Kabul hosted the sixth China-Pakistan-Afghanistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue on August 20, the first of its kind since the Afghan Taliban’s return to power. The dialogue was attended by Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar, and Afghanistan’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. The meeting came at a crucial time when Pakistan was expressing concerns over cross-border terror attacks from Afghan soil.
Beijing framed the moment in terms of its agenda of a prosperity-for-security bargain. China wants to ease trade, cooperate on resource extraction, and, above all, extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan. Chinese officials are betting that economic incentives will tip the scales against terrorism. Islamabad, by contrast, came with a security-first agenda, reiterating demands for concrete, tangible actions against cross-border militancy.
Can Beijing’s economic inducements really press the Afghan Taliban to curb terrorism – or is China making a costly mistake?
China has long believed that economic integration can reshape security outcomes, whether abroad or at home, and this constitutes the core tenet of its Afghanistan policy. In Kabul, Wang’s pitch for the Afghan Taliban was focused on prosperity, and its centerpiece was the extension of CPEC into Afghanistan, linking Kabul to promising transit revenues, infrastructure, and connectivity under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative. China has shown a readiness to invest in Afghanistan’s mineral wealth, which can provide the regime with an economic lifeline. It has also lowered trade barriers for Afghan agricultural products such as pine nuts and pomegranates.
Equally important, Beijing has granted the Taliban political and diplomatic legitimacy – which the regime seeks desperately – by engaging at the ministerial level, and that too on Afghan soil. These incentives are not mere projects of cooperation and development. China sees them as strategic levers. If Afghanistan is drawn into the Chinese economic sphere, it will – Beijing hopes – prioritize stability and curb militant networks that threaten both China’s Xinjiang and Pakistan’s internal security.
For Islamabad, the trilateral dialogue was mainly about pressing security concerns, as Pakistan has faced the brunt of militancy exported from Afghan soil since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. In 2023 alone, more than 1,500 Pakistanis were killed in terror attacks, with the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) claiming responsibility for most of these attacks. Yet the TTP is not the only security threat. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) and its suicide wing, the Majeed Brigade, also target civilians, military officials, and Chinese interests in the country. From the 2021 Dasu bus attack to Jaffer Express train hijacking of 2025, Pakistan has faced intensive, concerted attacks from these terror organizations.
Islamabad insists, with evidence, that these terrorist groups use Afghanistan as a launchpad to destabilize the country and sabotage CPEC. It sees these attacks – along with the Taliban’s resistance to recognizing the Durand Line as an international border and sporadic episodes of fence removal by their commanders – as attempts to undermine Pakistan’s border security and territorial integrity.
At the trilateral meeting, Pakistan emphasized the need for concrete, tangible, and objectively verifiable measures against these terror outfits. This position signaled frustration with the Taliban’s inaction. While Pakistan appreciates the importance of strong regional trade connections, security remains the top priority for CPEC’s future, both in Pakistan and in its future extension to Afghanistan.
At heart, these different approaches reflect the different stakes for Beijing and Islamabad. Afghanistan might just be a frontier challenge for China, but for Pakistan, unchecked militancy originating from Afghan soil is an existential challenge.
As for the Taliban, however tempting China’s incentives may be, the entrenched ideological and political realities of Afghanistan contradict each other. The TTP and BLA are not just fringe militant outfits hidden in remote areas. They are part of the Taliban’s broader network of alliances and leverage. The TTP, particularly, is a trusted ideological partner that has proven its worth on the battlefield and pledged allegiance after the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul in 2021. As per the United Nations, some 6,000-6,500 TTP fighters operate from Afghanistan, enjoying the protection and logistical support of their hosts. This camaraderie makes it difficult for the Taliban to clamp down on the TTP.
The case of BLA and its Majeed Brigade is different from the TTP’s but holds similar outcomes for Pakistan. The BLA exploits Afghanistan’s geography for its operational depth. Although the Taliban regime does not openly support the BLA in its activities, its tolerance serves as a bargaining chip against Pakistan (and China in general). The Taliban regime pressures Pakistan to engage on its terms of political recognition, financial assistance, or relief from international isolation by turning a blind eye toward the BLA and Majeed Brigade’s activities. These groups thus serve both domestic and external purposes for the Taliban: the regime can claim ideological credibility and independence as well as pressuring Pakistan from time to time.
In this regard, the Kabul dialogue unraveled a triangular equation between China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, where interests converge but priorities diverge. China’s role in this triangle is that of a cautious investor, guarantor, and mediator, seeking to avoid any direct intervention and confrontation. It needs to safeguard its western flank and advance the BRI. A secure Afghanistan benefits on all fronts: the prevention of terrorism, access to Afghan mineral wealth, and the extension of CPEC.
Pakistan’s role, on the other hand, is more immediate and existential in nature. Its willingness to engage in trilateral diplomacy reflects both considerations: the awareness that China’s leverage may be the only external pressure the Taliban will respond to, and the desperation to curb militancy and terrorism.
The most important role is that of the Afghan regime, as it is the most decisive of all three. As the party with the most stakes, it holds both China and Pakistan hostage. On the one hand, the Taliban court China’s investments, welcome projects with promises of security, and host delegations with overt promises of cooperation. But at the same time, the regime tolerates and provides support for militant sanctuaries, believing that a crackdown would alienate their ideological allies (like the TTP) and weaken its government. The regime prioritizes survival through internal cohesion and consolidation of power.
China’s gamble is that economic incentives will moderate Kabul’s behavior. This approach faces at least four limitations. First, the Taliban regime has credibility issues. It continues supporting the TTP and the BLA despite past promises and pledges. The Taliban leaders associate this support with the survival of their regime. They will not risk the regime’s survival for China’s sake.
Second, China’s economy-first approach does not coincide with the region’s security situation. Infrastructure projects and mining deals may look practical on paper, but the CPEC experience is evidence of how quickly investments become targets.
Third, Beijing’s approach does not align with the expectations from Islamabad. Pakistan needs firm Chinese pressure on Kabul, but China relies more on quiet diplomacy and avoids confrontation. This leaves China’s closest ally in the region, Pakistan, exposed to cross-border attacks that may strain the long-standing partnership.
Finally, Afghanistan’s internal dynamics, factional division within the Taliban, and the challenge of Islamic State Khorasan Province add to the uncertainty. That was evident from the 2022 attack on Chinese nationals at a hotel in Kabul, which was claimed by the Islamic State.
These constraints not only underline the limits of Beijing’s Afghanistan strategy but also question the very basis of its gamble. Economic incentives alone cannot override the social and entrenched realities of Afghanistan.