Two of the most common buzzwords that are associated with U.S. President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy are “transactional” and “short-sighted.” Indeed, pundits and observers have long expressed strong discontent with Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy for lacking a focus on long-term goals, warning that its zero-sum mentality would effectively erode the United States’ long-standing reputation in the Indo-Pacific.
Now that the administration has been in office for over half a year, there are more concrete datapoints to discuss regarding Trump 2.0’s approach to the Indo-Pacific – and its strategic deficiencies.
One of the major blind spots of Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy lies in its priority focus on hard power measures. The Trump administration is not unique in viewing the region, and regional relationships, through a security-first lens; however, it has taken this historic limitation to a new extreme. As the United States views China as the principal threat and seeks to counterbalance against it accordingly, the Trump administration has sought to double down on its effort to pressure its allies to increase their defense spending so as to be able to better deter Beijing’s adventurism. While officials in Washington have long voiced an interest in working with allies and partners to counter China’s aggression in the Indo-Pacific, the Trump administration even went as far as to press allies into clarifying their security commitments if a conflict between the United States and China were to break out in the Taiwan Strait.
As far as geopolitical interests are concerned, these hard power measures are important for the United States in terms of gaining military advantages over China. The problem is that a heavy reliance on hard power measures is not enough to constitute a comprehensive and balanced Indo-Pacific strategy that can robustly embed the United States’ strategic presence within the region. Under Trump, there is a lack of focus on augmenting U.S. soft power in the region through the use of foreign aid, economic trade, and socio-cultural engagements. On the contrary, Trump has moved in the opposite direction by dismantling USAID, and he has yet to make concrete commitments on advancing the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Both of these are – or were – important tools to reinforce the United States’ diminishing soft power influence. Moreover, Trump’s punitive tariff policies on key allies and partners in the region are detrimental to the U.S. image, and thus the development of soft power in the region.
Soft power lies at the heart of diplomacy. It is one of the fundamental building blocks for establishing mutual understanding and trust, which are instrumental in facilitating progressive strategies in international affairs. As with hard power, enhancing soft power is key to safeguarding the United States’ security values and interests in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. is concentrating on bolstering its security presence in the region to counteract China’s revisionism, but the prudent use of economic and sociocultural engagement tools can potentially enable the U.S. to establish more positive relationships with important allies and partners. This would be necessary for Washington to gain more support for both existing and prospective security initiatives it wishes to pursue in the Indo-Pacific region.
Trump’s excessive focus on the hard power aspect of the Indo-Pacific may resonate with his domestic audiences, who are keen on the fulfillment of his “America First” agenda. Trump wants to ensure that the United States would retain military and geopolitical superiority in the region. However, this obsession with a hard power-based Indo-Pacific strategy, coupled with Trump’s forceful demands to pressure both allies and partners on security matters, mean that the U.S. is in fact leading a top-down style of containment strategy against China. It is difficult to see how Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy – which, thus far, is all stick and no carrot – would be warmly embraced by allies and partners. Most of them would obviously prefer to contribute to the peace and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific at their own pace rather than being pressed into service by the U.S. to constrain China.
What is most visibly lacking in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy is an understanding of the importance of multilateralism in securing U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. Notably, his administration has not promoted a principle-based approach to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP). Previous U.S. administrations emphasized the shared responsibility among regional stakeholders to collectively uphold the peace and prosperity of the region through a variety of means: reciprocal trade, environmental protection, ensuring freedom of sea lanes, and fostering good governance practices.
By contrast, the Trump administration has undermined existing institutional arrangements that are critical to U.S. security in the Indo-Pacific. Instead of deepening engagement with Australia on how best to deliver the strategic aims of AUKUS, he has subjected the important defense pact to a review. Experts have warned that scrapping AUKUS may significantly undercut the United States’ ability to deter China if a contingency in the Taiwan Strait breaks out.
Meanwhile, it has been pointed out that there is a considerable gap between the Quad’s goal to foster a free and open Indo-Pacific region and its current capacity to achieve it. Despite this, Trump has yet to outline a viable strategy with regards to the strategic progression of the Quad, and has actively undermined ties with India, one of the four Quad members.
Institutional initiatives such as the Quad and AUKUS are of significant strategic importance in securing the United States’ FOIP vision. In particular, these security initiatives serve as useful force multipliers for the U.S. to ensure that its soft and hard power is optimally projected across the Indo-Pacific region. Unfortunately, Trump has yet to make clear his strategy to further enhance these existing institutional arrangements as part of his broader Indo-Pacific strategy to counter China’s expanding influence in the region. Instead, he is apparently more interested in recalibrating existing ties with allies and partners to ensure that the America First principle is well reflected.
Another strategic deficiency in Trump’s Indo-Pacific strategy stems from his use of coercive and aggressive statecraft. From the imposition of economic tariffs to the unfriendly pressure on allies to increase their defense spending and commitments, Trump has effectively caused significant discomfort to the United States’ regional allies as well as partners. The cracks are starting to grow wider by the day.
For instance, Southeast Asian states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam are looking toward China to hedge against the unpredictability of Trump’s policies. Indonesia has become a full member of the BRICS while Malaysia and Vietnam have attained formal partner-country status and all three are eyeing opportunities for deeper engagement with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Meanwhile, it has been reported that Japan is resisting U.S. calls for creating a trade bloc to maximize economic pressures on Beijing out of concerns that it may compromise its economic ties with China, which remains Tokyo’s largest trading partner.
What most states and allies desire most is an effective U.S. counterweight to China’s influence and initiatives so that they would not be at Beijing’s mercy. In no way are they looking for aggressive trade blocs or security establishments that are meant to confront China and unnecessarily heighten Cold War-like tensions in the region. China is an increasingly important player in the region, which no state or even U.S. ally in the region could afford to alienate. Trump’s aggressive approach is unlikely to gain widespread support – and worse still, his coercive economic policies are driving some important partner states further into China’s embrace.
The U.S. may be the most powerful country in terms of military capability. But when it comes to counterbalancing against a formidable adversary such as China, which has in the past two decades achieved impressive feats of economic and military growth, Washington cannot afford to adopt a unilateralist approach toward Indo-Pacific security. It must proactively engage regional partners and allies so as to be able to build a strong and resilient strategic presence or risk becoming sidelined in the region.