Taiwan is at a critical point in terms of its energy security: despite its global importance in semiconductor manufacturing, the island is highly vulnerable due to its heavy reliance on energy imports and centralized grid infrastructure. In short, Taiwan’s current energy set-up exposes it to significant risks, both from potential external coercion and from natural phenomena.
In this context, some have argued that Taiwan should resume production of nuclear energy to ensure a secure power supply. While the reactivation of nuclear power plants may provide a stable energy base, it carries unacceptable risks and offers limited strategic advantage in the face of Taiwan’s challenges. Instead, shifting to decentralized microgrids powered by diverse renewable energy sources and supported by a robust energy storage represents the most viable path to ensuring Taiwan’s energy security and national resilience.
It is important to understand that a robust and decentralized energy infrastructure constitutes a strategic deterrent for the country. If Taiwan is perceived as capable of withstanding a prolonged blockade due to its energy resilience, the perceived effectiveness of such a blockade as a coercive tool is diminished. This perception plays a crucial role in the cost-benefit analysis of initiating a conflict, as it turns energy resilience into a component of “asymmetric defense” and “deterrence by denial” – making Taiwan a harder target and increasing the risks for any potential aggressor.
The Energy Achilles’ Heel
Taiwan’s current energy landscape is defined by an overwhelming dependence on imports, with the island importing around 96 percent of its total energy supply. Fossil fuels dominate the electricity generation matrix, accounting for approximately 80 percent of the total electricity produced in 2024. Of this share, natural gas makes up 42.4 percent, while coal contributes 39.3 percent.
Taiwan holds a critical position as the world’s sixth-largest importer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), as of 2025. This heavy reliance is further exacerbated by a strategic energy reserve estimated to last only 11 to 14 days under normal consumption conditions. Such vulnerability exposes the island to sharp fluctuations in global energy prices, as seen in 2022 when fuel costs surged due to the war in Ukraine. In a scenario marked by geopolitical tension this energy dependency becomes Taiwan’s “Achilles’ heel,” posing an existential risk to the island’s security.
Defense and security experts have pointed out that a maritime blockade would likely be among the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s strategies in a conflict over Taiwan, directly targeting these supply lines and potentially crippling Taiwan’s energy infrastructure within weeks. Therefore, moving away from imported fossil fuels toward domestically sourced energy is not merely an environmental priority, but a matter of national security.
In addition, Taiwan’s historically centralized electrical grid presents another major challenge to its resilience. With power generation largely concentrated in the center and south and heavy consumption in the northern urban centers, the centralized transmission system creates vulnerable chokepoints. This means that isolated failures can rapidly cascade into widespread blackouts across the island, as demonstrated by incidents like the major “303 blackout” in 2022 which was triggered by an equipment malfunction at the Hsinta Power Plant in Kaohsiung, where a switchyard failure caused a sudden imbalance in the southern grid. That fault tripped an ultra‑high‑voltage substation, triggering cascading shutdowns that left over 5.5 million households without power island‑wide.
Distributed Resilience
A key shift in Taiwan’s path to energy resilience is the adoption of distributed power systems, particularly microgrids, as an alternative to centralized energy infrastructure. These systems integrate local power generation, battery energy storage, and smart controls, allowing for autonomous operation when disconnected from the main grid. Microgrids are designed to function modularly, with automatic and seamless “islanding” capabilities, enabling them to continue supplying electricity during disruptions.
Battery storage lies at the heart of this architecture, playing a vital role in stabilizing intermittent renewable inputs, absorbing excess energy, and redistributing it during peak demand. It also enhances system reliability during grid failures. The strategic benefits of combining decentralized energy with storage include not only greater efficiency, sustainability, and cost savings, but also critical backup capacity for essential infrastructure – such as hospitals, data centers, and military facilities.
The very features that protect against typhoons, such as distributed energy and islanding capabilities, are precisely those needed to withstand military threats, whether conventional, cyber, or electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attacks. This “dual-use” nature makes the microgrid strategy inherently robust and politically justifiable across multiple threat vectors. In this way, the energy transition is framed not only as an environmental initiative or disaster preparedness effort, but as an integral part of Taiwan’s broader national defense strategy.
Recognizing these advantages, Taiwan’s government has already pledged to invest NT$564.5 billion ($19.2 billion) in grid modernization, with emphasis on decentralization, energy storage, and system redundancy. These efforts have been shaped by previous crises, such as Typhoon Danas and major blackout events, which exposed vulnerabilities in the traditional grid model.
As part of its push toward a more resilient and flexible energy system, Taiwan is actively developing its battery storage infrastructure. The government has set a target of reaching around 590 megawatts (MW) of installed battery storage by 2025, combining efforts from both public initiatives and private sector investments. Although relatively small in scale compared to Taiwan’s overall electricity demand, this capacity would play a crucial role in managing fluctuations from renewable sources and ensuring backup power during emergencies.
Looking further ahead, Taiwan plans to expand its energy storage capacity significantly, aiming for up to 20 gigawatt-hours (GWh) by 2030. This long-term goal reflects the country’s commitment to integrating distributed storage into its broader strategy for energy security and national preparedness.
Complementing these developments is Taiwan’s considerable potential in renewable energy, particularly in solar and offshore wind. Geothermal energy also offers significant promise, though it remains largely untapped due to location constraints, regulatory complexity, and land use conflicts.
Considering the national needs, the government has set ambitious renewable energy targets: 20 percent renewables by 2025 (up from 5 percent in 2020), including 5.7 GW of offshore wind power and 20 GW of solar capacity by 2025. By the end of 2024, Taiwan’s total installed renewable energy capacity reached 21,067 MW, led by solar photovoltaic with 14,281 MW and wind energy with 3,905 MW.
Despite Taiwan’s remarkable potential and its ambitious goals, the rollout of solar and wind projects has so far fallen short of expectations. This is not a matter of technology or resources. Rather, issues such as corruption scandals and local opposition have hindered progress, and for Taiwan’s renewable-centered energy resilience strategy to succeed, these internal barriers must be addressed and overcome. This will require strong political will and effective public engagement.
What About Nuclear Energy?
Taiwan’s nuclear energy policy has been politically contentious for decades, culminating in the decommissioning of its last reactor in May 2025, as part of its ambition to become a “nuclear-free homeland.” However, the more vulnerable the population feels, the more divided public opinion has become regarding nuclear power in the country.
The 2011 Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan deeply impacted public perceptions of nuclear safety in Taiwan. In its aftermath, widespread protests broke out across the island, reflecting growing anxiety about the risks of nuclear power. By 2014, this rising public concern had translated into strong majority support for phasing out nuclear energy, leading the government to suspend work on the almost-finished Lungmen (Fourth) Nuclear Power Plant.
Another key factor contributing to public opposition is the historical mishandling of nuclear waste, particularly the storage of low-level waste on Orchid Island (Lanyu) without fully informing the indigenous Tao people. This event left a deep trauma and fostered structural distrust in government assurances regarding nuclear safety and waste management. As a result, reaching public consensus for reactivation is extremely difficult, regardless of technical arguments.
Amid the shutdown of nuclear facilities, the debate has resurfaced due to rising energy demand driven by the semiconductor and AI industries, blackout concerns, financial losses at Taipower due to fuel costs, and the broader global narrative of a “nuclear renaissance.” Pro-nuclear groups advocate for its stability and potential benefits to national security. However, even if nuclear energy were technically feasible or strategically appealing, the social cost and political capital required to overcome this deeply rooted distrust could prove prohibitive, diverting valuable resources and attention away from more effective resilience strategies.
Reactivating nuclear power plants in Taiwan would be a strategic miscalculation – one that both fails to address the nation’s core vulnerabilities and also introduces new, unacceptable risks that further compromise its resilience.
The Limits of Nuclear Energy
China’s “joint blockade campaign” is a central strategy of the PLA in a Taiwan contingency. This approach seeks to integrate military, cyber, space, and economic measures to isolate Taiwan and compel its surrender without the need for a full-scale invasion. A key component of this strategy is “network-centric coercion,” which aims to sever Taiwan’s connections with the outside world.
Closely related to a blockade is the possibility of a “quarantine,” a gray zone operation led by China’s coast guard and other law enforcement forces rather than the PLA. This type of operation offers China several strategic advantages: it is more politically reversible, not immediately considered an act of war, and could still compel foreign companies and governments to comply with their demands.
From an energy resilience standpoint, however, the differences between a blockade and a quarantine are subtle. A well-enforced quarantine could still heavily disrupt Taiwan’s access to international shipping routes, including those necessary for importing fuel, uranium, and maintenance components essential to nuclear power plants.
Simultaneously, the economic and logistical uncertainty caused by such operations would suppress industrial activity, which accounts for over 50 percent of Taiwan’s total power use, leading to a steep decline in overall energy demand. Under these reduced-demand conditions, existing coal plants, combined with an expanding portfolio of renewable energy sources, could sustain the island’s electricity needs for over a year. This directly challenges the argument that nuclear baseload energy would be “essential” for survival in such a situation.
Furthermore, one of China’s key strategic objectives in implementing a blockade or quarantine would be to avoid provoking a direct military response from the United States and its allies. To achieve this, China would aim to force the Taiwanese government to surrender – or at least lose its capacity to resist – as quickly as possible, ideally before any external intervention becomes feasible. If China can impose enough economic and logistical pressure on the island for a sustained period, it may either coerce Taiwan into negotiations or create favorable conditions for a full-scale invasion.
In this context, Taiwan’s ability to sustain itself energetically, especially through independent and resilient systems, becomes a critical deterrent. The longer Taiwan can endure without external support, the more time it buys for its defense forces to mobilize and for potential allies to intervene, undermining China’s initial objective of a swift and contained campaign.
Nuclear Energy as a Dangerous Liability in an Open Conflict
In the event of a military conflict, China may prioritize seizing control of Taiwan’s critical infrastructure – particularly its nuclear power plants – rather than destroying them outright. Direct strikes on these facilities could risk a catastrophic radiological disaster, rendering parts of the island uninhabitable. However, nuclear plants remain highly vulnerable in wartime. Even if not deliberately targeted, they can suffer collateral damage, accidental hits, or be used as strategic leverage during a struggle for control.
The case of Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, captured by Russian forces in March 2022, underscores this risk. Since its occupation, the site has faced repeated shelling and drone strikes, sparking global concern over nuclear safety. Similarly, Chinese military exercises have included simulated attacks on Taiwan’s energy infrastructure, suggesting that such facilities are seen as viable targets for disruption, if not total destruction.
The inherent risks of operating nuclear facilities in a seismically active, densely populated, and geopolitically volatile region are significantly magnified in wartime. During such periods, safety protocols may be compromised, and external power supplies may be disrupted. The possibility of a nuclear incident whether due to direct attack, collateral damage, or loss of control, is so catastrophic that it transforms nuclear energy into a dangerous liability in a warzone, regardless of China’s initial intentions. The risk-reward analysis for Taiwan strongly favors avoiding such a potential disaster. The consequences of even a minor failure are so severe that the risk becomes simply unacceptable.
Therefore, it becomes evident that the issue is not merely that nuclear power is unnecessary or dangerous in isolation, but rather that it fails to address the root causes of Taiwan’s energy vulnerability, and introduces new, uncontrollable risks in the process.
Charting a Truly Resilient Future for Taiwan
In light of the multiple challenges Taiwan faces, it is clear that energy resilience is a strategic imperative for national survival. In this context, the most realistic, secure, and effective solution does not lie in reactivating highly centralized and politically divisive nuclear power plants. Instead, it lies in building a decentralized energy system based on microgrids supported by energy storage. This approach enables the continuous, localized supply of electricity and dramatically reduces exploitable vulnerabilities for hostile actors.
Moreover, by being powered through renewable sources, these microgrids would enhance the island’s self-sufficiency, gradually eliminating its reliance on imported fossil fuels. The integration of battery storage ensures grid stability and reliability, transforming the intermittency of renewables into a strategic advantage.
Therefore, if Taiwan truly seeks to ensure its energy security, protect its population, and preserve its sovereignty in the face of current and future threats, the most coherent response would be to invest in decentralization, storage, and renewable energy. This is the architecture of a truly resilient future.