As global supply chains break down and climate shocks spread across borders, food systems have quietly become a key part of strategic planning. For Central Asia – a region historically known for its hydrocarbons, transit routes, and post-imperial balancing acts – the agricultural and food sector might seem minor. However, a closer examination reveals a region in transition, where agriculture is neither disappearing nor static, but going through a contested transformation. Whether this transformation results in resilience or regression will shape the region’s economic future.
Between 2020 and 2024, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GDP declined across all five Central Asian republics. However, the pattern of change masks as much as it reveals.
Kazakhstan, the region’s industrial leader, saw a drop in agriculture’s share from 5.4 percent to 3.9 percent. This decline reflects a steady shift toward energy, logistics, and digital services – signs of structural development. Despite this, Kazakhstan remains the region’s top wheat exporter, with 60 percent of its grain going to Uzbekistan, and the rest divided among Tajikistan (18 percent), Kyrgyzstan (14 percent), and Turkmenistan (6 percent). While its agricultural contribution to GDP decreased, its influence through food exports has increased.
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, experienced the most significant change – a 4.2 percentage-point fall from 22.5 percent to 18.3 percent, marking a 20 percent decline in agriculture’s share of GDP. This reflects a deliberate diversification approach, where agriculture is no longer the primary driver but rather part of a broader reform effort that emphasizes services, industry, and construction. Still, agriculture and food processing continue to employ about 25 percent of the workforce, indicating that diversification is a matter of evolution, not abandonment.
Kyrgyzstan’s situation is more complicated. The country reduced its agricultural share from 12.2 percent to 8.6 percent in just four years. On the surface, this might indicate sectoral change. However, it could also suggest stagnation – driven by ongoing water shortages, rural-urban migration, and limited government capacity. Without concurrent growth in high-value services or tech sectors, this decline risks becoming a hollowing out rather than a healthy rebalancing.
In Turkmenistan, the agricultural sector’s share slightly declined from 11.5 percent to 11.1 percent, resulting in a minor change to the overall structure. The government’s near-exclusive focus on natural gas and large public projects has left the agro-food system underdeveloped and marginalized. Services remain weak, while rural production operates with little policy support.
Tajikistan’s case is unique. Its share of agricultural GDP has remained almost unchanged, at 22.7 percent in 2020 and 22.5 percent in 2024. While this stability may seem reassuring, it actually highlights the country’s limited economic change. Agriculture leads, not because it is thriving, but because other sectors have not gained ground.
These trends reveal a broader truth: a falling agricultural share does not automatically signify economic progress. In some cases, it may signal strategic modernization, as in Uzbekistan. In others, it may indicate systemic neglect, as in Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan. And where no change occurs, as in Tajikistan, the risk is entrenchment – trapping a country into low productivity and climate vulnerability.
Agriculture’s strategic importance in Central Asia goes beyond just GDP share. The region has been facing a worsening water crisis, with irrigated land per person decreasing by over 25 percent in the past 15 years. Glaciers supplying the Syr Darya and Amu Darya are melting quickly, endangering more than 10 million hectares of farmland. At the same time, population growth and urbanization are increasing the need for food, water, and employment.
Despite these overlapping threats, regional food systems remain fragile. Most nations rely on imported fertilizer, food logistics are underdeveloped, and export opportunities are constrained by regulatory fragmentation and phytosanitary gaps. Additionally, job creation in the agrifood sector is primarily informal and low-wage, particularly for women, raising questions about whether it can support inclusive growth.
Innovation – often seen as a universal solution – remains largely driven by donors or limited to pilot projects. Technologies like precision agriculture, digital irrigation, and crop diversification are available, but scaling them up is rare. Without increased public investment and reforms in governance, innovation risks becoming just a buzzword rather than an effective answer.
If Central Asia is to build a resilient, inclusive, and adaptive economy, it must not retreat from agriculture – it must reimagine it. This means upgrading policy institutions to treat agrifood not as a residual rural concern but as a strategic system that links labor, trade, water, and climate adaptation. Agriculture ministries need to evolve into inter-ministerial platforms for agrifood governance, coordinating across various sectors, including transport, energy, environment, and education.
Rural capability also needs rebuilding. This includes vocational training, access to credit, land rights (especially women’s land rights), and rural infrastructure – from cold storage facilities to innovative irrigation systems. For example, Uzbekistan’s horticulture development project presents a promising case, featuring over $300 million in concessional loans, 34,500 permanent jobs (40 percent of which are held by women), and the revitalization of agribusinesses. These are not just statistics; they signal what is possible when agricultural reform is integrated into economic planning.
Finally, regional cooperation must go beyond rhetoric. Food security cannot be achieved solely within national borders. Shared seed banks, regional certification regimes, water diplomacy mechanisms, and joint investments in agrilogistics corridors are essential. As climate stress increases, Central Asia must develop what might be called “cooperative sovereignty” – not dependence but deliberate interdependence.
To sum up, the agrifood transition underway in Central Asia is not guaranteed to succeed. It could stall, become polarized, or unravel under the weight of climate shocks and institutional inertia. However, if the region can align reform, resilience, and regionalism, it may yet carve out a future in which food is not just sustenance or trade, but a strategic asset.
The farm may no longer be a dominant contributor to the GDP of Central Asian states, but in the coming decades, it may once again determine the stability of the state.