar, the United States will become more habituated to the notion that other countries have their own, independent interests and cannot be simply expected to follow Washington’s lead.
Moreover, Trump is famously capricious. While he may impose tariffs on India now, in a year, he may well have reduced them while also selling India advanced weapons systems. The logic of the Sino-American geopolitical rivalry will continue well beyond his presidency, and Indo-U.S. relations could get back on track in a few years under a different president.
There are strong people-to-people ties between the two countries, and many prominent people of Indian origin among the U.S. leadership. Indians use American social media apps, and people from the two countries interact in a way that neither can with China. In fact, in a century, we may be able to speak of a common Christohindu civilization. Furthermore, some of India’s closest partnerships are with countries firmly aligned with the Western camp, including Japan, Israel, and France, among others. An Indian alignment with China (and Russia) could alienate these relationships for little gain. Western powers are more likely to transfer vital technology and military equipment to India than China.
This is not to say that India shouldn’t take some steps to improve its situation in regard to China without jeopardizing its relationship with the United States. Even if India doesn’t see eye-to-eye with China on geopolitical issues, it should allow more travel and investment. There is no need for such coldness between two neighbors. India should also continue to pursue strategic autonomy in partnership with other countries that do not want to be pushed around by either the U.S. or China.
While, in the long term, a closer relationship with the United States and the West is to India’s advantage, it would have to be a relationship of equals. Capitulation to U.S. demands on tariffs would send the wrong message.
Ultimately, India’s best bet is to invest in itself and strengthen its military and economy. In this way, India would not simply be courted by other countries in order to serve as a balancing power but because ties with India — a major economy, a vibrant culture, an Indian Ocean power — would be inherently desirable. In this way, India will be able to enhance its leverage and be more respected by its partners.