Taliban’s Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi is expected to visit India soon. The dates of the possible visit are not confirmed yet. Once confirmed, India will need to ask the U.N. Security Council for approval.
The UNSC has sanctioned many Taliban leaders, including Muttaqi. The UNSC 1988 committee oversees measures such as arms embargoes, asset freezes, and travel bans against individuals and groups linked to the Taliban.
If Muttaqi’s visit goes ahead, it will mark a significant shift in India-Taliban relations, as this would be the first high-level political visit by a Taliban minister to India since the group’s seizure of Kabul in August 2021. New Delhi appears ready to move away from its historic anti-Taliban stance.
Since the beginning of 2025, India’s outreach to the Taliban has increased tremendously. It all began with Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s meeting with Muttaqi in Dubai on January 8, a meeting reportedly facilitated by the United Arab Emirates. India’s top diplomat S. Jaishankar held a telephonic conversation with Muttaqi in May, a few days after the India-Pakistan clash, marking another significant step in New Delhi-Taliban relations. Muttaqi’s visit to New Delhi would mark yet another significant shift in India’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Taliban.
India has long been been anti-Taliban. New Delhi was even against the Mujahideen in the 1980s, before the establishment of the Taliban in the 1990s. During the first period of Taliban rule from 1996 to 2001, India, along with Russia and Iran, supported the anti-Taliban United National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan, commonly known as the Northern Alliance. Thus, after the Taliban were dethroned by the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, India was among the first countries to extend its support to Afghanistan. From 2001 to 2021, India focused on fostering goodwill in the country through development projects and humanitarian assistance, along with rebuilding the country’s infrastructure.
After the Taliban takeover of Kabul four years ago, India seemed to be on the back foot. The fall of the Afghan Republic was deemed a major setback to India’s regional policy. However, India maintained its presence through humanitarian assistance in the country along with a technical team in its Kabul embassy since June 2022, before talks at the diplomatic level began. The Taliban were eager to engage with New Delhi, partly to end their isolation and play their role in the regional politics, and partly to end Pakistan’s influence and role in Afghanistan.
India’s growing closeness with the Taliban can be attributed to its regional geopolitical and geoeconomic interests. The Taliban were long considered a Pakistani asset. However, the reality hit Pakistan hard when the Taliban refused to rein in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has increased its attacks inside Pakistan since the Taliban regime’s seizure of power in Afghanistan. The patron-client relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan ceased to exist, which provided India an opportunity to ease its opposition to the Taliban. Meanwhile, Pakistan has also upgraded its relations with the Taliban, reportedly at the aegis of China, which is also a strong partner of the Taliban.
China and Pakistan have been providing a diplomatic and political boost to the Taliban. Last week, on August 20, during a trilateral meeting of the foreign ministers in Kabul, all parties reaffirmed their commitment with an agreement to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, which will make Afghanistan part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All sides said that the extension of CPEC into Afghanistan will connect it with regional markets. However, it also insinuates a deeper alliance among Beijing, Islamabad, and the Taliban.
This move could be alarming for India since it considers CPEC, which transits Pakistan-administered Kashmir, to be illegal. Thus, India has to increase its own engagement with the Taliban in response. Muttaqi’s anticipated visit to New Delhi would hold great significance not only for India and the Taliban, but also for the region.
Additionally, India needs access to Central Asian markets, which it currently has to an extremely limited extent through Pakistan. A vital option for India would be to link Afghanistan to Iran’s Chabahar port. India and Iran signed a 10-year contract to develop and operate the Chabahar port in May last year. During the meeting between Foreign Secretary Misri and Muttaqi in January this year, they discussed Afghanistan’s access to the Chabahar port. Thus, it is plausible that India and the Taliban agree to Afghanistan’s access to Iran’s port during Muttaqi’s anticipated visit to India. If it happens, the Taliban will have another major win and will be a step closer to ending their international isolation.
Besides these geopolitical and geoeconomic realities, India is also concerned with the security affairs pertaining to terrorism. India would like the Taliban to prevent attacks or threats to attack Indian soil emanating from Afghanistan. However, the Taliban’s commitment in this regard has been questionable, and there is no certainty that India would, in any way, convince the Taliban to take concrete steps against the terrorist groups such as al-Qaida in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which poses a threat to India. That said, the Taliban considers the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) a mortal enemy, so cooperation against this group and its affiliates could be possible.
Despite apprehensions, Taliban-India engagement underscores the reality of changing regional geopolitics, which are again centering on Afghanistan. In such a situation, keeping out of Afghanistan is tantamount to India closing its eyes to a reality that could hurt its national interests in the long run. Thus, India is gradually engaging with the Taliban.
The Taliban, meanwhile, long for greater recognition, and getting closer to India provides them with the diplomatic boost they need to stay in power without giving in to international pressure. If India gives Afghanistan access to the Chabahar port, it would be another victory for the Taliban regime, as it could provide relief for their economic woes. If New Delhi manages to get along well with the Taliban, it will mark a significant strategic realignment.