On August 5, 2024, as the clock struck noon, news spread rapidly that Bangladesh Army General Waker-Uz-Zaman was set to address the nation. Across the country, people sensed the bloody mass uprising that had been raging for over a month was about to reach its climax. Many believed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year-long autocratic rule was finally coming to an end.
Just moments later, Hasina resigned and fled the country, seeking refuge in India. By that time, protesters and ordinary citizens had already stormed state landmarks like the Prime Minister’s Office, Ganabhaban (the prime minister’s residence) and Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban (the national parliament building), engaging in widespread vandalism and destruction. Simultaneously, attacks on police stations broke out in Dhaka and across other regions.
The Road to an Uprising
The protests that summer originally focused on a single limited issue: reforms to the quota system in government jobs. But the brutality shown by law enforcement during the protests – allegedly under Hasina’s direct orders – sparked unprecedented public outrage. According to United Nations estimates, around 1,400 people were killed, while thousands were injured during the protests. From late July through early August 2024, calls mounted for Hasina to resign.
This was not Bangladesh’s first mass uprising. Since its independence in 1971, the country has experienced frequent political upheavals. But this was the first time in history that a sitting prime minister was forced to flee.
The last major uprising occurred in 1990, leading to the fall of military ruler Hussain Muhammad Ershad and a democratic transition. Within two decades, Bangladesh had made progress in consolidating democracy. However, in 2007-2008, another major disruption occurred known as the 1/11 period when an army-backed caretaker government took power. Both Hasina and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) leader Khaleda Zia were arrested, Zia’s son Tarique Rahman was exiled under a no-politics condition, and new political forces were introduced – but failed to gain traction.
Hasina and her Awami League (AL) returned to power in 2008 through elections under the caretaker government, raising hopes for democratic revival. Yet, over time, Hasina’s government systematically suppressed opposition, the media, civil society, and state institutions. Through legal amendments and the abolition of the caretaker government system in 2011, the AL ensured its dominance of the 2014, 2018, and 2024 elections.
Gradually, the country’s democratic space shrank. Dissent was silenced. Enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, politically motivated court cases, and corruption became normalized, often shielded by AL loyalists. While the government completed mega infrastructure projects, many came with heavy foreign debt.
Simultaneously, efforts intensified to idolize Hasina’s father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, one of the leading leaders of the 1971 Liberation War. Textbooks were rewritten to glorify Mujib while other historical figures were sidelined.
Overall, Hasina’s nearly 15-year reign was the longest and most entrenched authoritarian period Bangladesh has seen.
After Hasina’s fall, Bangladeshis hoped for deep reforms. On August 8, three days after Hasina fled the country, Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus was appointed to lead the interim government. Its mission was to implement urgent reforms and hold fair elections.
Yet, one year on, these promises remain largely unfulfilled. Rising lawlessness has raised doubts over whether the promised elections will be truly free and fair. Political tensions have resurfaced, especially between the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), while other Islamist groups are gaining ground. Women’s safety is also becoming a serious concern.
Although fear of state-sponsored oppression has eased, people still long for deep structural reforms.
A Nation Freed, But Not Yet Safe
Since Yunus took office, one of the biggest challenges his interim government has been facing is restoring law and order. Every passing week brings fresh headlines – murders in broad daylight, rape, robbery, mugging, and extortion.
In one recent incident in Old Dhaka, a businessman was beaten and crushed to death with bricks and stones over an extortion scheme. The brutality of the killing shocked the nation and signaled that crime is once again spinning out of control.
In January 2025 alone, 294 murder cases were filed, up sharply from 231 the previous January. In February, 300 murder cases were reported; in March, 316; and by June, the monthly total had reached 344. Robberies rose to 171 in January, compared to 114 a year earlier. Abduction cases have more than doubled.
Dhaka is among the worst-hit. Between August and November, the capital saw 379 murders, 65 kidnappings, and muggings. Business owners are being extorted openly. People are frightened, and many avoid going out after dark.
To tackle the growing unrest, the government launched Operation Devil Hunt, a joint force crackdown involving the Bangladesh Army, which is still ongoing. Over 10,000 people were arrested between February and July. However, the crime rate remains stubbornly high.
So what’s holding back the state?
Dr. Tawohidul Haque, associate professor and crime analyst at the Institute of Social Welfare and Research at the University of Dhaka, told The Diplomat in March 2025 that the police force is now viewed with public distrust. “They’re seen more as oppressors than protectors,” Haque said, adding that this perception has made many officers reluctant to act.
Internal tensions within the force have also deepened. After the fall of the AL, officers who were long sidelined for political reasons were promoted. But now they face pushback from juniors still loyal to the previous government. Local informant networks, critical for tracking criminals, have also collapsed.
“Even the criminals don’t fear the police anymore,” Haque said.
He believes part of the solution lies in better coordination between the police and judiciary – especially around bail decisions. “When courts release high-profile suspects without informing the police, it weakens law enforcement efforts,” he added.
Meanwhile, a disturbing rise in mob justice is creating fresh fears. The Hindu community, Bangladesh’s largest religious minority, has faced scattered attacks too since August 2024. However, the scale and intensity of these incidents do not match the exaggerated portrayals often circulated by India’s right-wing-leaning media. Still, the atmosphere remains tense, with concerns about whether the interim government can ensure the safety of all citizens equally.
Even though the authoritarian regime has ended, Bangladeshis continue to live in deep insecurity. The post-Hasina interim government has yet to restore law and order effectively. Many are now questioning: in such a climate, is it even possible to organize a free and fair election?
From United Uprising to Divided Politics
Before and during the uprising, nearly all major political parties in Bangladesh – aside from the AL itself – stood united against the authoritarian rule of Hasina. But following her ouster, that unity quickly started to fracture. A year on, competing interests and power struggles have returned to the forefront, as each group now seeks to expand its own influence in the post-Hasina landscape.
Although all parties currently support the interim government, they remain deeply divided over the proposed structural reforms introduced by the National Consensus Commission (NCC). These reforms – such as limiting prime ministerial terms, separating the roles of party leader and head of government, shifting to proportional representation, and forming a National Constitutional Council to oversee key appointments – have sparked contentious debates across the political spectrum.
The BNP, now the largest political force in the absence of the AL, has largely rejected the NCC’s key reform proposals, instead favoring a return to electoral politics without overhauling existing institutions. The BNP has consistently pushed for early national elections, initially agreeing to a mid-February 2026 date in a meeting between Tarique Rahman, the acting chairman of BNP and Yunus in London.
In contrast, JI and the newly formed National Citizen Party (NCP), which comprises student leaders of the July uprising, insist that justice must precede elections. They demand prosecution of those involved in the violent state crackdown during the uprising and a commitment to structural reforms before the nation goes to the polls. These parties have backed most of the NCC’s recommendations and have even called for a constitutional referendum and the formation of a constituent assembly, ideas the BNP opposes.
The divide over reforms also extends to how they should be implemented. The BNP prefers parliamentary procedures, while JI supports direct public referendums, and the NCP advocates for a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. These disagreements reveal a deeper philosophical clash over where democratic legitimacy should stem from in a post-Hasina Bangladesh.
Analysts suggest that the BNP’s reluctance stems from strategic calculations. Historically, JI has never contested national elections alone, and its calls for systemic change are often dismissed by centrist actors. The NCP, on the other hand, is increasingly seen as receiving state support, as evidenced by the tight security at its rallies and the interim government’s apparent responsiveness to its demands. This has led critics to label it a potential “king’s party.”
Tensions between the BNP and JI have escalated. Jamaat leaders have accused the BNP of extortion and corruption, while BNP supporters have branded JI as collaborators for their role in the 1971 war. These public exchanges have nearly led to confrontations on the streets, suggesting that the old alliance between the two is rapidly deteriorating.
Meanwhile, JI has moved to form a new coalition with other Islamist parties, including Islami Andolon Bangladesh and Bangladesh Khelafat Majlish and other islamist parties. The BNP’s absence from a massive gathering arranged by JI in Dhaka on July 19, where the NCP and other parties were present, further underscored the growing isolation of the BNP within the broader opposition landscape.
The situation became even more volatile when, during the NCP’s “Desh Gorte July Podojatra” (July March to Build the Nation) campaign, its procession was attacked in Gopalganj. In a rare move, members of the armed forces, police, and Border Guard Bangladesh reportedly opened fire on AL-affiliated assailants, killing four. NCP activists were then escorted out of the district in military armored vehicles.
The lack of post-mortem examinations for the deceased and their rushed burials sparked widespread condemnation and raised serious human rights concerns. For many, this was a grim reminder that even in a post-autocratic era, extrajudicial violence and state-sanctioned abuses remain possible.
With just months to go before the proposed February election, the lack of political consensus risks plunging the country back into chaos. If the opposition fails to reconcile its differences and agree on a common reform roadmap, the dream of democratic transformation born from the July Uprising may be lost to renewed polarization, elite dominance, and public disillusionment.
Women Fought, Men Rule
During the uprising, women were on the frontlines. They organized protests, shared resistance stories on social media, and even faced bullets alongside their male peers. For many, it was a rare moment of empowerment. The country watched in awe as mothers brought food to students, young women led processions, and an entire generation demanded both democracy and equality.
But a year on, those promises ring hollow.
Not only has gender-based violence sharply increased, but women remain politically sidelined. The reserved seats in Parliament, originally intended to ensure representation, now serve as a token gesture. Most political parties agree on reserving 100 seats for women in the upcoming national election. However, there is disagreement over how these seats should be filled – Although the BNP and some parties favor the current nomination-based system rather than direct polls to fill women’s seats.
That means women must rely on party nominations for reserved slots, reinforcing the idea that women belong in politics only when handpicked by male leaders.
Even in the ongoing national consensus dialogues, where parties debate electoral reforms and the future of governance, women are barely present. Out of dozens of delegates, only a handful are women – and none hold central negotiating power. This exclusion is not a coincidence, but a reflection of how deep-rooted patriarchy still controls decision-making in Bangladesh.
Meanwhile, attempts at reform have faced fierce pushback. Earlier this year, the National Women’s Commission proposed legal amendments to expand protections for survivors of domestic and sexual violence. But within days, Islamist groups staged protests, calling the proposals “anti-Islamic” and “Western propaganda.” Under pressure, the interim administration quietly shelved the proposal, signaling that the fear of offending religious hardliners still outweighs the political will to defend women’s rights.
Statistically, the situation is worsening. A total of 441 rape cases were reported in just the first half of 2025, already surpassing the total number for all of 2024. Incidents such as mob lynching of women for wearing Western clothing or on allegations of prostitution have also occurred in several places inside the country.
What began as a hopeful chapter for women during the uprising has now become a cautionary tale. Bangladesh may have ousted its autocratic regime, but its patriarchal structure remains intact, and women’s voices have been silenced once again.
Is Freedom of Speech Truly Free?
Although the initial protests in July began over the discriminatory quota system in government jobs, it did not take long for the movement to escalate into a full-fledged anti-government uprising. Two key reasons drove this transformation. First, the state’s violent crackdown – especially the killing of protesters by law enforcement – outraged the public. Second, pent-up frustration from the past 15 years, during which citizens were denied a fair election since 2008, finally exploded.
Under the AL’s prolonged rule, freedom of speech gradually eroded. From opposition leaders to ordinary citizens, anyone who dared to criticize the government faced harassment, arrest, or digital surveillance. The Digital Security Act 2018 was widely used to silence dissent, creating an atmosphere of fear.
However, following the fall of Hasina in August 2024, some changes began to emerge. People started speaking more openly against the government without the immediate threat of state retaliation. The notorious cyber laws were no longer weaponized as before. Critics of the interim leadership and independent media found more space to operate.
That said, the promise of free expression is far from universally fulfilled. Questions are now being raised about the freedom of speech of AL supporters, many of whom claim they are being targeted or silenced. Moreover, the recent incident in Gopalganj raised serious concerns as four people were reportedly killed, and their bodies were buried without any autopsy.
Such incidents suggest that while Bangladesh has taken significant steps forward since the collapse of Hasina’s regime, true nationwide freedom of speech and accountability remain elusive. The road to democratic recovery is evidently still under construction.