Myanmar’s post-coup civil war is now into its fifth year and regional geopolitics are playing a bigger role than ever in the success of the country’s pro-democracy movement. According to some estimates, the military now controls less than 30 percent of Myanmar’s territory and is struggling to retain what territory it still holds. The pro-democracy movement’s armed resistance, which includes the People’s Defense Forces (PDF) under the National Unity Government (NUG) and ethnic revolutionary organizations (EROs), continues to make territorial gains on balance, despite recent losses in northern Shan State and Mandalay Region.
The military plans to hold elections in December 2025 and January 2026, but pro-democracy forces will not accept what are expected to be fraudulent polls. Whatever the result, both political and armed resistance to the junta will continue.
However, Myanmar’s neighbors may endorse the SAC’s elections, hoping for a return to some form of stability for the country, and by extension, its immediate neighborhood. Myanmar’s two most regionally influential neighbors and geopolitical rivals, China and India, will likely accept the election results. However, the only common interest Beijing and Delhi share vis-à-vis Myanmar is for the country to return to political stability. Otherwise, their strategic interests in Myanmar diverge. China’s strategic goals, particularly the implementation of the China Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), may be best served by a military victory, as Beijing has a history of extracting mega-project deals from authoritarian regimes. On the other hand, India’s strategic interests, particularly Delhi’s goal of countering China’s growing regional influence, are best served by a democratic Myanmar. As such, there are strong reasons why Delhi could do more to support the pro-democracy movement.
China and India in Myanmar
China has made its position on the “spring revolution” clear. After giving tacit approval in late 2023 for the EROs under its influence to launch Operation 1027 in northern Myanmar, which resulted in significant losses for the military, Beijing has shifted its stance to fully supporting the regime. Beijing has since pressured EROs on the China-Myanmar border into ceasefires with the junta, which have included the return of the strategic city of Lashio, captured in Operation 1027, to the military. China has calculated that it is the junta that can best guarantee its strategic interests in Myanmar, especially the completion of the CMEC, which is designed to help resolve Beijing’s Malacca Dilemma while also projecting its maritime power into the Indian Ocean. A key element of the CMEC is Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, which adds to China’s “string of pearls,” a series of deep-sea ports with dual-use commercial and military capabilities designed to strategically encircle India in the Indian Ocean.
While China has been strategic and decisive, India, in contrast, appears to have no decipherable Myanmar policy. Delhi is several steps behind China in advancing its strategic interests, primarily the implementation of its Act East Policy aimed at countering Chinese influence in Myanmar and the wider region. Unlike China, India possesses neither influence nor leverage over either the junta or the EROs that are the key stakeholders in the pro-democracy movement.
India’s approach is a misguided imitation of China’s tactics: engagement with the military junta, including likely endorsement of the regime’s elections, hoping that a junta victory will bring stability to Myanmar. However, this may produce the opposite of India’s desired outcome, which is ultimately to counter Chinese influence. Instead, a military victory will likely increase Beijing’s power in Myanmar. It will guarantee the implementation of the CMEC, bringing a Chinese commercial and potential naval presence right into the Bay of Bengal.
In fact, there is no scenario in which the junta’s election will favor India over China.
For one thing, India cannot outcompete China in courting the junta. Beijing has long provided considerably more resources than Delhi to the Myanmar military. India also doesn’t have the leverage over EROs necessary to broker ceasefire deals, as China has done for the military. Even if the military junta miraculously emerges victorious against the pro-democracy forces, India simply cannot outdo China in pushing Naypyidaw to fulfill its strategic goals.
India would be laboring in vain, throwing its support behind the Myanmar military. The only viable solution for India to promote its strategic interests is to support the pro-democracy movement. But Delhi needs to be quick and decisive, and formulate an effective strategy.
Fortunately, several factors play in India’s favor. The Myanmar public’s resentment toward China remains high and may remain so after the military junta’s eventual demise. Delhi has the perfect opportunity to come in and win the hearts and minds of the Myanmar public, which is indispensable to building strong relations with a future democratic Myanmar, where public opinion will figure more prominently in foreign policy decisions.
Furthermore, resentment against China isn’t confined to the Myanmar public. Beijing continues to pressure EROs into ceasefires with the Myanmar armed forces. EROs along the China-Myanmar border, and elsewhere, are dissatisfied with China’s meddling and unwelcome “peace-brokering,” but depend on cross-border trade with China to survive and are susceptible to Chinese bullying. Provided with alternatives for trade and security, the EROs would welcome India as a partner.
It would be easy for India to ride the wave of anti-China sentiment and support the pro-democracy movement. The armed resistance forces in particular need assistance to reach a tipping point in the war against the Myanmar military. Delhi would find its support welcomed with open arms. India’s post-earthquake humanitarian assistance to the resistance was a step in the right direction, as was its invitation of the pro-democracy stakeholders to the Indian Council of World Affairs seminar in November 2024.
Options For India
Drastic measures are not necessary for India to support the pro-democracy forces. Delhi need not cease engagement with Naypyidaw. Nor does it need to end its diplomatic and consular presence in Myanmar. Engagement with the military regime can continue, albeit in a form that does not provide any substantial diplomatic, economic, or security benefits to the administration. Public declarations of support for the pro-democracy movement are not necessary either.
Instead, India can provide increased humanitarian, educational, and general non-lethal assistance to the pro-democracy movement, particularly to EROs operating along its borders. Cross-border humanitarian assistance should include building infrastructure such as schools, clinics, housing, and if possible, air-raid shelters. This would win goodwill and mitigate the influx of Myanmar refugees into India.
Educational assistance in the form of scholarships for Myanmar youth to study at India’s higher education establishments would provide the youth with a means of escape from the Myanmar military’s conscription. Additionally, it would enable India to tap into a wealth of information related to Myanmar and build generational ties by educating young, impressionable Myanmar people. Other non-lethal assistance options range from direct assistance to the EROs, in whatever form Delhi may feel comfortable, to promoting local media and organizations that report on China’s pro-junta activities and related rights abuses. The possibilities are endless.
Delhi is reportedly already engaging under the radar with the pro-democracy movement at some level. The engagement needs to be more comprehensive, encompassing diplomatic, economic, and defense channels at high levels. Quiet diplomacy, through strengthening Track 1.5 engagement with pro-democracy stakeholders present along Myanmar’s western range – including the Arakan Army, Chin groups, the NUG, and smaller groups based in Sagaing Region – would be effective. India’s key connectivity projects, including the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project and key segments of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway, are in territories now controlled by the western range groups. Defense dialogue can include former military men who have defected from the junta. Knowledgeable in military affairs, with an insight into the Tatmadaw as an institution, these men can provide valuable defense intelligence on the true state of the Tatmadaw – an important factor in India’s formulation of its strategic approach towards Myanmar. India can also set preconditions for providing further support to the resistance, including vetting resistance representatives to Delhi and requesting resistance troops’ participation in border area operations against drug-trafficking and other illicit activities.
All said, the question remains on what India can gain from supporting the pro-democracy movement, particularly in terms of a longer term guarantee on the advancement of its strategic interests in Myanmar if and when the military regime is removed from power. This will require dialogue with key stakeholders that includes a tabulation of compromises and gains from all the parties involved, detailed conversations on exactly how India can help the pro-democracy forces expedite victory against the junta, and what the resistance can realistically guarantee India in a future democratic Myanmar. India may be hesitant to throw its weight behind the pro-democracy forces, given its past experience of having supported the failed pro-democracy movement of 1988. However, the “spring revolution” involves a nationwide armed resistance that was not present in 1988, increasing the odds of winning against the military junta.
Underpinning all engagement and dialogue, of course, is trust. In the aftermath of the recent incident at Tamu, where resistance troops were reportedly killed by India’s Assam Rifles, Delhi needs to provide credible reassurances through demonstrations of good faith. The prevailing public sentiment regarding India is deep mistrust. However, gestures of goodwill and substantial support can go a long way. After all, Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement and public share a common goal with Delhi: keeping China at bay in Myanmar and the region.