Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi arrived in the Maldives on July 25 for a two-day state visit to the archipelago, during which he attended the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the island nation’s independence from Britain in 1965. The state visit, the first to be hosted by the Maldives’ incumbent President Mohamed Muizzu since his election in 2023, came at a significant juncture in the trajectory of their bilateral relations and the regional dynamics of South Asia, in general. This was Modi’s first state visit within South Asia since the terrorist attack in Pahalgam pushed India and Pakistan into a conflict.
Muizzu greeted Modi on his arrival at the airport. The leaders witnessed a military parade and cultural performances to mark the occasion. During their joint press briefing, they underlined strategic cooperation in the Indian Ocean region and addressed shared concerns on climate change and diasporic linkages. Burnishing their defense ties, Modi inaugurated the new building housing the Maldivian Defense Ministry, constructed with Indian financial assistance. India also offered a concession on debt servicing, besides extending a new credit line worth $565 million.
The visit holds special significance as it came after the signing of a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Arrangement between the United Kingdom and India. By juxtaposing the progress in its bilateral ties with Britain with the reaffirmation of its proximity with the Maldives, India has brought its Neighborhood First strategy closer to the Link West strategy.
Enduring Proximity Through Historical Currents
India and the Maldives have historically enjoyed cordial relations. India was one of the first countries to extend diplomatic recognition to the Maldives after it secured its independence from Britain; by 1976, both countries had concluded an enduring maritime border agreement, which settled the dispute around the control of the Minicoy Island. The Ibrahim Nasir-led nation-state became a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 1976.
In the 1980s, India-Maldives cooperation mushroomed under the ambit of the Colombo Plan and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The dispatch of Indian troops to quell a coup d’état against President Gayoom in 1988 invigorated bilateral ties, adding new verticals of security and defense and elevating their ties to what Gayoom’s foreign minister described as a “model friendship.”
India supported the Maldives’ transition to multiparty electoral democracy in 2008, but since then, its engagement has become increasingly entangled in the web of political expediency and ideological divides. In asymmetric bilateral relationships, it is not unusual for the larger power to be subject to intense scrutiny and shifting perceptions. However, Malé’s domestic political dynamics have exaggerated this tendency, producing an extraordinary oscillation in the perception of India – ranging from the embrace of an “India First” policy under leaders like Mohamed Nasheed and Ibrahim Solih to the assertive “pro-China” tilt seen during Abdulla Yameen’s presidency.
Mutual Interests, Strategic Continuity
Modi’s visit reinforced the recalibration of India-Maldives ties, which had turned frosty after Muizzu’s election on an “India Out” platform. The trend was already well underway; Muizzu was present at the swearing-in of the third Modi Cabinet in 2024 and then made a state visit to India in October. The reset offers lessons in pragmatist, interest-driven foreign policy. India’s position in this calculus is favorable on at least three counts.
First, India has established itself as the first responder to crises in the Maldives. In 2004, India’s Navy launched Operation Castor immediately after the tsunami: three vessels and rescue helicopters, loaded with food, medical supplies, and water, were dispatched to the Maldives, in addition to disbursing $2.4 million in budgetary assistance. A decade later, Malé’s water crisis prompted Indian support. During its financial crisis, the Maldives has benefited from a $760 million currency swap arrangement with India, as well as a roll-over of a $50 million treasury bill.
Second, India continues to be one of the biggest development partners in the Maldives, having contributed to healthcare, social infrastructure, and connectivity since the beginning of relations. India invested $80 million in land reclamation and shore protection around Addu and inaugurated the Addu City Hankede in 2024. The flagship Greater Malé Connectivity Project – a 6.74 km bridge and causeway network linking the capital to three islands – is the largest infrastructure project in the country’s history, financed under Indian soft credit. Over the years, India has invested in High Impact Community Development Projects (HICDPs), emphasizing decentralization of development and empowerment of the atolls, focusing on mental health, sports, and sustainable power generation.
Third, the two countries’ geographical proximity underpins maritime interdependence. As highlighted by Muizzu, India is the Maldives’ closest neighbor. Separated by just 400 nautical miles, the Maldives is crucial to India’s Neighborhood First strategy and MAHASAGAR vision. The archipelago sits astride critical sea lanes of communication in the Western and Central Indian Ocean, through which 80 percent of India’s energy imports transit. Synergistic defense cooperation is paramount for maritime domain awareness, coastal mapping, anti-piracy activities, and surveillance.
Need for Pragmatism: Maldives’ Multi-Alignment
Although Modi’s visit burnished the partnership, caution and diplomatic patience are still the order of the day. Muizzu’s electoral rhetoric and the “India Out” campaign now seem distant, but it would be premature to interpret the warmth in bilateral ties in the same vein as Solih’s “India First” strategy.
Rather, Maldivian voices have repeatedly underscored that their foreign policy will be guided by a “Maldives First” strategy. Malé recognizes the potential and importance of its ties with India but has not – and will not – hesitate to widen its diplomatic heft by reaching out to a myriad of partners, including those with whom New Delhi does not concur on regional affairs.
Muizzu began his presidency with a rupture in diplomatic tradition: instead of choosing New Delhi for his first state visit, Muizzu eyed the Middle East, introducing a new sphere of interest for Maldivian foreign policy. Muizzu visited Ankara in November 2023, securing guarantees on investment, acquiring drones, and paving the way for preferential trade by concluding a trade and economic cooperation agreement.
In addition, he has thrice visited Saudi Arabia – to perform the hajj and umrah, and to attend the Arab-Islamic Summit on Gaza. The Saudi Fund for Development has financed the upgrade of the Velena Airport through concessional lending worth $217 million. The ambitious Maldives International Finance Centre is being financed by a Dubai-based, Qatari-owned investment fund.
An abiding theme of Muizzu’s foreign policy is the emphasis on the country’s Islamic identity. The Maldives shot into the global spotlight for banning Israeli tourists and backing South Africa’s appeal against Israel at the International Court of Justice, alleging genocide in Gaza.
The logic behind this is clear: Muizzu’s electoral fortunes correlate with the remit of Islamist politics in the country. Thus, his foreign policy highlights the Maldives’ reinvigorated role as a republic with an Islamic ethos in the international community.
Muizzu’s visit to Malaysia was rich in symbolism as the president invoked shared Islamic heritage. His engagement with the Maldivian diaspora replicates domestic repertoires of Islamic piety, which will inevitably drive Malé closer to member-states in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.
Simultaneously, while Muizzu has carefully distanced himself from Yameen’s overt pro-China tilt, the allure of Chinese development finance is unlikely to fade soon. The Maldives owes over $1.4 billion to Chinese lenders. The Sinamalé Bridge remains a flagship of Chinese development finance in the country. China’s ocean research vessel was granted permission to dock in Maldivian ports in 2024; both countries signed an agreement on Chinese military assistance during the summit between Muizzu and Jinping.
Modi’s visit, thus, will not rupture the Maldives’ ties with other partners. But it will burnish the India-Maldives bilateral relationship, especially if the momentum is carried forward.
The conclusion of an agreement on fisheries emphasizes the shared opportunities in the blue economy. It is important for Malé and New Delhi to elevate the importance of the regional security architecture and its instruments, including the Colombo Security Conclave, in which the Maldives did not participate in 2023, deteriorating ties with India.
India, having met 70 percent of the training needs of the Maldivian National Defense Force, must continue its capacity-building initiatives and increase their stakes: in addition to just providing surveillance and radar capabilities, for instance, India must empower Maldivian technology by sharing best practices. India-Maldives concerns must also encompass frontier technologies, especially in disaster prevention and mapping, and cybersecurity.
Maldivian polity is delicately poised: the Muizzu regime has proposed sweeping electoral reforms, including the potential dismantling of atoll councils. These changes make a national referendum imminent, likely intensifying domestic polarization. In this fledgling landscape, India must exercise continuity, restraint, and strategic patience to avoid being drawn into Malé’s internal political churn. By meeting with the cross-party Maldives–India Friendship Group, the Indian prime minister signaled that India will continue to seek bipartisan support for the relationship.
In a nutshell, pragmatism must underpin India’s Maldives policy – one that safeguards long-term interests without compromising democratic sensibilities or inviting unnecessary entanglement.